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The Anthropocene, the geological epoch where human activity is visible in 
geologic strata, is often framed with a coming-of-age story: Society must use its new 
knowledge about earth systems to play an active role in earth stewardship.  In some 
versions, this extends to taking responsibility for designing or managing ecological 
processes.  However, designing or managing ecosystems increasingly involves using 
emerging technologies for environmental modification that may require specialist 
expertise or high capital, provoking questions of who has the ability to choose, use, or 
design these technologies.  This dissertation explores four “ecotechnical imaginaries” on 
varying scales: (1) “negative emissions technologies” such as bioenergy with carbon 
capture, which are included in climate models; (2) the “blue revolution”, or new forms of 
ocean-based food and energy production; (3) restoration or management of California’s 
Salton Sea; and (4) solar geoengineering in the Arctic.   
 
The key question addressed in this dissertation is: By what means or processes 
can citizens have more agency in intentional environment-making?  Fifty-five extended 
interviews were conducted, primarily in Finnish Lapland and California’s Imperial 
Valley, to explore citizen and stakeholder perceptions of opportunities for public 
participation in environmental decisions and design.   
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From looking at these four imaginaries together, three major themes emerge.  
First, public engagement with environmental futures often takes the form of rationally 
selecting between ready-made options. This “selectability” fits with familiar forms of 
participation in contemporary life, such as shopping, clicking, and representative 
democracy.  Agency construed as an ability to choose is a very limited form of agency, 
and actors are generally constrained from shaping environmental technologies 
themselves.  However, civil society actors do work on generating compelling narratives 
and metrics to improve the selectability of particular futures. Following on work by STS 
scholars, sociologists, anthropologists and human geographers, who have observed that 
anticipations of the future are made through practices of quantifying, performing, and 
imagining, I trace how selectable environmental futures are produced by multiple actors 
through mutually constitutive combinations of metrics and narrative in these four 
imaginaries. 
 
When citizens are able to shape which options are selectable, there is greater room 
for other important processes of ecological future-shaping, such as making and taking 
responsibility.  The second key theme involves how the narrative of responsibility in the 
Anthropocene should be modified to deal with entanglements like burden and agency, 
and to emphasize response.  Selection between futures in a moment of decision cultivates 
a type of one-off responsibility that curbs agency in the long run.  I join other sociologists 
of the Anthropocene in calling for a continual notion of responsibility, which focuses on 
responsibility as not a moment of taking the right decision among predetermined options, 
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but as responsibility as a continual process of care and maintenance that recognizes labor 
and agency. 
 
 The third major theme is that the imaginaries are serving purposes other than their 
stated purpose.  In this case, rather than deploy climate engineering, restore the Salton 
Sea, or harness ocean life and energy, the work done by these ecotechnical imaginaries 
serves other ends besides material transformation: legitimating business as usual or states, 
performing responsibility without taking it, haunting the climate policy discussion and 
strengthening the case for other climate pathways, providing jobs for professional 
calculators, and creating speculative investment in the moment, among others.  Social 
science that looks at imaginaries across scales can help illustrate the work these 
imaginaries do, which can help citizens shape them towards different ends.  The 
conclusion argues that the selectable and calculable nature of these ecotechnical 
imaginaries belies the fact that certain disciplines have more privilege in constructing the 
future, and that an interdisciplinary field of “future studies” grounded in empirical work 
from fields like sociology, anthropology, and human geography is much needed to better 
make and take continual responsibility for ecological flourishing. 
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Introduction 
 
 
1. Research questions and rationale 
 
The Anthropocene, an epoch defined by human activity in the geologic record, is 
seen by some as a moment where humans have entered responsibility for nature.  As 
Bruno Latour writes, modern people thought "the future was one of greater and greater 
detachment from all sorts of contingencies and cumbersome ties. Free at last!" Yet with 
our attachments to the biosphere becoming explicit, we now face "the weaving of careful 
attachments with an ever greater and greater list of explicitated beings ... Attached at last! 
Dependent! Responsible! " (2007: 3).  
 
Now that humans are self-aware about the Anthropocene, global society may 
decide to move to a more sustainable pathway, suggest some earth system scientists. "We 
are the first generation with the knowledge of how our activities influence the Earth 
System, and thus the first generation with the power and the responsibility to change our 
relationship with the planet," write Steffen et al (2011)— notably, the responsibility here 
is to change a relationship, implying social change.  This responsibility for social change 
derives, at least in part, from the new scientific knowledge, not simply from a moral 
source.  Given what is known, directing the future towards a kind of planetary 
stewardship is no longer a mere possibility, but an imperative.  On the other hand, post-
Cartesian social science critics often express skepticism about this need for design— and 
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about the whole Anthropocene narrative.  It has instrumentalist tendencies, and it folds 
everyone together, obscuring inequality and the environment-shaping done by capital 
(Malm and Hornborg, 2014; Moore, 2014). Meanwhile, other social scientists — such as 
myself — are intrigued by the idea and what responsibilities it could open up, even while 
recognizing the limitations. 
 
The Anthropocene as blurring, time-warping, dramatic rupture of a "thought-
event" (Colebrook, 2013) is riddled with questions of agency.  Capacity for directing 
social (environmental) change is up for dispute. Latour exclaims that "Suddenly, agency 
and historicity are in the glacier!" Ironically, agency in terms of intentional individual 
action on global situations, such as climate change, is stripped away or made irrelevant at 
the very time “we” are realizing geologic agency.  Shaping the sort of Anthropocene we 
are in is possible, I argue, through making and taking of collective responsibility and 
agency — but the ability to engage in these collective processes is not a given.  Rather, it 
is constrained by social structures, vested interests, and inherent scalar tensions, as these 
chapters illustrate. 
 
My thinking in this dissertation is broadly aligned with Robbins and Moore, who 
suggest an all-of-the-above approach to the question of agency, writing that novel 
Anthropocene ecologies are "simultaneously 1) gardens of our own crafting albeit, in the 
words of Emma Marris, wholly unruly and rambunctious ones, 2) monsters born of our 
tinkering albeit, in the words of Bruno Latour, ones deserving of our love, and 3) as sites 
of struggle, albeit in the words of Neil Smith, ones of production and accumulation." 
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(2013: 12).   That is, modified or engineered landscapes are all of these things at once, 
and I look at how citizens are addressing landscapes, climates, and even oceans as 
gardens, monsters, and sites of struggle. 
 
Because so much of the emergent capacity to shape environments faster, more 
dramatically, and with different labor inputs than ever before relies on new technologies, 
this dissertation considers agency in ecological modification through the language of 
“emerging technologies”, while simultaneously pointing out that the focus on 
“technologies” has its limitations. In this dissertation, I explore ecological sociotechnical 
imaginaries related to climate engineering, lake restoration, and ocean management.  
Many of these are better construed as practices rather than technologies or artifacts.  But 
while the technics are available, the social, cultural, and political ability to take on new 
responsible and responsive roles or practices is less certain. 
 
A major premise of this work is: If we are indeed at a unique moment of 
responsibility and caretaking, we need to understand much more about the social aspects 
of building future environments.  Failing to do can result most mildly in unrealized, 
ineffective, or failed designs, and more gravely in the use of environmental technologies 
that are blind to environmental justice and exacerbate harms to people. 
 
Hence, the key question in this dissertation is: By what means or processes can 
citizens have more agency in intentional environment-making? Citizens can (1) 
participate in developing the technologies that enable environment-making, or (2) 
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directly participate in the selection process between different futures through formal 
deliberative processes.  Opportunities for these two forms of participation, however, are 
often limited, and the examples in this dissertation showcase several limiting factors.  I 
explain that there is a third important avenue for citizen participation in environmental 
future-making: to participate in generating compelling narratives or metrics to make 
particular futures “selectable”, i.e. to do storytelling work to influence which options get 
on the table.   
 
These five chapters share a similar storyline:  the Anthropocene is characterized 
by a technocratic, or top-down, or metrics-heavy vision of future environmental action, 
and also a bottom-up or participatory alternative (which is typically conducive to or 
promotional of procedural and recognitive environmental justice).  The tension between 
these two visions is not just one found in environmental governance literature in the wake 
of neoliberalism, or in science and technology studies — foundational threads of this 
binary, such as rationality or calculability, have been a central theme in sociology 
through the Frankfurt School back to the days of Weber and Simmel.  The idea in this 
dissertation, however, is expressly not to simply set up and recite a familiar and formulaic 
binary in several different contexts.  Neither do I want to absolutely privilege the bottom-
up over the technocratic.  While my sympathies lie in some regards with Thomas’s 
“futurology from below” (2015), even “below” publics and citizens are constructed.  
Arguments that some of the ecological challenges we face could be better managed by 
experts or technocrats are also considered.  
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Instead, I explore: In which ways do these formalized or bureaucratic or rational 
visions and structures interact with human beings or grassroots organizations — or even 
lively nonhumans or climates?  Where are those interactions surprising or productive, and 
where do they run aground?  I explore this through four examples of ecological 
sociotechnical imaginaries: the engineered landscape of California’s Salton Sea, 
imaginaries of solar geoengineering, the idea of the “Blue Revolution” in ocean 
commodity production, and the rise of “negative emissions technologies” in climate 
models.  Each of the chapters weaves in new insights about these different “ecotechnical 
imaginaries”, and the selection process between them.    
 
Below this inquiry, at a foundational level, are sub-questions: How are 
expectations of the future made, and how do futures become “selectable”?  What actors 
are driving some imaginations and possibilities and precluding others?  How might these 
particular imaginaries shape Anthropocene ecologies in specific places?  I argue that 
“selectable” environmental futures are produced through combinations of metrics and 
narrative.  This follows on work by STS scholars, sociologists, anthropologists and 
human geographers who have observed that anticipations of the future are made through, 
as Anderson observes, practices of performing, calculating, and imagining (Anderson, 
2010).  I focus on the interplay of calculation and narrative, and in particular, the notion 
of “options” and option-making.   
 
This dissertation works with several big concepts: agency, responsibility, 
participation, selectability, citizenship, environmental justice, design, scale, metrics, 
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narrative, and umbrella categories of “emerging technologies.”  They are not all treated 
with equal attention.  In general, the concepts which relate most closely to environmental 
sociology are given more weight, and concepts from neighboring fields like geography 
(scale, landscape), science and technology studies (emerging technologies), design, or the 
humanities (narrative) are given somewhat less attention than agency, collective 
responsibility, and participation.  This disciplines the dissertation in a way that I hope is 
helpful.  The choice of emphasis is not because these concepts are more important than 
the others; rather, it is a matter of audience and contributing to specific sub-fields.  In the 
following section, I contextualize the contributions of this dissertation within the specific 
bodies of literature it is in conversation with, introducing some distinct concepts from the 
literature that will be used as flexible tools throughout the dissertation.  The third section 
reflects on the methods used, and the fourth section introduces the five chapters by means 
of explaining what insights they bring to the research questions. 
 
 
 
2. Contributions of this dissertation to scholarly literature 
 
Social science on climate engineering 
 
This dissertation makes specific contributions to two bodies of literature, and 
draws from and is in conversation with a third.   
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The most specific contribution of this work is to the social science literature on 
climate engineering.  It joins the empirical social science literature — a small body of 
sociological work which is often conflated with the larger climate engineering 
governance literature.  Much literature on climate engineering governance is implicitly or 
explicitly based upon the image of the self-interested rational actor, which appears as a 
specific kind of citizen (e.g Barrett, 2014; Victor, 2008; Bodansky, 2013; see review by 
Harding and Moreno-Cruz, 2016).  Moreover, even the empirical work on climate 
engineering often asks respondents to compare the technologies as essentialized artifacts 
without any social context — a legacy perhaps of the foundational 2009 report on climate 
engineering by the UK’s Royal Society, which set out a taxonomy of climate engineering 
methods and attempted to comparatively assess them.  Much of the literature on climate 
engineering governance is speculative and not based upon empirical research; of the 
empirical social science research that exists (about 30 studies), around half use 
deliberative methods (Burns et al, 2016)1.  Only one other study (Carr, 2015) uses semi-
structured interviews.  I argue that qualitative and deliberative methods potentially have a 
lot more to contribute to how climate engineering is conceptualized, researched, and 
governed than the present body of literature indicates.  This is not a novel suggestion —																																																								
1 About fifteen deliberative studies have been done with regards to solar geoengineering in the last 8 years; 
see Bellamy and Lezaun (2015) for an excellent review.  They have characterized these deliberative 
investigations into two "waves."  The first wave was encompassed in the 2010 Experiment Earth? 
dialogue, which formed geoengineering as a discrete object of deliberation.  A second wave of public 
engagements aimed to "unframe" geoengineering: to unsettle assumptions, and allow for a diversity of 
approaches and framings of climate engineering to avoid "locking in" geoengineering as a concept— as 
Bellamy and Lezaun explain, this was a “a deliberate response to the perceived role that public 
engagement was beginning to play in reifying geoengineering as a tangible technological future" 
(2015).  Strategies for “unframing” included asking respondents to consider geoengineering alongside 
mitigation and adaptation, or other broader considerations about climate and social and political systems 
(Bellamy et al, 2014, Macnaghten and Szerszynski, 2013).  The method of semi-structured interviews 
used in chapter five allowed respondents to essentially unframe geoengineering themselves, by allowing 
respondents to guide the conversations along the lines of other preferred strategies for coping with or 
combatting climate change.  
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 others have called for more deliberative social science research or upstream public 
engagement (Carr et al, 2014; Burns and Flegal, 2015; Burns et al, 2016).  However, this 
work is another attempt to fulfill that call in practice.   
 
Three of the chapters in this dissertation bring new insights to this small but 
growing body of literature.  The first chapter reviews the social science literature on 
negative emissions and calls for existing work on biofuels, afforestation, CCS, and 
energy transitions to be applied to the topic: this is not a particularly radical argument, 
but it was the first review of the social science on carbon removal technologies.  The 
fourth chapter looks at negative emissions in a particular context, as embedded in a 
landscape, which was a new thought-experiment in imagining particular ways 
ecotechnical imaginaries may manifest  — it builds on the first chapter to highlight issues 
around environmental justice and participation through a concrete case.    
 
Both chapters four and five explore on the relationship between place and 
perceptions of climate engineering, which no other studies have looked at.  This focus 
encourages exploring the social context in which climate engineering might be used. 
Chapter five is a genuine addition to the literature in two ways: it is the first work to 
explore how place is related to perceptions of solar geoengineering, and it brings up the 
issue of how citizens perceive geoengineering differently than state or other elite interests 
do.   In sum, the three chapters in this dissertation help fill gaps in the climate 
engineering literature related to the social context in which climate engineering might be 
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used, how citizen views can diverge from expert or elite views, and how these global 
imaginaries are seen through local lenses.  
 
 
Sociology of the Anthropocene 
 
This dissertation’s second contribution is to the growing interdisciplinary body of 
literature on the Anthropocene, a concept which has intrigued human-nature geographers, 
anthropologists, earth system scientists, political theorists, humanities scholars, and also 
sociologists.  As Lorimer describes it, the Anthropocene is “a wider intellectual event: a 
flurry of activity with far-reaching ontological, epistemic, political and aesthetic 
consequences”; this event-space has been termed the “Anthropo-scene,” and it serves as 
both a boundary object and “charismatic meta-category” (2017: 118).2  This wave of 
interest has produced a crop of new titles on how to make sense of, inhabit, or shorten 
this epoch (Haraway, 2016; Tsing, 2015; Alaimo. 2016).  The concept has also garnered 
popular attention (see titles by Vince, 2014; Ackerman, 2015; Biello, 2016; Grinspoon, 
2016): as Lorimer notes, it has “captured an intellectual zeitgeist, providing a plastic and 
catchy label for a common curiosity and anxiety about the state and future of Earth after 
the ‘end of Nature’” (2017: 121). 
 
In this dissertation, I am broadly interested in social questions of design.  There 
are many vocabularies for discussing the role of design — with regards to 																																																								
2 Lorimer’s 2017 review in Social Studies of Science, “The Anthropo-scene: A guide for the perplexed”, is 
a helpful review which puts forth a typology of five ways the concept has been mobilized: as scientific 
question, intellectual zeitgeist, ideological provocation, new ontologies and science fiction. 
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geoengineering, we have seen a shift from climate engineering to climate intervention.  
However, I prefer design over engineering or intervention because I believe it is more 
aspirational than engineering, more personal than intervention, and more adaptive than 
planning.  As Ross et al write, in terms of ecosystem design,  
 
Design is the broader plan where goals are set, actions are taken to achieve 
goals, and failures and success are studied and incorporated into the next 
iteration. In this framework, architecture is design and construction is 
management; in essence, design is strategy and management is tactics. As 
such, we consider adaptive management and related approaches as design 
processes. (2015) 
 
 In this view, design encompasses a visioning process, and that is what the 
chapters of this dissertation are interested in: whose visions for future environments are 
on the table, and how are they executed?  Part of this discussion involves questions of 
expertise, and here I draw from Appadurai’s comments on design in social worlds.  
Appadurai notes that “Most ordinary people do not experience their social worlds as 
either planned or designed.  They experience these worlds as given, as external to them, 
as relatively fixed, and as largely indifferent to their own preferences or desires” (2013: 
253).  Yet daily life is produced through effort, imagination, and deliberate investment; 
so “from this point of view, design is only partly a specialist activity, confined to an 
artisanal or digital class, and is better seen as a fundamental human capacity and a 
primary source of social order” (254).  Appadurai is writing about both design of objects 
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and of social order, but in the Anthropocene, this broad thinking could be extended to 
ecologies as well.  Industrial capitalism, he observes, brings a double gap — a gap 
between professional design and the quotidian design of daily life, and “a growing gap 
between design, as substantially confined to the realm of the marketed commodity, and 
planning, an activity connected with cities, states and empires” (256).  I am interested in 
how to lessen these gaps, and in particular, how technologies can be designed to lessen 
them.  Appadurai emphasizes that design is something that everyday people do: “ordinary 
people are already involved in both planning and design as part of their efforts to achieve 
dignity and equity in their lives” (267).  This is largely the sensibility I take through my 
work, while discussing the various factors, from institutions to technologies, that might 
inhibit people to express this inherent capacity for design in their environments. 
 
One specific contribution this dissertation makes to the sociology of the 
Anthropocene literature is on the theme of responsibility for designing environments.  
While the Anthropocene narrative has been critiqued for the ways it universalizes the 
agency of the “human” species, occluding how particular actors created the 
Anthropocene(e.g. Malm and Hornborg, 2014), the narrative that the Anthropocene is a 
time for taking responsibility has some appeal to both critics and promoters of the 
concept.  As Arora writes, “Within this debate, however, there seems to be substantial 
agreement that humans must urgently bear the responsibility to address climate change 
and to reduce their geological impact” (2017).  However, there is some slippage between 
the forwards and backwards dimensions compressed into “responsibility.”  Backward-
looking responsibility includes accounting for past harms, which many seem to be on 
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board with in theory.  Earth system scientists have articulated a backwards-and-forwards 
type of stewardship: as explained by Steffen et al, it "entails emulating nature in terms of 
resource use and waste transformation and recycling, and the transformation of 
agricultural, energy and transport systems" (ibid). For Palsson et al, responsibility is one 
part of "a ‘radical’ change in perspective and action in terms of human awareness of and 
responsibility for a vulnerable earth – a ‘new human condition,’ to paraphrase Arendt 
(1958)" (2013).  But when it comes to taking responsibility for ecological functioning, in 
terms of modifying nature or control-driven formulations of stewardship (Arora, 2017), 
“responsibility” becomes a controversial claiming of something.   
 
Indeed, the Anthropocene literature is replete with ways of looking at 
responsibility.  One is entanglement, as brought up by Latour.  Donna Haraway writes 
about kinship and making-kin.  More broadly, in terms of future responsibilities, Adam 
and Groves write that “responsibility requires that we involve ourselves in tending to a 
relationship by providing what is needed by another person or persons.”  This form of 
non-reciprocal responsibility is associated with care:  “Care is therefore both future 
directed and, in the first instance, always attached to specific individuals. It is thereby 
specifically directed toward their futures, and is therefore tied to futures which are 
embedded in distinct contexts of concern. Consequently, it constructs lived and living 
futures” (2011).  Karen Barad writes of relationship as well, explaining that 
“Responsibility is not an obligation that the subject chooses but rather an incarnate 
relation that precedes the intentionality of consciousness”; not a “calculation to be 
performed” but an “iterative (re)opening up to, an enabling of responsiveness” (2010).   
	 13	
 
Yet responsibility is not the same thing as being able to respond — an entity 
might have responsibility for some socio-environmental situation, but not be able to 
mount a response.  Conversely, not all responses are responsible.  Responsiveness brings 
up questions both of capacity and of agency.  As Gibson-Graham and Roelvink write, 
references to millions of years "now endow us with gargantuan agency and an almost 
unbearable level of responsibility—intuitively beyond our capacities for rational or 
concerted action" (2009; see also Lidskog & Waterton, 2016).   
 
While I also look at responsibility in these terms of care, tending, and 
relationship, building on the work of these theorists with some concrete examples, I’m 
primarily interested here in how responsibility interacts with agency.  I define agency as 
the ability for action, focused here upon action that shapes one’s future — not to select it, 
or to choose a particular option, but to engage in material or discursive practices which 
create its substance.  It can be produced by social structures and enabled by technology; it 
can also be constrained by them.  When it comes to shaping future environments, in some 
cases, a lack of power precludes actors from taking responsibility for shaping their 
environments, and also for having agency in their environmental futures (agency and 
responsibility in this case are roughly equivalent).  In other cases, power allows actors to 
avoid responsibility for ecosystem management (agency enables irresponsibility). There’s 
also a way in which taking responsibility might look like “appropriation of planetary 
agency for humans”, bringing into question of the agency of nature (Arora, 2017).  
Indeed, I see nature as having agency — much as Mitchell writes about how “nonhuman 
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agencies enter into human partnership not just as passive elements to be costed and 
arranged, but as dynamic and mobile forces with their own powers and logics” (2002: 
299). But while the literature features rich multi-faceted discussions of responsibility and 
agency, it rarely looks at these as entwined social processes. 
 
 
Responsibility as a social process: Where is the sociology of responsibility? 
 
While responsibility is a concept elaborated in jurisprudence or ethics, when it 
comes to responsibility as a social process — how it is made or taken — there is 
surprisingly little writing.  Responsibility is a stowaway within the Anthropocene 
literature, but rarely is it a focus of sociological work, though there are some exceptions 
through the years.  Strydom (1999) reviews the history of responsibility, tracing it to a 
postwar crisis of consciousness among scientists.  He describes how in the 1960s a new 
sense of responsibility emerged gradually, in tandem with new environmental and social 
movements.  Strydom suggests that “a shift has occurred from traditional emphasis on 
individual responsibility, which sociologists like Durkheim, Weber, Parsons and even 
Habermas took for granted, to a new conception of collective or co-responsibility”; he 
treats responsibility as a new master frame (ibid.).  Whether this has actually happened, 
or if this is Strydom’s longing, is unclear.  But the concept of co-responsibility, which 
brings a public level of responsibility without disburdening individuals of their individual 
responsibilities, is a useful one for our discussions. 
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Giddens also engages with responsibility, writing of responsibility as a multi-
layered term which only seems to have come into English in the late eighteenth century; 
he names it “a notion associated originally with the rise of modernity” (1999).  He writes 
about it mostly in conjunction with risk, explaining that risks only exist when there are 
decisions to be taken, and the idea of responsibility presumes decisions: “What brings 
into play the notion of responsibility is that someone takes a decision having discernable 
consequences” (Giddens, 1999).  The transition from external to manufactured risk is 
bringing about a crisis of responsibility, because the connections between risk, 
responsibility and decisions are rearranged. 
 
Beck, too, engages with responsibility in a limited way, writing about organized 
irresponsibility, describing a system where social processes and institutions collaborate to 
create risks without being held responsible for the consequences or damages from their 
actions (Curran, 2016).  Climate change is often held up as a prime example (see Beck, 
2015).  Responsibility has also been touched on in conjunction with neoliberal 
environmental governance.  Pellizzoni (2004) writes about four dimensions of 
responsibility — care, liability, accountability and responsiveness — in terms of 
environmental governance, illustrating how the caring state has been replaced by new 
arrangements focused on liability and accountability, and largely fails at responsiveness. 
 
Even though these writers have engaged with responsibility, it has not emerged as 
a coherent and sustained theme for sociologists, particularly with regards to responsibility 
as a social process.   There are several possible reasons why:  (1) Responsibility has been 
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considered in other domains: philosophy for the moral dimensions; law, and science and 
technology studies / responsible innovation in future-oriented policymaking.  
“Responsibility” writ large is perhaps too vast and abstract to study.  (2)  Responsibility 
was eclipsed by other concepts, such as risk (see Strydom, 1999).  (3) Environmental 
sociologists have focused more on notions of personal or individual environmental 
responsibility, rather than collective ones, in studies of consumption throughout the 
1980s – 2000s – trending, perhaps unwittingly, along with a neoliberal ethos that 
transferred responsibility onto individuals.  (4)  Responsibility, when it came to the 
environment, was a relatively empty signifier compared with its potential – there was 
much rhetoric around it in the early 1990s, but not much ecological responsibility has 
actually been taken, making it a difficult process to study. 
 
However, the Anthropocene storyline points out that this is an interesting time to 
take another look at responsibility as a social process.  The chapters – chapter three in 
particular, but also five – explore: What are the social processes by which responsibility 
for ecological flourishing is made, and what are the processes by which it is taken? 
Moreover, in what ways does having the responsibility for an ecosystem differ from 
having the agency to participate in shaping its ecological future? 
 
I argue that making and taking responsibility is one part of how futures are made.  
I discuss how ecosystem responsibility making and taking are complementary or 
interrelated processes, but not exactly the same.  My contribution to the discussion in this 
dissertation is to suggest how the narrative of responsibility in the Anthropocene should 
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be modified to deal with entanglements like burden and agency, and to emphasize 
response.  This emphasis on response is similar to the approach of theorists like Barad 
(2010) or Haraway (2016), but I connect it with the ways my study participants approach 
action or intervention in landscapes, both materially and discursively.  There is a 
component of responsibility, etymologically, which is connected to responding, and to 
answering; it connotes the ability to speak in response, and also to author.  There is a 
relationship between design and authorship, and narrative as well, which my title (Who 
authors future environments?) alludes to.  Taking responsibility for ecological design is a 
burden, but is also a way to capture the ability to author.   
 
 
Sociology of the Future, Sociology of Expectations, and Public Engagement with 
Emerging Technologies 
 
Thirdly, this work is in conversation with work on the sociology of expectations 
(e.g. Brown, Rappert, and Webster, 2000), methods for studying imagined futures, and 
the “sociology of the future” broadly.  As Selin explains, "sociologic tools readily equip 
scholars to look at the future in terms of how various people today talk about tomorrow; 
but they do not enable taking the social reality of futures seriously”, and “conducting 
inquiries at the future confronts social scientists with not only problems of methods and 
methodology, but also problems of developing theories that move and can account for 
change processes” (2008).  Nevertheless, sociologists study “things (prototypes, strategic 
plans, design sketches); deeds (investment decisions, educational programs, chemical 
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processes; like pollution); or words (science fiction, after dinner speeches, political 
promises) to get at the future" (ibid.), and this dissertation considers archival and textual 
material (public speech) as well as private interviews from respondents on how they see 
the future.   
 
I use two key concepts from this literature: socio-technical imaginaries (Jasanoff 
and Kim, 2009; 2015) and embodied futures (Adam and Groves, 2007, 2011).  Jasanoff 
and Kim defined socio-technical imaginaries as “collectively held, institutionally 
stabilized, and publicly performed visions of desirable futures, animated by shared 
understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive 
of, advances in science and technology” (2015: 322).  They explain that “only when the 
originator’s “vanguard vision” (Hilgartner 2015) comes to be communally adopted” do 
these rise to the status of an imaginary, and it often is institutions like law or the media 
that accord imaginaries a dominant position for policy purposes (2015: 4).  
 
The term "sociotechnical imaginaries" was elaborated as a way of foregrounding 
how advances in science and technology have shaped collective visions of desirable 
futures (Jasanoff and Kim, 2015).  Their work often looks at science and technology 
policy at the national level to see how these imaginaries are formed and implemented.  
I’m looking at something a bit different — imagined forms of social life that center on 
the fulfillment of environmental projects, but ones that involve innovative technologies. 
Here, I am interested in ecological sociotechnical imaginaries — collective visions of 
desirable ecological futures, shaped by science and technology.  “Ecological 
	 19	
sociotechnical imaginaries” is a clumsy phrase, so I have shortened it to “ecotechnical 
imaginaries”, though at the risk of eliding the thing I want to emphasize (the social).  I 
see solar geoengineering and negative emissions and blue growth as ecotechnical 
imaginaries. I wouldn’t say that specific visions for the Salton Sea are ecotechnical 
imaginaries, as they would be projects or plans, but more general concepts like a 
managed Salton Sea or a restored Salton Sea might be. These types of imaginaries have 
relationships with spatial and environmental imaginaries, which can be found throughout 
the writing of geographers, but the role of technical systems is key to this work.  A key 
observation made by Sovacool and Brossman in their study of future energy systems is 
that the interactions between imagination and technology are mutually constitutive   
(2013). In this dissertation, I look at how the narrative content of the imaginaries helps 
constitute environments, but it’s also important to keep in mind that the environments 
help constitute the imaginaries. 
 
This mutual constitution relates to Adam and Groves’s concept of embodied or 
embedded futures (2011).  Their observation is that the way institutions construct futures 
institutionalize irresponsibility, through constructing empty futures and economic 
practices that discount the future.  To generalize broadly, previous societies often had 
seasonal or cyclical patterns linked with social practices that provided structural security.  
Modernity brought the fiction of an empty future.  When the future is decontextualized 
future and emptied of content, Adam and Groves argue, it’s open to exploration and 
exploitation, calculation and control.  It can be traded, exchanged, and discounted.  As 
they write, “We can forget that our future is the present of others and pretend that it is 
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ours to do with as we please, with our imagination, creative skills and technological 
prowess the only boundaries to our activities” (2011). 
 
The alternative to this fiction of an empty future is what they call an embodied, or 
embedded, or contextualized future.  Some of the ways in which my work seeks to 
counter that emptying of the future is to embed these imaginaries of the future in both 
spatial and historical context, and also to address responsibility directly.  These two 
conceptual tools — ecological sociotechnical imaginaries and embodied futures — are 
just two that I’ve borrowed from this rich body of literature on the sociology of the 
future.  
 
 This dissertation is also in dialogue with the literature on public engagement with 
emerging technologies.  Interestingly, in the case of the Salton Sea as well as 
stratospheric aerosol geoengineering, what’s imagined is a fusion of “emerging” 
technologies as well as very old or crude engineering.  While none of the chapters in this 
dissertation includes much about formal “public engagement”, some of my past and 
forthcoming writing goes into this space — chapter five is part of a larger project which 
aimed to incorporate publics into the scientific research process.  The way I think about 
public engagement is largely consonant with what Chilvers and Kearns (2016) set out.  
They explain that there is a dominant or residual “realist conception of participation and 
the public”, which entails publics as external to participation; they are an aggregation of 
autonomous individuals.  Participation is a technologized procedure separate from 
science and democracy.  It happens in discrete and ephemeral events, with a linear model 
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of participation and engagement and with debates around extending it and scaling it up; 
inclusion is a key quality of success.  In contrast, they put forth a version of participation 
which sees publics as mediated and emergent collectives, and participation as nonlinear 
with experimental practices “in the making”, with key qualities of reflexivity and 
humility; participation is constitutive of science and democracy.  In this work, I have 
aspired to the latter view, as well as reflected with respondents on how it could be 
strengthened. 
 
 
3. Methods and study design 
 
Study populations 
 
This multi-sited dissertation involved work with “publics” as well as “studying 
up”, a term that’s been used in anthropology to describe focusing on elite groups (Nader, 
1969).  Some of my fieldwork attempted to discuss environmental decision-making with 
professionals who are involved with politics or with producing the knowledge that 
policy-makers use.  But I also made an attempt to talk with “lay people”, though this is a 
blurry divide.  I would not claim the label of ethnography for this work, but it does have 
an ethnographic spirit, in that I attempted to enter the lifeworlds of the people I spoke to 
and understand the issues from their perspectives, as well as conducted participant-
observation.   The Anthropocene calls for this kind of research, argues McGregor, who 
writes that creative cross-scale multi-sited research that studies how decisions are made 
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and how industrial innovations are facilitated or presented can link responsibility for 
earth systems change with those negatively affected by it (2017).  This style of research, 
McGregor writes, can help dispel the “species thinking” haunting Anthropocene debates. 
Like other multi-sited studies, this work has various audiences. Hine describes the 
tensions in this kind of work: 
Multi-sited ethnographers craft field sites with an eye to producing 
appropriate accounts for heterogeneous audiences comprising diverse sets 
of peers, policymakers, funders, bosses and research contacts.  Rather than 
a pre-existing territory in the middle, there is instead an embodiment of 
tensions, in the ethnographer attempting to sustain a sense of meaning in 
the project out of diverse responses and accountabilities.  From this 
perspective a study is therefore not, in some abstract sense, adequate or 
not.  Instead, the ethnographer seeks out resonances, finding audiences for 
whom the study will be recognized as having an adequacy to connect with 
their concerns. (Hine, 2007) 
 
 I hope that this work can influence varying audiences in solar geoengineering 
research as well as Salton Sea restoration, not to mention the scholarly debates around 
responsibilities for design in the Anthropocene that span these two rather particular 
topics. 
 
Study sites and methods 
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In terms of the foregrounded methods — the empirical fieldwork — this 
dissertation included semi-structured interviews in two sites.  The work in Finnish 
Lapland (August- Sept. 2016) was conducted after several months of searching for a 
collaborator in an Arctic site, which was very challenging.  The field season there is 
short, and research institutes based in the Arctic are swamped with requests from people 
studying the climate changes actually unfolding; it is a difficult ask to request people’s 
time for a more speculative project, particularly one focusing on such an unappealing 
prospect as solar geoengineering.  I was fortunate to meet a fantastic collaborator in Ilona 
Mettiäinen at the Arctic Centre at the University of Lapland, who facilitated and 
translated our focus groups.  (The results of the focus groups are discussed in a co-
authored manuscript which is not part of this dissertation; see Buck and Mettiänen, 2017)  
We chose the Arctic as a region of study because of the discussions around regionally 
using stratospheric aerosols to cool the Arctic (see chapter five for more discussion).  
There has only been one study of Arctic people’s thoughts on climate engineering, which 
is Carr (2015), who spoke with indigenous peoples in Shishmaref, Alaska. Carr is also 
the only other social scientist to use semi-structured interviews as a method, and part of 
my interview guide is modeled upon his so that we may consider doing a comparative 
analysis in the future.  I found this method to be particularly rich compared to the focus 
groups, as it allowed people to be more forthcoming about emotions as well as individual 
biographies. 
 
 My work in the Coachella-Imperial valleys (Oct. – Dec. 2016, with pilot visits in 
July 2014 and January 2016) consisted of semi-structured interviews, as well as visits to 
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museums and archives, visits to sites of production (farms, geothermal plant, algae 
production facility), an informal tour of factories and energy production sites outside 
Mexicali, and attendance of formal meetings (e.g. Imperial Irrigation District Water 
Conservation Board, Salton Sea Authority), training workshops for farmers, and 
community events around environmental justice and the Salton Sea.  The interview guide 
used had some similar questions to the Lapland project in terms of whose responsibility 
the situation was, and who had the agency to change things.  I chose to work here 
because it was already such an engineered landscape, and I was interested in how 
perceptions of this would figure into attitudes about climate change or Salton Sea 
management.  (This turned out to be a difficult thing to measure, though my impression is 
that people who live there are not as struck by the degree of intervention as someone 
from outside would be.)  More specifically, I chose the Salton Sea as my object of focus 
because it turned out to be a defined object that a wide range of people were concerned 
about. 
 
The dissertation also draws from the well of what I’m calling “background 
methods”— knowledge-gathering which I did not document in a formal, standardized 
way.  I repeatedly engaged with a specific community of climate engineering researchers 
over seven years.  This includes speaking at and attending meetings on geoengineering 
research and governance over the past several years, including a two-week research 
residency at Harvard (2016); two week-long summer schools at Harvard (2013) and 
Heidelberg (2010); work with the Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative, 
including a stakeholder engagement in Jamaica; speaking at the SRM Science conference 
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at Cambridge, UK; a workshop on the ethics of solar radiation management in Missoula, 
Montana; consulting with the Carnegie Council on Geoengineering Governance initiative 
in New York City; speaking at the US Forum on Solar Geoengineering Governance in 
Washington, DC; participating in a metrics workshop in Hamburg, etc.  I held a position 
as a project scientist at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies in Potsdam, 
working on an effort to incorporate ethical criteria into assessment of climate engineering 
technologies, and served on the steering committee for climate engineering conferences 
in Berlin in 2014 and 2017— making eight trips to meetings in Potsdam over the course 
of writing this dissertation, during which I learned much about integrated assessment 
modeling.  I also held a position as a Faculty Fellow with the Forum for Climate 
Engineering Assessment at American University, and consulted with their Academic 
Working Group.   
 
These activities are part of the normal course of building a policy-oriented 
academic career, but at the same time, they gave me insight into knowledge production in 
climate science generally and climate engineering in particular, and shaped this 
dissertation as much as the formal fieldwork did.  In particular, I was a participant in 
numerous discussions about how publics are constructed.  The disjunct between some of 
the ways publics were spoken about (as unknown forces, broadly put, who were seen to 
have a power or stake in the technology development, but in an abstract way, without 
specific mechanisms for participating) highlighted a need to understand both ideas that 
publics might hold about their agency as well as the role of researchers (including 
myself) in constructing publics. 
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The aim was not to compare two field sites, or any of the ecotechnical imaginaries 
studied, in a formal way.  To do so would be like comparing four bricks in a building, or 
four paving stones on a path.  The aim is more additive: by considering these together, it 
is easier to see insights about things like responsibility in the Anthropocene, how global 
imaginaries live or are perceived in particular places, or how people can have agency in 
designing future environments.  In the rest of this introduction, as well as the conclusion, 
we will step back and consider the themes that emerge from looking at the ecotechnical 
imaginaries together.   
 
 
 
4. How the chapters address the research questions 
  
These chapters are organized by scale, from the planetary to the individual.  We 
will begin with an ecotechnical imaginary that began in global integrated assessment 
modeling, negative emissions.  Then, we will look at how the imaginaries of the “Blue 
Revolution” and the ocean economy play out on the national scale.  The third and fourth 
chapters are sited in the landscape and community scales.  The fifth chapter is the most 
personal: even though it is focused on the global or regional imaginary of solar 
geoengineering, people discuss what climate change and climate engineering means to 
them through language of loss, security, and hope for change. 
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In what follows, I’ll introduce the chapters in greater detail with respect to what 
insights they add to the research questions, (1) By what means or processes can citizens 
have more agency in intentional environment-making?  (2) How are expectations of the 
future and “selectable futures” made?   
 
Chapter one, “Rapid scale-up of negative emissions: social barriers and social 
implications,” is a review paper of the social science literature on negative emissions, and 
its central argument is that empirical work on topics like land use change, agricultural 
and energy system change, and technology adoption can help us understand the social 
implications of scaling up negative emissions technologies.  It does not address citizen 
agency explicitly, but implies that social science might play a role in making these the 
social implications of these technologies visible — participatory social science research 
on the ground could be a first step in increasing citizen agency.  What this paper does not 
address, but what I will point out here, is that negative emissions can be seen as a way of 
depriving future citizens of agency — a responsibility-deferring device, if you will.  
James Hansen et al point this out in a paper entitled “Young People's Burden: 
Requirement of Negative CO2 Emissions,” stating that if negative emissions is a way to 
continue fossil fuel use, this “unarguably sentences young people to either a massive, 
possibly implausible cleanup or growing deleterious climate impacts or both” (2016).  If 
the future is not empty but embodied, populated with these people, negative emissions is 
a weighty trajectory to model, and selecting this pathways out of the others that have 
been graphed commits them to heavy infrastructure and labor. 
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Negative emissions make a fascinating case study in how expectations of the 
future are made, because in this case the vision of negative emissions was created by 
modelers trying to show plausible pathways to keep global mean temperatures below 
2°C.  Anderson and Peters explain that “the allure of BECCS and other negative-
emission technologies stems from their promise of much-reduced political and economic 
challenges today, compensated by anticipated technological advances tomorrow”; part of 
this is embedded in the integrated assessment models, which assume perfect knowledge 
of technologies and give less weight to future costs (2016).  It is by no means certain that 
anyone actually expects these technologies to be scaled up to the levels required to 
remove emissions — not even the modelers themselves, who were in a sense simply 
doing their job to figure out what would be required for that particular temperature 
trajectory.  At the same time, it’s possible that now that the concept exists, it has become 
part of climate policy discourse to some degree — Jeffrey Sachs has mentioned this as 
part of presentations on deep decarbonization; Shell referenced it in a recent scenario 
report (2016); and Saudi Arabia called for it to be part of upcoming IPCC special reports 
(IISD, 2017).  We may be witnessing a concept that was imagined by modelers as a 
theoretical calculation becoming part of and shaping material reality; it is too soon to tell 
if a discourse coalition will emerge in favor of negative emissions (more on this in 
Chapter four).   
 
Chapter one also looks at expectations of the future by means of analogue to the 
2008-2010 biofuel boom, which illustrated the gap between the promise of the 
technology and the reality on the ground when it is “deployed”, as well as what happens 
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on local scales – how new relations of production were inflexible, how speculative 
activity and “phantom crops” emerged, and how marginal land designated for biofuel 
deployment was not really all that marginal.  By looking at analogies from the biofuel 
boom and also forest carbon projects, it argues that both scientists and policymakers 
thinking about scaling up NETs should be attentive to their roles in creating or curbing 
speculative investments — investments which may or may not materialize, but which can 
have real changes for people on the ground regardless. 
 
The second chapter, “Calculating the potential for “Blue Growth”: how 
imaginaries of ocean futures are built upon numbers,” focuses upon the particular 
narrative of “Blue Growth” – how the oceans can be mobilized to meet Anthropocene-era 
demands for food, fuel, raw materials, and carbon services – and analyzes the 
quantification practices which buttress this narrative.  The paper traces how scientific and 
political trends converged to boost ideas of new ocean wealth, including high commodity 
prices, rapid scientific advances in biotech and robotics, and contemporary references to 
the blue economy in ocean development discourse.  The chapter focuses on four states, 
explaining that they have varying motivations for creating expectations of blue growth.   
 
In particular, the paper illustrates how stories and numerical practices work 
together to drive a socio-environmental imaginary.  Twin narratives of the ocean’s 
importance and fragility are propped up by numbers, numbers derived through three 
practices of calculability: geographical measurements are combined with biophysical 
monitoring to enable economic calculations of “ocean wealth.”  Ocean wealth is hidden; 
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it rests on practices of quantification to make it recognizable.  Grim numbers also help 
drive the blue economy, as it is an imaginary built around sustainability and even repair – 
the worse things get, the more we need the blue economy.  This is a logic of necessity 
that works in all four imaginaries addressed in the dissertation.  Assessments of ocean 
wealth can be a performative tool for states to engage promissory capital; on the other 
hand, conservation organizations also try to use them to make a case for saving ocean 
wealth. Calculating the blue economy goes beyond the aims of driving policy and 
investment to complex political and cultural concerns: from geostrategic aims to 
economic diversification to valuing cultural heritages which were undervalued during 
colonialism.  The chapter questions the assumption that quantification of the ocean 
economy enables management of it — these are lively and fluid ecologies, with 
biophysical factors that confound methods of calculation and social factors that are 
underappreciated.   The quantification does, however, make a future based on the ocean 
economy more selectable. 
 
Like the concept of “negative emissions technologies”, this is largely a top-down 
imaginary designed to solve a global problem, without much purchase on the ground 
from people who would be doing the labor of creating the blue economy.  The first two 
chapters share a similar mandate, in terms of using social science to highlight how these 
global imaginaries are not merely technical but also social.  Similar to chapter one, 
chapter two suggests that social science could play a role in citizen agency — observing 
that some measurement of ocean life is done to further conservation and restoration goals, 
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and suggesting that deliberative or anticipatory governance with communities about what 
they want to measure, and how.   
 
The third chapter, “Choosing a future for California's Salton Sea: Making / taking 
responsibility in the Anthropocene”, moves to the landscape scale, and is the first of the 
three involving new data collection.  It looks at how options for the Salton Sea have been 
formed, chosen, or rejected.  The chapter provides a history of the process of selecting the 
sea’s future, and looks at how, in the wake of previous failures, the state of California has 
come up with a limited and incremental plan of action for the sea.  Responsibility was 
legally taken by the state through a 2003 water transfer agreement, but expectations of 
the future have somewhat stalled.  From the state’s point of view, the only possible path 
of action was to try and mitigate dust from the sea’s shrinking through constructing 
shallow habitat, which is still unfunded, and review the situation in ten years (a type of 
incrementalism and dependence on future action which is also built into the Paris 
Agreement).  In both the instances of Salton Sea restoration and climate engineering, the 
assumptions seems to be that future people will be richer, more capable, and more 
committed than we are to addressing these issues. 
 
From the citizen point of view, however, the future is still open, people are 
actively making a vision of sea-to-sea water import or alternatives, using tools of 
visualization and design.  They are producing both a narrative of water import, as well as 
metrics to support the idea: they need the numbers to win the battle for who is being 
“realistic.”  The alternative vision refers strongly to engineering and technologies, such as 
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desalination, advances in algae cultivation and saltwater agriculture, and renewable 
energy.  The chapter shows how citizens are using formal processes, citizen science, and 
social movements to make and take responsibility for their future landscape.  Citizen 
organizations can (1) visualize alternatives, (2) educate people and policymakers about 
the sea, (3) help locals participate in formal processes; they can engage in media 
production as well as reframe the problem in terms of environmental or social justice.  
However, citizen science is not the same as citizen engineering, and citizens are in a bind 
trying to address a problem of this material scale, which requires incredibly high initial 
capital to move earth and water.  While citizens don’t yet have the capacity to make up 
for the absence of state action, they can use the tools at their disposal to shift conceptions 
of what’s most “realistic” or selectable, or push alternative expectations of the future. 
 
Chapter four, “Climate change technologies in California’s Imperial Valley: 
Prospective challenges for negative emissions at the landscape scale,” remains in the 
Salton Sea region.  It turns back to the issue of climate engineering, arguing that looking 
from the landscape scale can illuminate frictions and tensions in instituting a global 
imaginary like negative emissions.  The landscape scale is useful for seeing the landscape 
holistically; it invites human habitation and allows one to imagine negative emissions 
technologies not as artifacts but as part of a socio-technical landscape, placed not just in 
spatial context but also temporal context, history and future.   
 
The empirical fieldwork points to a disconnect between how the Imperial Valley 
under climate change is seen from outside and within it — a disconnect also taken up in 
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the next chapter, where imaginaries of climate change from inside and outside the Arctic 
are in tension.  From a wide-zoom standpoint, the Imperial Valley is filled with empty 
land for solar, and will face increasing water stress as the southwest continues to heat and 
dry.  From inside, the myth of empty land for solar evaporates; the water shortages are 
not threatening because of strong water rights; the heat is already extreme to the point 
where a few more degrees might not matter; and anthropogenic global warming is a 
matter of debate.  The chapter argues that attitudes about climate change are germane to 
the possibilities of scaling up negative emissions — and that it’s not just the attitudes, but 
the disconnect between them and the global imaginaries that matters, because these 
stances affect adoption of and participation in the NETs regime. 
 
The chapter argues that one can see NETs as part of the broader renewable energy 
transition, and that both existing efforts at climate-smart land management and the rapid 
scale-up of renewables allow some foresight into what scaling up NETs in the landscape 
would entail.  In particular, negative emissions are likely to face five types of challenges: 
financing, technical barriers, landholder adoption, broader social acceptance issues of the 
technologies, and environmental justice concerns.  From looking at the renewable energy 
landscape, we can see how there are different versions of what it might look like.  In 
particular, the chapter hears from citizens and activists who are resisting energy 
development for various reasons.  Resistance and promotion of particular technologies 
don’t always map onto familiar narratives.  Some of the resistance is easily coded as not-
in-my-backyardism, but much of it is in fact related to environmental justice — people in 
the valley have to bear harms from particular forms of development, and the benefits 
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flow elsewhere.  So opposition is not inherent to the technology itself, but to the place-
blind ways it is being implemented. 
 
In the imaginary of negative emissions technologies, a portfolio concept is taken 
for granted, where the best options will be selected and combined.  This case study 
illustrates how there might in fact be tensions between different technologies and their 
actor-interest groups.  The chapter also illustrates that while some issues with renewable 
energy or carbon removal are “local”, it would be a mistake to simply consign them to a 
box of “local issues.”  Some concerns that are evident when examining the local are only 
addressable on larger scales.  Finally, the chapter illustrates one key issue with the 
imaginary of NETs — it is largely based upon metrics and lacks a compelling narrative, 
and a NETs future will likely not be selectable on metrics alone. 
 
In the fifth chapter, “Perspectives on albedo modification from Finnish Lapland: 
Viewing a global imaginary from a regional context,” we look again at how people in a 
specific place experience a global imaginary — that of albedo modification, or solar 
geoengineering, as seen by people in Finnish Lapland.  With a similar inquiry to chapter 
four, chapter five asks: How do they imagine themselves shaping solar geoengineering?  
What agency might they have in determining its research trajectory or use, and what 
experience can they bring to bear?  What does placing albedo modification in a local 
context help us see regarding the prospects of governing this kind of global intervention?   
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The results from this set of semi-structured interviews challenge the global socio-
environmental imaginary of solar geoengineering as it appears in the geoengineering 
governance literature in several important ways.  Firstly, the chapter challenges the tacit 
assumption that people’s climate preferences are obvious or quantifiable.  When it came 
to climate change, respondents were concerned with changes to wintertime, and worried 
about it becoming unfamiliar or uncanny while also planning how to adapt to the new 
long, dark autumn.   
 
Secondly, this chapter challenges the tacit assumption that people will look at 
climate change and climate intervention through the prism of local concerns, through an 
individual utilitarian lens or like a state would.  The literature seems to assume 
competition between self-interested actors, but the respondents here seemed to share 
ideas about cooperative governance (and in fact had a similar set of concerns to 
respondents in other qualitative studies).  Shorter and stranger winters were the most 
frequently cited effect of global warming, but often not the primary concern – the 
primary or urgent concern with climate change was global suffering in far-flung places, 
which people believed would affect them eventually.  When it came to climate 
intervention, people viewed the earth as a complex system and were concerned about 
unforeseen consequences.  Participants had a more sophisticated, nuanced view of benefit 
and detriment than a “winners and losers” discourse on climate change would suggest; 
rarely was the Arctic seen as an ultimate “winner”.  While their concerns were global and 
abstract, and touched on how people in other places would be affected, these concerns 
were still informed by particular contextual histories of the north and Europe – Cold War 
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tensions and living on the border with Russia, local contaminants making their way to the 
Arctic, and European colonialism and racial integration.  These types of concerns are not 
readily found in the geoengineering governance lit, which bounds such topics off from 
environmental governance.  
 
Thirdly, the chapter challenges the tacit assumption that states act in the interests 
of their citizens.  There may be a divergence between citizen ideas about solar 
geoengineering and nation-state or elite, decision-maker imaginaries of it.  Participants 
found that a history of non-participatory decisions made it difficult to imagine citizen 
participation in something so vast — no one directly imagined themselves shaping the 
trajectory of geoengineering research or deployment, even though they thought at a 
minimum consent should be given.  At the same time, people felt a strong case for 
considering local perspectives.  They uniformly suggested international governance, 
while questioning if it would work.  Residents wanted to talk about broader issues such as 
loss, insecurity, and worries about the current zeitgeist – their worries were not simply 
about solar geoengineering as a technology, but solar geoengineering in the context of 
global instability; it was perceived to be a chaotic, non-secular time where “national 
interests are back.”  That is, it was not an empty future, but an embodied one, and there 
was not a widespread faith that people in the future would be better human beings than 
present people are.  People vacillated between democratic liberal ideas of what should be 
and pessimism about how things were trending, evidencing the fluidity of positions about 
what is realistic or possible: the same person could in a matter of minutes express both 
optimism and pessimism about human nature and human values.  Geoengineering was 
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seen as something which deserved research, but not as a source of hope.  In general, 
many respondents wanted to broaden the horizons of the problem and solutions – they 
found hope in talk of relocalization and new rural livelihoods, as well as 
dematerialization of the economy, new values, and education. 
 
The ambiguity about solar geoengineering in the fifth chapter can be seen as a 
breakdown of the master narrative about scientific, economic, and cultural progress.  
People are remarkably unenthused about the idea, and this shows up in other studies of 
climate engineering as well: they largely accept a rationale for research into the idea, but 
this is not the same as being supportive of it as an exciting pursuit.  The other 
Anthropocene-era socio-environmental imaginaries studied here are met with the same 
lack of real enthusiasm.  Negative emissions are met with the vigor of someone being 
excited about cleaning up a huge mess — the state of California has the same general 
attitude about the Salton Sea.  The Blue Revolution has the most potential out of the four 
imaginaries for genuine enthusiasm, but it’s inextricably twinned with observations about 
the ocean’s decline.  Technology in an era of obligatory repair means something different 
than the previous analogues of these technologies (referents: weather modification 
technologies of the 1950s, or aquaculture and ocean energy enthusiasm of the 1970s).  
 
How connected are these two narrative events: modernity's failure to be credible 
— at least to those in the West and perhaps elsewhere — and the Anthropocene, the self-
awareness of environmental impact and commensurate responsibility?  They are clearly 
related, but the decline of one does not follow neatly upon the rise of the other.  For some 
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critical scholars, the Anthropocene represents totally technical rationality; 
disillusionment; ecological management and control — modernity at its final end.  In 
other words, it is an extension of modernity, not a replacement narrative for it.  This is a 
reasonable viewpoint in light of the history of the Imperial Valley, which reflects a 
century of control of both nature and racialized labor (Andrés, 2015), or in light of early 
ecological modernization efforts.  As the Brundtland Commission report, “Our Common 
Future”, declared, "This new reality, from which there is no escape, must be recognized – 
and managed” (WCED, 1987).  After so many decades of histories and framings of 
control, it is very easy to see the Anthropocene narratives of responsibility as 
managerialism in new clothes — especially since the Anthropocene is grounded in 
scientific observation and the metrification favored by earth system scientists, e.g. 
discussions of planetary boundaries. 
 
Yet the evidence suggests that ecological modernization— the notion that eco-
friendly innovation would benefit both environments and economies — has not 
transpired; a more rapacious and kleptocratic neoliberalism happened instead, dashing 
hopes of carbon markets or weak sustainability.  Ecomodernism seems like an ever-more-
elusive dream in the face of modern irrationality: the empirical fieldwork from my 
dissertation indicated this as well.  Hence, I do not see the Anthropocene as an extension 
of modernity, but rather as a new story which comes after it— messily overlapping with 
it’s tail end and thus being influenced by it, but whose contours and storyline are up for 
authorship.  Haraway brings up no less than eight objections to the "Anthropcoene as a 
tool, story, or epoch to think with", some of them in this vein: it relies too much on 
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bounded utilitarian individualism, it tends to be top-heavy and bureaucracy-prone; it's 
most easily meaningful and usable by elite intellectuals (2016).  Most of her objections 
are noteworthy; yet the Anthropocene still seems to be doing useful work as a shorthand 
and provocation to think through possible stories before it becomes clear what comes 
next.  An underlying theme in the very constitution of the four imaginaries discussed in 
this dissertation is what kinds of narratives around ecotechnical imaginaries are possible 
once modernity is exhausted as a master frame, and this discussion will be returned to in 
the conclusion. 
 
Together, the chapters illustrate the difficulties of citizen participation in these 
global ecotechnical imaginaries — and illustrate paradoxical thinking on the part of their 
promoters, since these imaginaries might not travel far without citizen involvement.  How 
do promoters imagine that the imaginaries would be taken up, deployed, adopted, or 
created?  There are several possible explanations.  One is that the people generating and 
propagating these imaginaries are amazingly technocratic and managerial even in the face 
of a paradigm that has shifted away from this view of science and technology’s 
controllability, in which case they are able to cope with a remarkable level of cognitive 
dissonance.  A second possibility is that the imaginaries arise from disparate discourse 
coalitions of multiple and disconnected actors, and no one is charged with assessing the 
imaginaries’ overall viability.   A third possibility is that the people proposing the 
imaginaries are not hopeful or invested in them being materialized, but are doing so out 
of a lack of knowing what else to do, with the added bonus that developing them offers 
gainful employment.  It seems likely that the point of these imaginaries is not that they 
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are actually ever realized (in which case, critical scholars should not be taking them at 
face value).  What, then, is the point of them?  The conclusion addresses the varied work 
these ecotechnical imaginaries are actually doing, and further synthesizes what these 
chapters bring to the question of how citizens can have more agency in the design and 
decisions around environment-shaping technologies.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Rapid scale-up of negative emissions technologies: social barriers and social 
implications 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Negative emissions technologies have garnered increasing attention in the wake of the 
Paris target to curb global warming to 1.5°C.  However, much of the literature on carbon 
dioxide removal focuses on technical feasibility, and several significant social barriers to 
scale-up of these technologies have been glossed over.  This paper reviews the existing 
literature on the social implications of rapidly ramping up carbon dioxide removal.  It 
also explores the applicability of previous empirical social science research on 
intersecting topics, with examples drawn from research on first- and second-generation 
biofuels and forest carbon projects.  Social science fieldwork and case studies of land use 
change, agricultural and energy system change, and technology adoption and diffusion 
can help in both anticipating the social implications of emerging negative emissions 
technologies and understanding the factors that shape trajectories of technological 
development. By integrating empirical research on public and producer perceptions, 
barriers to adoption, conditions driving new technologies, and social impacts, projections 
about negative emissions technologies can become more realistic and more useful to 
climate change policymaking. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 Scenarios in the fifth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report 
rely upon the use of "negative emissions" technologies to maintain less than 2°C of 
warming; in particular, they anticipate widespread deployment of bioenergy with carbon 
capture and sequestration (BECCS) (IPCC, 2014; Fuss et al, 2014; Gasser et al, 2015). 
Negative emissions technologies (NETs) are in varying, speculative stages of 
development.  Yet they are implied in meeting the ambitious 1.5°C target set in Paris. 
This critical role of negative emissions has alarmed scientists, provoking commentaries 
on the feasibility of these scenarios and calls for climate researchers to be candid to 
policymakers about the tight carbon budget (Anderson, 2015; Geden, 2015; Peters, 2016; 
Williamson, 2016). 
 
What would a rapid scale-up of NETs entail? How would a successful scale-up 
transform society? There are few integrated analyses of the “technological, economic, 
social, and cultural pathways to get to 1.5°C, or about the implications of a massive 
expansion of negative emissions technologies”, observed Mike Hulme (2016).  Of those 
few analyses, the social and cultural analysis is particularly limited (work in the special 
issue of this journal edited by Tavoni and Socolow, 2013, is a notable exception).  Many 
factors contribute to this lack of analysis: there are inherent uncertainties in the 
technologies and in the future that make declarative “results” difficult, and methods in the 
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social sciences lend themselves to the study of currently-existing phenomena rather than 
future prospects.  Social implications like changes in food security, concentration of land 
ownership, or resource access dynamics at community or household levels require 
difficult or expensive-to-gather data to understand in the present, and are even more 
challenging to anticipate in the future.  
 
Thus far, the primary aim of studies on carbon dioxide removal is typically to 
calculate the potential that these methods can offer.  Lines of inquiry begin from that 
starting point, bringing in social implications as difficult-to-quantify side issues later in 
the conclusion or discussion sections of the work.  This work generates crucial insights 
and cautions about material issues that will have social implications, like fertilizer use 
and bioenergy crop yields (e.g. Creutzig, 2015, Smith et al, 2015).  Yet a focused 
discussion of both social barriers and implications of the rapid scale-up of carbon dioxide 
removal is notably absent.   
 
 If the claims that NETs will be necessary to reduce climate damages are credible, 
the lack of social research is remarkable, since understanding the social dynamics is key 
to making these futures actually happen.  A genuine evaluation of the social feasibility of 
large-scale carbon dioxide removal needs to be made if society is serious about 
comparing these technologies with other large-scale mitigation approaches, in order to 
make public and private decisions about what to invest in and design policy accordingly.  
On one hand, the research community could simply continue to acknowledge the vast 
social and political uncertainty around NETs.  However, this may lead to “analysis 
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paralysis”, which risks “losing valuable time and helping to self-fulfill the prophecy that 
GGR cannot be realized at scale”, as Lomax et al (2015a) point out.  Another course 
could be to use the already-existing body of empirical social science studies on related 
topics to understand the social implications and challenges to scaling up NETs.  
“Empirical” here simply means evidence-based: evidence from analogue case studies, 
from discourse, from commodity chain analysis, from the conventional suite of social 
science methods like interviews, surveys, focus groups, and other means of gathering 
social data.  Evidence from the ground can indicate factors which biophysical and large-
scale economic models may not be able to include, such as corruption, landowner 
preferences, not-in-my-backyard-ism, household and inter-community inequalities in 
land or food access, to name just a few. This chapter aims to lay the groundwork for such 
an analysis by first reviewing the existing literature on the social implications of NETs.  
Then, selected examples from fields like environmental sociology, agricultural 
development, and science and technology studies are reviewed, to further understanding 
of what a rapid scale-up of NETs would entail.  The contemporary, real-world examples 
of what happens when communities are left out of environment-shaping illustrate what is 
at stake when imagining a scale-up of NETs.  If negative emissions are going to be more 
than a discursive tactic for (temporarily) evading responsibility for climate action, the 
social challenges discussed below will have to be met head-on. 
 
 
2.  Roles for social science research on NETs 
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Social science can contribute to discussing (1) public understanding and 
acceptability of NETs, including how NETs come to be understood and defined by 
society, (2) barriers to deploying or scaling up NETs, including what factors are shaping 
the technology as it develops, and (3) the social implications of a rapid scale-up of NETs, 
including changes in social relations.  Within “social science”, there are a range of 
relevant fields and sub-fields— environmental sociology, communications, anthropology, 
human geography, political ecology, science and technology studies, international 
development, to name a few, each with a range of methods. Some methods, like scenario 
and foresight exercises, are better for understanding implications of the more speculative 
emerging technologies.   
 
Can social implications emerging technologies be anticipated?  “Typically it is 
only as a technology is rolled out into society that one can get a firm grip on the timing 
and strength of side effects, the operation of countervailing forces, and the mobilization 
of direct opposition”, writes Meadowcroft (2013), who cites biofuels and wind energy as 
examples.  This is mainly true, yet there are numerous case studies of precedents and 
analogues to draw upon, and because most NETs have known component technologies, it 
should be feasible to get a handle on some “side effects”.  Because technologies are not 
simply forces that are rolled out— rather, they are shaped by human choices throughout 
their (often non-linear) development— doing such social inquiry at all stages of 
development is useful.  Moreover, technologies develop along with societies: 
Meadowcroft helpfully points out that CDR approaches should not just be assessed from 
the perspective of their mitigation potential (tons removed over time), but also by “asking 
	 50	
what sort of societal development trajectory they imply”, noting that “a civilization that 
employed large scale afforestation and reforestation, for example, would look very 
different from one that declined this option; widespread BECCS implies an extensive bio-
energy economy, and so on” (2013). Taking account of social contexts is crucial in 
anticipating technological development. 
 
What social science research on NETs already exists, and how comprehensive is 
it? There is virtually no social science literature on the non-biological technologies (direct 
air capture, enhanced mineral weathering).  This may be because non-biological methods 
are seen as distinct technologies to be rolled out, compared to biological carbon dioxide 
removal, which is more obviously embedded in socio-technical systems. However, the 
scale-up of an entirely new infrastructure or industry with either direct air capture (DAC) 
or enhanced weathering (EW) would warrant serious social research.  Drawing down 50 
ppm of atmospheric CO2 with enhanced weathering could cost $50-500 trillion for 
mining, grinding, and transporting rock, with further similar costs for distributing it 
(Taylor et al, 2016). A global enhanced weathering industry that sequesters 1Gt Co2e per 
year may have an energy demand equivalent to 0.7-19.4% of global energy consumption 
(Hartmann et al, 2013).  The governance and implementation barriers to distributing these 
amounts of rock are massive— some of the tropical lands signaled by models as 
geologically suitable for enhanced weathering are in places like the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (Moosdorf et al, 2014), where institutional infrastructure for promoting 
adoption of new land use practices is limited.  Direct air capture would also have high 
costs and substantial energy requirements (McLaren, 2014); in some analyses, powering 
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DAC with gas or coal would be pointless as more emissions would be generated than 
captured.  The direct land footprint of DAC is low, but optimally emissions-free DAC 
implies large renewable energy resources, which may have been used for other purposes, 
and which may require large amounts of land.  For example, for the U.S. to sequester 
~13GtCO2/yr, roughly 100,000,000 acres of land in the Southwest would be required for 
the solar energy to make it emissions-free (NAS, 2015).  Moreover, much of the current 
industrial infrastructure society enjoys was built in a time where infrastructure was 
valued as a source of national pride; today, in a fuller world, infrastructure has a new 
politics and is much more contestable.  In sum, new industries of air capture or enhanced 
weathering would indeed be shaped by society, with opportunities but also considerable 
challenges.  However, because literature on the social barriers, implications, or 
perception of DAC and EW has not yet emerged, we will turn to examining social 
research on the other technologies.  
 
 
2.1  Research on biological NETs 
 
 Modeling studies on biological NETs (terrestrial or marine carbon sequestration) 
often point to the need for more social research.  There is virtually no social science 
literature about microalgae biofuels or macroalgae sequestration, and just a few studies of 
“blue carbon” sequestration in coastal ecosystems (e.g. Wylie et al, 2016).  Much 
attention has gone to terrestrial sequestration, particularly BECCS.  Concerns identified 
with BECCS include land requirements, input requirements, freshwater requirements, and 
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tradeoffs for food and fiber production (see e.g. Cruetzig et al, 2015; Geisler and Currens, 
2017). For example, using dedicated high-energy crops (willow and poplar short rotation 
coppice and Miscanthus), Smith et al found that achieving 3.3 Gt Ceq yr
−1 of negative 
emissions would require a land area of approximately 380–700 Mha in 2100, which 
represents 7–25% of agricultural land, and 25–46% of arable plus permanent crop area 
(2015).  Both BECCS and afforestation and reforestation would have land demands 2-4 
times larger than land identified as abandoned or marginal, and thus the use of these 
techniques on productive land would impact the amount available for food production 
and other ecosystem services (ibid).  BECCS could increase groundwater reserve tapping, 
reduce access to clean water, and divert water from ecosystems. Moreover, BECCS 
would consume a significant portion of the world’s fertilizer supply: an estimated 17–79 
Tg N y−1 applied per sequestered Pg C y−1 could represent up to 75 % of global annual 
nitrogen fertilizer production (Smith and Torn, 2013).  Phosphorous availability is 
another consideration, as this resource is limited and subject to price spikes, with reserves 
concentrated in just a few nations. 
 
How do these biophysical projections “translate” into social impacts?   Writing 
about bioenergy broadly, Creutzig et al (2013) point out that modeling studies of 
bioenergy potential are deficient in two ways: firstly, social impacts are measured in 
terms of economic efficiency, economic growth, and occasionally food prices, which 
leaves out important dimensions of human wellbeing like change in socio-economic and 
health conditions; secondly, the high level of spatial aggregation makes place-specific 
drivers and distribution of impacts among social groups and regions invisible (2013).  
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The translation from model results to social impacts is not straightforward, which is 
where empirical social science research could be helpful. A handful of studies address 
expert and public perceptions of BECCS. Lomax et al (2015b) conducted twelve semi-
structured interviews with experts, who caution about systemic technology “lock-out” 
due to reasons of technology choice, infrastructure development, resource supply (for 
biomass and biochar), and capacity and skills. Vaughan and Gough reported on a 
deliberative workshop about BECCS feasibility, finding that social acceptability was 
likely to be a barrier, though there was little consensus on the magnitude (2015).  Dowd 
et al (2015) review the public opinion research on bioCCS and discuss social license to 
operate, with the key question of whether or not the public opinion challenges of CCS 
will apply to BECCS, noting that BECCS might receive more public support than its 
component technologies do individually. While social research on BECCS is limited, 
CCS has been well investigated. 
 
 
2.2  CCS research 
 
Underpinning both BECCS and DAC is carbon capture and storage, which has 
been the focus of a relatively large body of social science research on CCS since 2005; 
see for example the edited collection The Social Dynamics of Carbon Capture and 
Storage by Markusson et al (2012a), or the special issue on the politics and policy of 
CCS in Global Environmental Change edited by Bäckstrand et al (2011).  Two foci in 
this literature are 1) public perception and acceptance and 2) economic modeling of 
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deployment options (Markusson et al, 2012b).  This is largely still the case at the time of 
writing this article.  Markusson et al also point to a small literature on CCS innovation 
and technology development, such as learning curve analysis, which tends to borrow 
from cost trends in other technologies (2012b).  
 
Why has carbon capture and storage, a technology considered necessary in 
climate assessments, had so much difficulty in getting off the ground? Barriers include 
the lack of government action, public concerns about storage, low carbon prices and 
advances in alternative renewable technologies (De Coninck and Benson, 2014).  Other 
key questions revolve around whether CCS will be an “add-on” technology, or a broader 
part of a hydrogen economy (Shackley and Thompson, 2012), or whether it creates fossil 
fuel “lock-in” (Vergragt et al, 2011).  These types of questions are relevant to the scale up 
of DAC and BECCS as well.  Areas for further research identified by Bäckstrand et al 
(2011) were the synergies and tensions between CCS and renewable options; public 
dialogue and choice; and work in developing countries, including technology transfer and 
risks in the context of fragile political institutions. These are all crucial areas for further 
inquiry within the contexts of DAC and BECCS. 
 
 
3.  Bringing in insights from empirical studies of intersecting topics 
 
This chapter will examine two cases of relevant literature from other fields: 
empirical studies of the recent biofuel boom, and studies of forest carbon projects.  These 
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are clearly more relevant to biological NETs, and were chosen to illustrate the depth and 
breadth of work already being done on environment-shaping in the Anthropocene.  
Equally interesting to bring in would be studies of biochar projects (Leach et al, 2012) 
and agricultural sequestration efforts (e.g. Swallow and Goddard, 2013). There are also 
case studies of energy system transitions and infrastructure scale-ups that could help 
analysts understand a scale-up of a DAC industry. For example, with regards to the CCS 
part of DAC, Rai et al (2010) studied analogue technologies of nuclear power, SO2 
scrubbing, and global liquefied natural gas, observing the decisive role of government, 
the credibility of incentives for investment in commercial-scale projects, and the 
weakness of the truism that experience with technologies inevitably reduces cost.  
Literature on the scale-up of renewables would also be particularly useful: for example, 
Iyer et al (2015) examine constraints on diffusion of low-carbon technologies and review 
the historical diffusion rates of energy technologies.  Here, though, the focus is on 
bioenergy and forest carbon, in order to illuminate: What social factors identified in the 
existing literature on bioenergy and forest carbon could shed light on the social dynamics 
of a rapid NET scale-up? 
 
 
3.1  Biofuel booms and busts 
 
 Most, if not all, projections regarding BECCS assume second-generation biofuels: 
switchgrass, Miscanthus, poplar, crop or forestry residues, etc.  Advanced biofuels would 
theoretically be free of the social concerns that first-generation biofuels came under fire 
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for. Nevertheless, empirical studies of the most recent first-generation biofuel crop boom 
(late 1990s ~ 2010) are useful to understand future biofuel scale-up for two reasons.  
Firstly, the speed of land use change and infrastructure and policy development is an 
object of study.  This wave of interest in ethanol and biodiesel produced from sugar, 
starch, and oilseed crops mirrors earlier waves of interest in the late nineteenth century 
and in the 1970s; however, the twenty-first century boom was also driven by concerns 
about agricultural stagnation and climate change (Kuchler, 2014). Secondly, the failure of 
this earlier biofuel boom is still affecting prospects for a second.  Advanced biofuels still 
have not received the breakthroughs they would need to be competitive, and while part of 
this is technological— cell walls in woody biomass evolved to be difficult to break 
down— part is certainly economical.  Despite the cleanly demarcated terminology of 
“first” and “second”, these are interrelated technologies. 
 
 There is no shortage of high-level assessment of first-generation biofuels.  Much 
of this is framed in terms of sustainability and addresses various aspects: e.g. the UK’s 
Gallagher Review of the indirect effects of biofuel production (2008); there are also 
numerous studies of livelihood impacts.  Because this literature is vast, I want to do two 
things here: (1) point out some factors identified in this first-generation literature that 
have not been mentioned with regards to NETs, but may be quite relevant, and then (2) 
mention a few studies that are specifically interesting in terms of their focus on second-
generation biofuels. 
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Empirical research on the first-generation biofuel boom reveals three related 
concerns: (1) the inflexibility of new relations of production, (2) speculative activity and 
“phantom crops”, and (3) the actual status of “marginal” land.  Biofuels for domestic use 
or export can represent employment opportunities, but income effects for growers depend 
on the model of feedstock cultivation: typical modes include plantations, contract farming 
or outgrower schemes, independent smallholder farming, and subsistence farming 
(Creutzig et al, 2013).  The switch to cash crops and paid jobs may not be a net gain for 
rural peoples, since cash crops bring new vulnerabilities like dependency on world 
markets.  For example, Van der Horst and Vermeylen cite the plight of Kenyan 
commercial rose farmers during the Icelandic ash cloud of 2010, who were stuck with a 
product that had no local demand (2011).  They argue that “simplistic proxies” like the 
number of jobs or the average pay per worker cannot adequately measure the 
involvement of rural communities in producing liquid biofuels (ibid).  In a six-country 
study of biofuel projects, German et al report that most of the production models, 
“whether industrial-scale plantations or outgrower schemes, lock land and labor into 
relatively inflexible arrangements that hinder the potential to adapt to changing 
socioeconomic and market conditions” (2011).  In one example, a jatropha outgrower 
scheme in Zambia, focus groups and household surveys revealed one-sided contractual 
obligations that were signed by farmers but not the company, as well as provisions 
requiring farmers to keep land under jatropha for 30 years and sell only to the company— 
the risks were borne by the smallholders who could least afford them, instead of the 
behind-the-scenes investors promoting the scheme (German et al, 2011). Numerous 
examples of changing relations of production point to concerns not just about income and 
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flexibility, but about repercussions on food security, gender equity, health, etc.  To be 
clear, effects of new relations are not always negative: for example, Riera and Swinnen 
studied a case of castor biofuel contract farming in Ethiopia where positive spillover 
effects on food production occurred, perhaps due to better fertilizer access, improved soil 
quality from the castor, or technical assistance from extension agents (2016). 
 
A second concern involves what Niemark et al have dubbed the “phantom 
commodity”, or a commodity existing in a “parallel economy of expectations and 
appearances”, which is “used in company rhetoric and policy and development discourse, 
but does not materialize into any real market exchange or deliver on promised 
environmental and social benefits” (2016).  Their case involves jatropha in Madagascar, 
where in 2011, the total amount of land intended for biofuels was roughly 800,000 to 1 
million ha— but only about 60,000 ha were “reportedly” producing biofuels, and much 
land was classified in either preparation or temporary suspension phases of production 
(2016).  A similar situation developed in Ethiopia, where government ministries offered 
investment licenses to 83 parties to produce biodiesel feedstock, but 3-5 years later, only 
7.2% had started production, and that on a limited scale; notably, state enterprises are 
producing much more (Shete and Rutten, 2014).  The concern is that speculative 
investments in “phantom production” is driving land prices upwards (2016).  While 
modelers calculated impressive production potentials, some companies were merely 
interested in financial, speculative profits rather than the complicated work of producing 
new feedstocks in areas without advanced processing infrastructure and proximity to 
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markets.  Expectations and hype giving way to phantom commodities is a cautionary tale 
for development of NETs.  
 
 Without “ground-truthing” these investments and projects, it would be difficult to 
know about changing relations of production, livelihood impacts, or the phenomenon of 
phantom production.  Similarly, it would be hard to assess the true uses of “marginal 
land”, which is often categorized using remote sensing methods. Fieldwork has shown 
that (1) much land classed as marginal is actually used in various ways (Nalepa and 
Bauer, 2012), (2) the designation of “marginal” or “degraded” often is done for political 
reasons (Lyons and Westoby, 2014), and (3) though biofuel crops can theoretically be 
grown in marginal land, or using rain-fed irrigation, growers may decide to use non-
marginal land if crops do better there and profits will be higher.  This is all highly 
relevant for second-generation biomass production, as it is projected to use marginal land.  
Notably, BECCS is imagined to use significant amounts of crop and forest residues, in 
which case the first-generation biofuel analogy would be less applicable. 
 
 The literature on second-generation biofuels is much smaller and more recent.  It 
focuses less on impacts, and more on anticipatory issues of social acceptance and interest. 
Creutzig et al suggest that for rural livelihoods, second-generation plantations would 
provide higher income and land rent compared to first-generation biofuels, but would 
again marginalize local people with informal land tenure, though they note that residues 
are promising for energy and livelihood improvement (2013).  However, very little 
research has been done on advanced biofuels and rural livelihoods in the developing 
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world. Most research has focused on high-income countries and involves gathering social 
data from various groups: the public, experts, and producers.  For example, Longstaff et 
al (2015) reported on a deliberative democracy event about advanced biofuels in Canada, 
which discussed biotechnology and citizen participation in government policy.  Also in 
Canada, Rollins et al (2015) used a choice experiment to examine public opinion on 
planting genetically improved poplars on public lands, with the majority allowing it if the 
fiber is used for biofuels. Raman et al (2015) employed stakeholder and expert interviews 
to assess the assumptions, values, and future visions around lignocellulosic biofuels in the 
UK, while Ribiero and Quintanilla used the Delphi method to survey experts from several 
countries on the potential social impacts of cellulosic ethanol (2015).  Producer decision-
making is also considered: Brunner et al (2015) found that among 505 forest decision-
makers surveyed in northern Michigan, 47% would be willing to harvest trees for 
cellulosic ethanol feedstock, with most having non-market factors such as recreation, 
conservation, and “other worthwhile goals” part of their decision-making.  Caldas et al 
surveyed 1984 Kansas famers about their willingness to grow cellulosic biomass, and 
found differences between Eastern and Western Kansas, with farmers’ perceptions about 
risk and profits as a key factor in decision-making, compared to biophysical factors 
(2014).  These studies— all from high-income nations— indicate that social factors play 
a large role in both public and producer decision-making.  These results warrant more 
attention when thinking about a scale-up of terrestrial CDR, particularly when 
considering genetically modified feedstocks, given that genetically modified crops have 
already faced contestation in the global north. 
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 These three aspects of the first-generation scale-up — new relations of 
production, phantom commodities, and alternative uses of marginal land — were 
examined here because they are aspects not easily teased out from modeling studies. 
There are certainly other social implications of scaling up advanced biofuels, and perhaps 
more relevant ones.  But these three offer an example of why the literature on first-
generation biofuels is useful to bring in: it illustrates the gap between the promise of the 
technology and the reality on the ground when it is deployed, as well as what can happen 
on local scales.  These results may darken the promise of projections regarding BECCS.  
Yet ideally, the three observations point to how policymakers could be smarter in 
designing incentives or devoting R&D funding for this new generation of biofuels, when 
the imperative is not just greener fuel but greenhouse gas removal.   
 
  
3.2  Forest carbon projects  
 
Afforestation is a way of enhancing the carbon sink, and there is a robust 
literature about how existing programs and projects attempt this.  For example, Thomson 
Reuters Web of Science article citations in the Social Science database for “REDD” 
number 325; there are 114 articles for “forest carbon” + “social”.  Many if not most of 
these are field-base case studies; some aggregate monitoring and evaluation information 
about REDD+ program effectiveness (e.g. Caplow et al, 2011).  Impacts data is of 
varying quality, with indicators like employment more common than health or literacy 
(Caplow et al, 2011). Fieldwork can illustrate several social issues around afforestation, 
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and how choices about future environments are made.  Here, two will be explored: 
changes in forest ownership and forest access, and concerns about who benefits from 
afforestation projects.    
 
Crucially, people who currently use forests (for food, fuel, grazing, etc.) may not 
be the ones making the decision to afforest for carbon projects. They may not even be the 
owners, since nation-states own much forestland.  In the world's 36 most forested 
countries, representing 85% of the world's forest estate, national governments have 
statutory ownership of 60% of lands— a legacy of state appropriation in many countries 
(Sunderlin et al, 2013). State ownership varies regionally: governments have official 
control of about a third of Latin American forests, about two-thirds in Asia, and virtually 
the entire area in Africa (ibid.).  This matters because people with communal or unclear 
land tenure may be displaced if governments launch forest carbon sequestration efforts.  
Some studies report limitations to access, which takes various forms. For example, Lyons 
and Westoby studied the largest plantation forestry operator in Africa, in Uganda, and 
describe restrictions on crop cultivation, grazing, bee keeping, and collection of firewood; 
the confiscation of animals that strayed into the plantation area, with expensive payments 
required to collect them; fines and jail time for "trespassing"; and destruction of burial 
sites (2014).  Another broad governance problem with scaling up terrestrial carbon 
sequestration is that nation-states are not equally strong, cohesive, or efficacious. 
Recommendations in carbon-woody biomass literature may work using assumptions that 
a developing country government actually controls all the lands within its borders, while 
in reality its influence might meet resistance rather than compliance (Unruh, 2011). 
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Unruh’s blunt assessment: “In reality the derivation and implementation of improved 
policies, laws, and ‘will’ in the developing world, particularly over large multicountry 
areas needed for carbon storage to be a mitigation option, are unrealistic within the 
needed time frame” (2011). These disjoints between imagined forest projects where 
nation-states guarantee smooth operations and conditions on the ground can lead to both 
conflict in particular places and disappointment for remote policymakers.  
 
Who benefits from existing forest carbon projects? In the Ugandan case study, 
foreign investors were the primary beneficiaries, as well as domestic power elites, 
company staff, and “local elites with ‘special’ access rights to graze animals and grow 
food crops within the license areas" (Lyons and Westoby, 2014).  Cases like this can be 
found elsewhere.  For example, Niemark et al studied a REDD readiness site in Laos, 
where higher status families were able to organize themselves and capture initial benefits, 
and chiefs and their families became local knowledge brokers on REDD+ and carbon 
trading (2016).  Unruh identifies two complications regarding benefits: first, the benefits 
earned from forest carbon projects have to be compared with the counterfactual; second, 
people often interact with forest resources for immediate needs, while carbon storage is 
theoretically long-term, so there is a temporal mismatch (2011).   
 
What of social safeguards?  Protections for forest people designed to deal with the 
above issues may have limited efficacy.  Within the REDD+ framework, social 
safeguards for REDD-readiness mandate tenure clarification. The Climate, Community, 
and Biodiversity Alliance has established certification schemes to ensure biodiversity and 
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community livelihood goals are met through REDD+ projects (e.g. standards) to ensure 
that biodiversity and community livelihood goals are met through just means while also 
reaching carbon mitigation goals; however, these standards are not always met (Suiseeya 
and Caplow, 2013). As in the biofuel example, the disjunct between idealized reality and 
actual reality was recognized, experts attempted to intervene (in the biofuel case, by 
developing sustainable biofuel standards); then a literature evaluating the effectiveness of 
that intervention emerged.  This literature offers a wealth of information for thinking 
about how the scale-up of carbon dioxide removal would deal with the issues of natural 
resource ownership and access and distribution of benefits. 
  
The above examples draw largely from the developing world, but there are also 
helpful studies addressing forest carbon in countries where land ownership is clear.  For 
example, in a survey of Australian landholders, relevant factors in their willingness to 
adopt afforestation for carbon sequestration included the design and social acceptability 
of afforestation, as well as the socio-demographic attributes, knowledge, skills, and 
experience of landholders (Schirmer and Bull, 2014).  Empirical research can suggest not 
just barriers to scaling-up carbon dioxide removal activities, but information to help 
target new projects.  
 
 
4.  Thinking beyond negative emission technologies towards carbon practices 
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With a carbon budget as tight as 590-1240 GtCO2 from 2015 onward to have a 
likely chance of keeping global mean temperature below 2°C (Rogelj et al, 2016), the 
stakes for understanding how society can scale-up carbon dioxide removal are quite high.  
The previous section identified several social aspects that would need to be confronted 
for a successful scale-up: (1) new arrangements of production of advanced biofuels or 
carbon commodities for biological sequestration; (2) the phenomena of speculation and 
phantom commodities as investment is scaled up, including the role of science and policy 
in creating or curbing speculative investment; (3) issues of  informal land tenure and 
“marginal” land; and (4) the question of who accesses the benefits of new technologies.  
The existing empirical work on these factors in previous biofuel and carbon policy 
suggests a few recommendations for scientists, entrepreneurs, and policymakers hoping 
to scale up NETs.   
 
Firstly, researchers and policymakers should examine intermediate scales.  While 
modeling can illustrate global processes, strategies for scaling up CDR are going to be 
extremely context-specific, with local challenges.  The regional level is a promising place 
to start bridging these scales.  Few regional or national models have looked at NETs, with 
Sanchez et al’s (2015) study of BECCS for power generation on the west coast of the US 
being an exception, and a blueprint for other studies (Bauer, 2015).  Another useful scale 
is the landscape level, as it can spur holistic thinking about ecological and social 
feedbacks (see Hunsberger et al, 2015).  Regional and landscape-level expertise from 
environmental sociologists, anthropologists, and human geographers can illuminate 
challenges particular to local cultural dynamics. In regards to bioenergy, Creutzig et al 
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(2013) called for a comprehensive assessment by human geographers and agricultural 
economists to think about distributional livelihood effects and the particulars of biofuel 
deployment schemes, from crops to institutional arrangements and tenure schemes; they 
noted an “ample opportunity to soft-couple integrated assessment models with local 
livelihood analyses and CGE and partial equilibrium sector models”. This kind of work 
will be essential in transcending scalar disconnects between coarse models and local 
impacts for CDR. 
 
Secondly, previous research on analogous and related technologies and projects 
suggests governments worldwide will need to employ a stronger hand in many aspects of 
the process of scaling up NETs — the market is not going to deliver outcomes that are 
good for broad swathes of societies without copious support and guidance. The research 
on the existing “social safeguards” for REDD+ and safeguards for allocating land to 
large-scale biofuel feedstock should be extended, as the current body of work suggests 
that voluntary guidelines are not sufficient to curb adverse effects of new land uses.  
Governments will need to provide clearer definitions of “marginal land” and revisit 
productive use requirements (Cotula et al, 2008)— both in terms of tenure security and 
avoiding phantom commodities.  This stronger role of government involves, obviously, 
setting up a carbon price and revisiting energy subsidies.  It also involves support for 
technologies to cross the valley of death from pilot-stage to implementation, training the 
workforce for new opportunities, as well as agricultural extension support and incentives 
for new land use practices. Moreover, this greater state involvement goes beyond what 
may immediately seem to be related to negative emissions technologies.  Proceeding 
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towards a greater economic valuation of carbon will not work without institutions that 
support livelihoods, good governance, and land tenure security in developing countries; 
current efforts from rich countries to provide aid to these goals must be expanded.  In 
short, actually scaling up NETs will require policies that are out of line with hands-off, 
market-led approaches to environmental management and technology development. It is 
better to reckon with this now, rather than separating the technology out from the social 
changes necessary to scale it up, and imagining that it can develop on its own. 
 
Finally, all of this suggests that “technologies” being “deployed” is not the most 
helpful way to think about these practices. In regards to “negative emissions 
technologies”, the focus on “technologies” is misplaced to the degree that it treats 
technologies as objects or artifacts — what Corry has called the “contraption fallacy” 
(2014).  Rather, it matters how the forest or crop is grown, how the infrastructure is built, 
and who is changing their soil management practices to sequester carbon.  It matters 
where the profits go, where the commodity chains lead, who is in the social groups that 
experience differential opportunities or constraints, etc.  An alternative framing might be 
useful in emphasizing these features, such as a holistic discipline of “carbon 
management”, though “management” implies a precision and control that is lacking at 
present. Within agriculture, “carbon farming” is a useful approach to emphasize the 
activity of farming.  Perhaps “carbon production” will become a concept, in terms of 
storing carbon in long-lasting wood products or plastics.  In any case, a focus on the 
activities (negative emissions practices, emphasizing the verb and action, rather than the 
noun or technological object) keeps the social dimensions of people and place in the 
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picture.  Empirical social science can work towards understanding the contexts, changing 
social relations, and barriers to these activities on the ground in ways that are crucial to 
bringing carbon dioxide removal from pilot-scale theory to scaled-up practice. It also 
illustrates ways in which previous imaginaries of large-scale land transformation for 
climate policy have fallen short.  For policymakers and modelers to continue to include 
assumptions about negative emissions in climate pathway projections constitutes, as 
Geden (2016) points out, the continued co-production of irresponsibility.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Calculating the Potential for “Blue Growth”: Building Stories of Ocean Futures 
with Numbers  
 
 
Abstract 
 
The “blue economy” or “blue growth” narrative suggests that to feed and fuel nine billion 
people, humans will tap the oceans’ potential to provide protein, energy, genetic 
resources, and ecosystem services. Twin narratives of the ocean’s importance and 
fragility are buoyed by a litany of numbers cataloging dwindling fish stocks, seabed 
resources, carbon storage potential, and so on, measuring both the potential for 
responsible development and irresponsibility. Emerging technologies and methods of 
quantification drive the blue economy’s ambitious story about the future human 
relationship with the ocean.  Quantification operates in three overlapping ways: 
geographical measurements are combined with biophysical monitoring to enable 
economic calculations of ocean wealth. Four case studies of national interest in creating 
ocean economy metrics (the United States, China, Mauritius, and Ireland) illuminate how 
this number-based narrative and operates in policy, noting how assessments of ocean 
wealth can be a performative tool for states to engage promissory capital, and questioning 
underlying assumptions about how to manage lively oceans in the Anthropocene.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Ocean acidification, dead zones, diminishing biodiversity: this is a perilous 
moment for the planet's oceans.  While data about ocean decline is flowing in, the ocean 
is simultaneously being constructed as a terrain of abundance, a “knowable space” loaded 
with “marine resources” or “bioresources.”  Varied terms are given to this vision of 
growth based upon ocean resources: "blue growth", "the blue economy", "the ocean 
economy", and "ocean wealth" are the most common.  What counts as part of the blue 
economy?  Assets like seafood, genetic resources, and mineral resources; new forms of 
energy like wave, current, tidal, ocean thermal, and offshore wind; and services like 
carbon sequestration are commonly counted.  Shipping and trade, cable 
telecommunications, and tourism are sometimes counted: though sectors like tourism can 
be at odds with extractive sectors. 
 
 The blue economy is commonly introduced with a litany of facts and figures 
supporting the ocean's relevance to economic life, as well as life in general.  The ocean 
produces half the oxygen we breathe. It provides 4.3 billion people with more than 15 
percent of their annual animal protein consumption, and global ocean economic activity 
is estimated to be USD 3–5 trillion (FAO 2014). Ninety percent of trade moves by 
maritime transport; 95% of global telecommunications are carried by submarine cables; 
and 13 of the world's 20 megacities are coastal (Cicin-Sain 2015). Looking beyond the 
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numbers, it is not clear that these are figures directly linked to the promise of the blue 
economy:  how does “three-quarters of the earth’s surface is water” directly link to 
economic potential?  These statistics do, however, provoke a sense of wonder for this 
often-overlooked realm the planet.  The ritual repetition of them reminds the reader that 
the ocean is there, vaster and older than us.   
 
 Importantly, the referent for ocean imaginations is often terra firma.  It is land’s 
relative scarcity which encourages the ocean to be constructed as a contrasting terrain of 
abundance.  The ocean is posited as the solution for various land-originating crises: food, 
energy, material scarcity. The plain language found in an OECD assessment of the ocean 
economy is typical: “By mid-century enough food, jobs, energy, raw materials and 
economic growth will be required to sustain a likely population level of between 9 and 10 
billion people. The potential of the ocean to help meet those requirements is huge” 
(2016).  In short, the sea is the next frontier where all these needs will be pushed towards. 
 
Ocean wealth, unlike many forms of land-based abundance, is hidden below the 
waves.  It rests on practices of quantification to make it recognizable.  Once it is 
countable, the results can promote attention and investment. There is also a mostly-
unquestioned assumption that quantification of the oceans enables management. In the 
past decade, states and supranational organizations have incorporated the blue economy / 
blue growth vision into policy, relying on a myriad of measurements and metrics in order 
to do so.  The past few years have seen a modest literature spring up to question the blue 
economy discourse and the specific measurement practices that enact it, and this article 
	 77	
reviews this literature. There are a number of critical literatures that intersect with the 
blue economy — those on ecosystem services, for example, as well as fisheries and 
aquaculture production.  Selected examples from these have been included in this review 
when their focus is on measurement and metrics, but in general, this review is limited to 
articles that either (1) engage the blue economy discourse directly, or (2) discuss its 
quantification practices.  The review embarks with a brief discursive history of the blue 
economy.  The second part examines the drive by nation-states to measure the oceans' 
wealth with economic tools.  The third section looks at the measurement practices from 
biology and geography that these economic valuations depend upon, and explores the 
overlapping currents of literature from political ecology, geography, and science and 
technology studies that critically analyze these practices.   
 
 
2.  Where Did the “Blue Economy” Come From — and Why Does It Emerge Now? 
 
 
Scientific measurements are indicating that the ocean is warming and rising in 
salinity, forcing changes in stratification and ocean overturning.  It is acidic: ocean 
acidification is the “sleeper issue” of climate change, where about 30% of the carbon 
dioxide emitted into the atmosphere is now in the ocean, decreasing the average pH from 
about 8.2 to 8.1 since the beginning of the industrial revolution (NRC 2010).  The rate of 
this change exceeds any known change in ocean chemistry for at least 800,000 years 
(ibid.).  The ocean has 400+ dead zones, driven by eutrophication from agriculture (Diaz 
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2008).  Notably, this dark facet of the Anthropocene ocean also rests upon quantification 
practices that enable us to know with greater and more painful accuracy what is 
occurring.  While the statistics on the new ocean might seem to shatter any notions about 
the oceans as a space of new potential, the grim numbers in fact help drive the blue 
economy, as it is an imaginary built around sustainability and even repair.  The worse 
climate change gets, the more we need alternative energy and food sources.  The more 
challenges to biodiversity, the more ocean research is needed to address them: such is the 
logic of the blue economy.  It is not just potentials and assets which count, but losses.  As 
Achim Steiner wrote in a forward to the UN-agency collaborative report Green Economy 
in a Blue World, “through a better understanding of the enormous economic losses being 
sustained and the enormous opportunities from investing and re-investing in marine 
ecosystems, perhaps the balance can be tipped away from degradation and destruction to 
sustainable management for this generation and the ones to come” (2012).  The hope 
lingers on that valuing ecosystems monetarily will result in valuing them spiritually and 
culturally enough to stop destroying them. 
 
 While this picture of the troubled ocean became increasingly detailed, economic, 
scientific, and political trends were converging to boost ideas of new ocean wealth.  
Firstly, high commodity prices (e.g. for food) and the land rush of 2008-2010 provoked a 
new wave of anxiety about the limits of terrestrial food and energy production.  
Promoters of new ocean industries, particularly aquaculture, but also marine renewables, 
seized upon this anxiety.  
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 Secondly, rapid scientific advances in biotechnology and chemistry fed the search 
for new organisms that thrive in novel environments and encouraged excitement about 
new processing techniques for ocean biomass, like the marine biorefinery.  Other 
technological advances in working offshore (e.g. robotics), telecommunications, and 
mapping are also opening new opportunities. 
 
 Thirdly, contemporary references to the blue economy in international 
development discourse began welling up in the run-up to the 2012 Rio+20 summit. This 
is well detailed in Silver et al's collaborative event ethnography, which examines the 
articulations of the term within four competing discourses about human-ocean relations: 
oceans as natural capital, oceans as good business, oceans as integral to Pacific SIDS, and 
oceans as small-scale fisheries livelihoods (2015).  Oceans are now marked by their own 
Sustainable Development Goal: “Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and 
marine resources for sustainable development”. This SDG was pushed for by the Pacific 
SIDS (Visbeck et al 2014), and has the sub-target: “By 2030, increase the economic 
benefits to Small Island developing States and least developed countries from the 
sustainable use of marine resources, including through sustainable management of 
fisheries, aquaculture and tourism” (Cicin-Sain 2015). Metrics— i.e., quantitative 
indicators that make the previously unknown measurable— are key to this sustainable 
management, and to knowing if progress towards the goal has been achieved.  
 
 While the transnational notion of the global blue economy is often traced to the 
Rio+20 moment, many national ocean strategies attempted to quantify ocean wealth in 
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the early 2000s, as will be discussed below.  There was also an earlier ripple of literature 
about ocean wealth in the early 1970s and 1980s, with some similar drivers as today.  
Firstly, the Limits to Growth era sparked an initial interest in ocean cultivation for food 
and fuel — manifesting in projects like the US Navy’s Ocean Food and Energy Farm 
project between 1972 and 1977, which constructed ocean farms for cultivating giant kelp 
(Wilcox 1982).  Deep-sea mining was also of interest in this time, though it has yet to 
prove lucrative.  Policy developments envisioned a more managed sea: for example, in 
the US, marine policy went forward with the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 
which explicitly required commercial fleets to change how they fished, and the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management act in 1976. Before these, 
federal management of marine fisheries was virtually nonexistent (Myers and Worm 
2003).  Further enabling the sea to be managed terrain was the landmark 1982 UN 
Convention on Law of the Sea, a bottom-up agreement which enabled responsibility-
taking, but which also made it possible to make definitive claims to resources.  Scientific 
advances like the deep-sea research of the Alvin submersible also factored into 
excitement about the potential of the seas.  While this earlier literature will generally not 
be reviewed here, it is important to note that today's wave of interest in ocean wealth has 
an earlier precedent.   
 
 
3.  Calculating the Blue Economy: State Attempts 
 
 
	 81	
 Why spend time making these calculations, and for whom?  It is not intuitive that 
it is necessary to measure the wealth of the ocean — in fact, through one lens it can seem 
quixotic, creating an information system for measuring the activity in a territory which is 
vast, fluid, and materially challenging to work in.  While industry benefits from ocean 
economy enthusiasm, industry does not seem interested in creating collective ocean 
economy statistics.  Sustainability, as mentioned, is a justification for measuring the 
oceans, and some NGOs are entering the discussion.  The World Wildlife Fund's report 
Reviving the Ocean Economy put forth an annual gross marine product of $2.5 trillion 
and an oceanic asset base of $24 trillion: "Putting it into an international context, if the 
ocean were a country it would have the seventh largest economy in the world” (Hoegh-
Guldberg 2015).  The report is clear about what it hopes to achieve with its 
quantification-based revisioning: "We believe this new economic analysis, coupled with 
the scientific evidence, makes an undeniable case to move urgently beyond rhetoric to 
action” (ibid.). 
 
For the most part, though, national ocean accounting is a state-led, or at least 
state-influenced, project. States need to measure to (1) manage their resources, and (2) be 
sustainable and make sure ocean health is protected.  In general, there is an unquestioned 
assumption that links data with the capacity to manage. As Zhao et al write, in regards to 
China, "the availability of a wide range of accessible data on ocean economic activities is 
necessary for achieving the efficient management of the marine economy" (2014).  Less 
oft-articulated reasons for measuring ocean wealth include (3) creating excitement to 
attract investors, and (4) creating jobs for the people doing the measuring.   
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 States have varying, specific motivations for incorporating blue growth as a 
strategy.  Small island states, with their 200-mile EEZs around each island, can revision 
themselves as "large ocean states" (Acharya 2014).  Single-resource dependent countries 
like Oman, whose government income depends on oil and gas, could diversify their 
economies by expanding into blue biotech (Al-Belushi et al 2015).   China, for example, 
has some geostrategic interest in expanding its ocean territory.  The Irish strategy for 
harnessing ocean wealth hearkens towards valuing a part of its heritage which was 
undervalued under colonialism.  Calculating the blue economy, then, goes beyond the 
aims of driving policy and driving investment to complex political and cultural concerns.   
In what follows, we will look at four examples from states who have been attempting to 
calculate ocean wealth, in order to ground discussion of these quantification practices and 
illuminate how they tie into management and responsibility-taking. 
 
 
The United States: Quantification for planning and protection 
 
 Because of its academic strengths, work from the US has had a prominent role in 
measuring ocean wealth, though the US does not have a strong maritime identity 
compared to other nations.  While in other states the drive to measure the ocean economy 
has been a top-down, ministerial-driven process, in the US academic entrepreneurship 
seems to have played a strong role.  In the US, the National Ocean Economics Program 
began in 1999, and is headquartered at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at 
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Monterey.  Early studies estimated the GDP derived from ocean-related economic 
activities; more recent work looks at employment, wages, and different scales of analysis 
(Colgan 2013).  Recently, the definition of the ocean economy has moved from a focus 
on economic activity rather than economic value (Colgan 2013).  The four concepts 
comprising "activity" are establishments (a place where employees work), employment, 
wages, and gross domestic product-state.   
 
 These national efforts also include cross-national dialogue on ocean economy 
topics.  For example, the newly developed Center for the Blue Economy has been holding 
workshops like the 2015 “The Oceans in National Income Accounts: Seeking Consensus 
on Definitions and Standards,” in which representatives from 10 nations worked upon 
finding mutually agreed criteria for ocean wealth measurement (Spalding 2016).  The 
work of scholars from the NOEP has been influential in other national programs, judging 
by citations, and so the values expressed in their techniques may also have been exported.  
The work in the US indicates a dual purpose for measuring ocean activity: planning and 
protection.  In a 2010 article, Kildow and McIlgorm lay out the rationale for estimating 
the contribution to the oceans to national economies: oceans comprise a large part of 
national economies, and so marine trade and resource trends can have national-level 
impact.  At the same time, ocean data is helpful to address challenges of moving away 
from a carbon-based economy, a decline in fish stocks, and land-based food shortages 
(ibid).   
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China: Quantification for industrial and geostrategic development 
 
 China is one of the few nations where the government collects and disseminates 
ocean economy data.  China's marine economy plays a larger role in its national economy 
than in most nations — 9.7% of GDP, compared to the ranges of 1-3% calculated 
elsewhere (Song et al 2013).  Its calculation efforts began in earnest in 1989, when the 
State Oceanic Administration was ordered to take responsibility for collecting and 
organizing marine statistics (ibid).  The SOA has been responsible since the early 1980s 
for things like surveying and monitoring the marine environment, scientific research, and 
environmental management; the agency now also organizes how marine territory is used 
(Takeda 2014). 
 
 In 1990, the SOA drew up the Index System of National Marine Statistics.  
Interestingly, two of the eight categories it was initially comprised of did not yet have any 
data — marine medicine and seawater utilization— indicating a forward-thinking 
direction.  These two domains received special five-year plans for their development in 
2012 and 2013, giving them investment support (Zhao et al 2014).  This was the first of 
many publications in marine statistics, the history of which is detailed in Song et al 
(2013).  The field became increasingly relevant with the 2006 Outline of 11th Five Year 
Plan for National Economic and Social Development, which "emphasized that ‘'we must 
strengthen ocean awareness, safeguard ocean rights and interests, protect ocean biology, 
exploit ocean resources, implement marine integrated management and promote marine 
economic development'" (ibid).  At this time, 12 categories were solidified, from offshore 
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oil and gas to sea salt and marine engineering and architecture.  It seems that a great 
emphasis is placed upon taxonomy.  For example, the 2006 "Industrial classification for 
Ocean industries and their related activities" laid out core, supportive, and outer layers of 
the marine economy, and divided them into 28 first classes, 107 second and 380 third 
classes (ibid).  
 
 Currently, work is in progress on accounting for marine permanent capital, 
environment, and non-market valuation (Song et al 2013); see Zhao et al (2014) for 
details. The 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015) goes into greater depth about the ocean 
economy, calling for the nation to “develop and implement a marine development 
strategy based on unified sea and land planning, and improve marine development and 
control capabilities" (Takeda 2014).  Three new areas of emphasis in this plan are 
renewable energy from the oceans, deep-seabed mineral exploration (e.g. methane 
hydrates), and polar exploration, as China seeks to make its mark in the Arctic (ibid).  
The government also plans to develop 11 ocean economic development zones (Zhao et al 
2014).  However, some of this emphasis on emerging industries— which contribute just a 
small fraction of growth— is concurrent with neglect of traditional industries like 
aquaculture (Ding et al 2014).  Ding et al note that the marine economy is not developing 
exactly as planned: instead of coastal reclamation, large scale sea reclamation is done 
because it is cheaper.  According to one government report, more than half of China's 
18,000 km of coastline has been artificially modified (ibid).  Rather than developing 
"marine resources", industrial coastal development has occurred, such as port 
construction, real estate, shipbuilding, etc. (ibid).  This disjunct between the policy vision 
	 86	
and outcomes, even in a state which emphasizes planning, may indicate the limits of state 
control over investment flows. 
 
 In China, the marine economy is wrapped up with state power.  In a 2012 address 
to the National Congress of the Communist Party of China, General Secretary Hu Jintao 
declared, “We should enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resources, develop the 
marine economy, protect the marine ecological environment, resolutely safeguard 
China’s maritime rights and interests, and build China into a maritime power" (Takeda 
2014).  Scarcity plays a role in this.  Productive land resources are near the limits of 
exploitation in some areas of China— the nation imports the majority of the oil it uses, 
has limited supplies of fresh water, and has limits to cultivation— all of which has led 
national strategy towards the seas, and towards asserting its rights to their resources 
(Zhao et al 2014; Takeda 2014).  In 2013, the SOA director gave a speech in which he 
stressed safeguarding the maritime rights of the state: "We will move further ahead with 
comprehensive administration, and we will strike a ‘combination blow,’ the main 
elements of which will be legal, administrative, and maritime activities and public 
opinion propaganda. We will undertake systematic deepening of research and external 
propaganda on hot issues of maritime rights and interests.” (Takeda 2014).  
Quantification practices are set to underlie the legal and administrative aspects of this 
"combination blow." 
 
 
Ireland: Quantification for economic recovery and cultural awareness 
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 Ireland's "Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth" strategy was launched in 2011, after 
roughly a decade of work on ocean economies by academics and government researchers 
at the state’s Marine Institute and NUI Galway's Socio-Economic Marine Research Unit.  
It has two numerical targets: to reach €6.4 billion a year in turnover from our maritime 
sectors by 2020, and doubling their contribution to GDP to 2.4% a year by 2030 (2012).  
The strategy emerged in the wake of the 2008 downturn— and the government's 
emphasis on "balanced" economic recovery, which means recovery for regions and rural 
areas.  At the same time, the ocean strategy is a part of a broader economic thrust towards 
a knowledge-based high-value added economy.  One of the aims is to "strengthen the 
collation of marine socio-economic data to ensure the timely availability of marine socio-
economic statistics, providing an evidence-base for policy and decision- making, 
economic forecasting and scenario planning."  The academic efforts to quantify ocean 
wealth (Morrissey et al 2011) draw upon Colgan and the US NOEP; and academic work 
has also looked at regional disparities (Morrissey and O'Donoghue 2012), illustrating the 
power of a geographical analysis.  Morrissey and O'Donoghue (2013) extend their work 
to an input-output analysis, which looks at inter-industry linkage effects, production-
inducing effects and employment multipliers.  Marine mapping has also been a part of the 
strategy broadly. 
 
 The strategy's three goals (based on the three pillars of sustainability) are to have 
a thriving maritime economy, to maintain healthy ecosystems, and to increase 
engagement with the sea.  This goal of strengthening maritime identity and increasing 
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awareness of the value (market and non-market) of the sea might seem out of character 
with this kind of report, but it relates to the history of cultivation and land appropriation 
under British rule, in which land was the focus of struggle.  The state’s narrative in the 
strategy alludes to this: "We have embraced the land as the primary provider of food and 
fuel; often overlooking our ocean wealth. We often hear that we tend to have a blind spot 
in relation to Ireland’s marine resource."  The document is in essence a reframing 
document, beginning with a map captioned: "The ‘Real’ Map of Ireland with 220 Million 
Acres Under the Sea" (“Harnessing” 2012).   
  
 The example of Ireland is notable for its emphasis on public buy-in.  It was 
shaped by stakeholder consultation, with 192 submissions, and it continues to seek to 
engage the public.  For example, the third annual Our Ocean Wealth conference in 2016 
at the National University of Ireland, Galway, is being held concurrently with an industry 
conference (Global Insights: Irish Opportunity, by Bord Iascaigh Mhara), and a public 
festival: SeaFest, with a giant paper boat, tours of marine survey and research vessels, 
and remote controlled boats to play with.  It will be interesting to track if the goal of 
public engagement with the sea translates into success with other aspects of the strategy. 
 
 
Mauritius: Quantification for a developmental state 
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 Mauritius, an island nation 2000 km off the coast of East Africa with a population 
of 1.3 million, is not the smallest of island states, with more people and economic 
capability than many of the small island developing states.  Mauritius considers itself to 
be a "large ocean state".  It has an "economic ocean space" of 2.3 million square 
kilometers, "equivalent to the combined land mass of Spain, Italy, France and the UK" 
(Roadmap 2013).  That is, its ocean space is more than 1100 times that of its land mass 
(ibid.). 
 
 As the Mauritius Government Programme 2012-2015 states, the recognition of 
Mauritius's economic rights over the EEZ "will transform our sense of our own 
geography and constraints", and hence "government will invite the nation to embark on a 
major rethink of the potential beyond our existing land mass and consider opportunities 
as an Ocean State" (“Government” 2012).  On one hand, this is clearly an exercise in 
actively re-imagining one's brand, and Mauritius is highly invested in its brand of being 
an "economic miracle in the Indian Ocean".  However, Mauritius has gone further than 
many nations in claiming an "ocean economy" as a pillar of its economy.  With one of the 
highest median incomes in Africa, Mauritius occupies a space where it can plausibly 
imagine a technology-driven development strategy— and it has a history of guiding its 
own development and standing up new industries.  While the colonial economy was 
driven by sugar, the government took on a program of industrialization post-
independence, building industries in export processing / textiles and then finance.  The 
ocean economy is considered to be the latest new strategic direction.  The government 
has proceeded in an organized matter.  As part of the "Government Programme 2012-
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2015", Mauritius created a National Dialogue on the Ocean Economy, and from this 
process set out the 2013 Roadmap for the Ocean Economy.  The seven main clusters 
identified in the Roadmap are (1) seabed exploration for hydrocarbon & minerals; (2)  
fishing, seafood processing, and aquaculture; (3) Deep Ocean Water Applications 
(DOWA); (4) marine services, including biotech, tourism, finance, ICT, and ship 
registration; (5) seaport-related activities; (6) marine renewable energies; and (7) ocean 
knowledge (“Government” 2012).  The position of Minister of the Ocean Economy was 
created, and in 2014, Mauritius opened the Faculty of Ocean Studies, which strategically 
feeds into the ocean knowledge cluster. 
  
 Developing the Ocean Economy is envisioned to take time.  In speech made by 
the former Prime Minister Ramgoolam, he stated, "It has taken us some 50 years to be 
where we are from a monocrop economy. It will take Mauritius longer to develop its 
Ocean Economy. This task is not for our generation only – it is a task for many more 
generations – and it is a task that we need to accomplish. The Ocean Economy is the 
bridge to the future of our country” (2013).  This narrative continues the story of 
Mauritius rising from its colonial past to a diverse, postmodern economy.  Though the 
administration changed in 2014, the new government seems to still be committed to the 
ocean economy idea.  The Ocean Economy, in this case, is a program of nation-building 
and future-building for a post-colonial state. 
 
 These four cases show the varying rationales that can drive the blue economy.  
While to some degree the answer to “Who authors future environments?” is in fact 
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“technocrats” or “economists”, working in some coalition of state-sponsored research and 
academia, they are responding to different demands.  The sensitivity to the environment 
evidenced in the US efforts probably reflects the influence of a strong environmental 
NGO presence in ocean discussions; the focus on education in Mauritius shows its drive 
to be a development-oriented state and build local capacity in a strategic area.  The 
processes by which Ireland sought to do stakeholder engagement in its ocean strategy, 
and the inclusive title of “Harnessing our ocean wealth”, show efforts to cast the ocean as 
a collective resource.  How well these positions translate into citizen involvement in 
environment-shaping is an empirical question beyond the scope of this chapter, but the 
four cases offer interesting insights into how national interests can influence the terms, 
tenor, and grounds for citizen engagement in environment-shaping imaginaries. 
 
 
 
4.  Quantification Processes: How Geographic, Biological, and Economic Forms of 
Measurement Work Together 
 
 
 The above four cases illustrate a variety of motivations for quantifying ocean 
economies: integrated management, geostrategic expansion, cultural identity-building, 
national economic development.  These cases also illustrate the patchwork nature of 
ocean economy measurement.  There are two main challenges to coherent metrics: (1) 
official national statistics are not designed to measure the economic contribution of the 
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oceans, and (2)  "the results obtained in these studies are not comparable because the 
selection of maritime activities, classification systems, data collection methodology, time 
periods or geographical scale, that is, the very definition of what it is considered maritime 
economy varies from country to country" (Fernandez-Macho et al 2016).  Perhaps in an 
era of big data, some of this data-matching will become easier, but it may require a much 
stronger force to lobby for it to be better funded. 
 
 There is not a widespread literature about the practice of ocean accounting, or 
about the blue economy comprehensively.  Why?  Perhaps because the notions are 
relatively new, perhaps because of disciplinary boundaries; perhaps because some of the 
technologies are emergent, or because the blue economy is a largely discursive 
phenomenon, encompassing some sociotechnical imaginaries that may not yet have great 
impacts on the ground (compared to other phenomena that catch the attention of social 
scientists).  However, there are sub-literatures that address facets of ocean economy 
measurement.  That is, while scholarly attention is not focused directly upon measuring 
ocean wealth as in the four examples mentioned above, scholars have scrutinized 
component practices: measuring ocean space and measuring ocean life. 
 
 
Geography: measuring space and place-bound resources 
 
 The drive to measure ocean space, and what it contains, has roots in navigation 
and maritime charting.  For a historical perspective, Anne-Flore Laloë's 2016 book 
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examines the scientific and cultural paradigms leading to the production of knowledge 
about ocean-space over the last four centuries.  She examines the role of technologies like 
sounding-devices, ships, and measuring buoys.  The link between these historical 
practices of charting and the blue economy can be seen in the US National Ocean Policy's 
Ocean Economy section, which aims to "Advance our mapping and charting capabilities 
and products to support a range of economic activities."   
 
To sustain the flow of the trillions of dollars and goods that pass through our ports 
and the many business that rely on the ocean, our coasts, and Great Lakes, agencies will 
coordinate to produce better mapping and charting products, which serve to preserve, 
protect, and expand our Nation's maritime economic activities.  Improved mapping, 
charting, and associated products will enhance the efficiency of maritime commerce 
through safer navigation and better accident-avoidance, and updated hydrographic charts 
and seafloor maps will support marine industries such as offshore energy.  These 
products will also provide coastal communities with better elevation and bathymetric data 
to plan for and mitigate economic impacts of disasters. 
 
 The rationale here is that mapping brings (1) efficiency, (2) knowledge for 
extractive industries, and (3) security, in terms of disaster response.  Beyond cartography, 
the policy also advocates ocean-observing systems for real-time information on marine 
conditions, to support commerce. 
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 From a nation-state perspective, quantifying the maritime domain through 
geographic practices is useful for both military aims, and for making claims on ocean 
space.  Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, maritime claims are based upon 
underwater geology, as coastal states have sovereignty over their continental shelf.  Each 
nation's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extends 200 miles from the shore, but in some 
cases the continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles, thus enabling claims based 
upon the "extended continental shelf."  Improvements in undersea charting technology 
have enabled many such claims in recent decades. 
 
 Quantifying ocean space is of interest to other actors, however; conservationists, 
for example, argue for marine protected areas.  In the past decade, marine spatial 
planning (MSP) has been proffered as a multi-stakeholder approach to addressing 
multiple uses of marine space.  This can be seen as an attempt to extend the logic of 
urban planning into rationalized global sea-space, regulating not the materiality of the sea 
but the relations between users (Ryan 2015).  Ryan points out that "zoning is profitably 
understood as a taxonomical process: as technological capability increases and scientific 
knowledge of the ocean expands, the global maritime is being systematically sub- divided 
into ever smaller administrative units" (2015).  With multiple stakeholders and multiple 
uses, there are tensions inherent in marine spatial planning, as the logics of production 
and conservation are at odds (ibid.).   
 
 Marine spatial planning and other mapping practices have given rise to three key 
scholarly responses.  Firstly, there are calls to better incorporate social data into marine 
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spatial planning, and make it truly more participatory or interdisciplinary (e.g. Kittinger 
et al 2014; see also Gruby et al's 2015 review article on a social science research agenda 
large marine protected areas).  Secondly, there is literature expressing concerns about 
how maritime protection zones and MSP contribute to new enclosures and "green 
grabbing" for conservation, or "blue grabbing".  Thirdly, and relatedly, there is an 
emerging geographical current of literature encouraging thinking beyond Euclidean space 
(Ryan 2015).  Steinberg and Peters propose "a wet ontology not merely to endorse the 
perspective of a world of flows, connections, liquidities, and becomings, but also to 
propose a means by which the sea’s material and phenomenological distinctiveness can 
facilitate the reimagining and reenlivening of a world ever on the move" (2015).  They 
highlight dimensions of volume, motion, and animation, as opposed to state ontologies of 
defined lines, suggesting that "In various frames, then, the sea is a fruitful space for 
revisioning volume and subsequent geopolitical order, offering a lens through which to 
study space and power from different angles. It is also a useful space for 
reconceptualising and ungrounding notions of time" (ibid.).  This is a very different 
approach to ocean space from quantifying it with GIS tools.  Empirical case studies like 
Van der Horst and Vermeylen's look at wind farm zoning  procedures and top-down 
spatial planning for flow resources illustrate the difficulties of counting on fluid assets 
(2010).   
 
 One result of these geographic practices, as Ryan points out, is to create value: 
"By being able to scientifically analyse, plan and predict the usage of space it acquires an 
economic worth. A hierarchy of value is constructed – some spaces are deemed to be 
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more productive than other spaces and a market comes into being" (2015).  The economic 
calculations of ocean wealth rely on these geographic practices to contain their value; 
they also rely on practices which count what is inside the containers. 
 
 
Biophysical science: measuring life 
 
 Measuring ocean life has a long history in fisheries management.  One primary 
current of literature stems from this, critiquing new enclosures and aquaculture as well as 
conventional fisheries management.  A second current of literature focuses upon 
measuring of ecosystem services, such as climate regulation.  In this we can include 
carbon, with "blue carbon" (carbon stored in mangroves and seagrass, for example) as a 
field of increasing interest (see Silver et al 2015).  A third, narrower current of literature 
links with science and technology studies, and looks at marine bioprospecting — which 
involves finding new forms of life, with the aim of quantifying their genetic material.  All 
of these concerns are included within a growing field of literature on "ocean grabbing"; 
below, these three currents of literature will be reviewed in turn. 
  
Fisheries governance, aquaculture, and the "Blue Revolution" 
 
 The measurement practices in sea fishery management have been interrogated 
from various angles.  Single-species biomass forecasting is used by governments to set 
the total allowable catch (TAC), and the UNCLOS mandates its signatories to use 
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Maximum Sustainable Yield to set catch yields (Cardwell and Thornton, 2015).  
Cardwell and Thornton review the history of three approaches to sea management — 
market-based fisheries management, based in bioeconomics; area-based conservation, 
based upon conservation biology; and community-based management, based upon 
anthropology.  They also helpfully review the small literature in human geography work 
on the sea, and call for more of it.  Geography can offer new ways of thinking about 
governing ocean space; as mentioned in the previous section.  Scholarship on more-than-
human geographies can highlight how the liveliness and mobility of sea life complicates 
rational management practices, as Bear (2013) does in an exploration of the Welsh 
Cardigan Bay scallop fishery. 
 
 Alongside an ecological or sustainability critique of sea fishery practices is a 
producer-oriented critique.  Mansfield authored a series of articles about neoliberalism in 
the oceans (2004), examining topics like property rights and the role of the state.  The 
processes of rationalization she analyses are obviously linked with measurement 
practices.  Later, a special issue of The Journal of Agrarian Change edited by Campling 
(2012) demonstrated the "historical and socio-ecological complexity of capture fisheries", 
and critiqued how technical practices designed to capture "maximum sustainable yield" 
are in fact political processes bound up with capitalist accumulation.  Multilateral 
agencies like the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have some sensitivity to this.  
After Rio+20, the FAO headed up the Blue Growth Initiative, which seeks to help 
countries implement the blue economy.  This has nevertheless provoked some critical 
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response for its quantification practices and “technocratic understanding” they represent 
(Doerr 2016).  
 
 This critique of the Blue Growth Initiative is more understandable in the context 
of the recent land rush (Bennett et al 2015).  Some scholars and NGOs focusing on how 
land grabbing affects smallholder farmers have turned their attention to fisherfolk, or 
ocean grabbing, with a landmark report being the Transnational Institute (TNI) 2014 
primer on The Global Ocean Grab.  As Oliver de Schutter, UN special rapporteur on the 
right to food, said: “Ocean-grabbing’ – in the shape of shady access agreements that harm 
small-scale fishers, unreported catch, incursions into protected waters, and the diversion 
of resources away from local populations – can be as serious a threat as ‘land-grabbing”. 
Bennett et al (2015) caution about misapplying the term, and offer a method of 
determining whether an intervention is "ocean grabbing," which they define: 
 
Ocean grabbing refers to dispossession or appropriation of use, control or 
access to ocean space or resources from prior resource users, rights 
holders or inhabitants. Ocean grabbing occurs through inappropriate 
governance processes and might employ acts that undermine human 
security or livelihoods or produce impacts that impair social–ecological 
well-being. Ocean grabbing can be perpetrated by public institutions or 
private interests.  
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  Ocean grabbing can refer to appropriation of spaces or resources, living or non-
living (ibid).  While at first ocean grabbing was used to refer to fish stocks, it could also 
refer to the taking of habitats, sand or minerals, etc., through various means of 
reallocation: single or multiple-use enclosures, changing property regimes, and changing 
resource allocation or resource use regimes, all of which are helpfully explored in 
Bennett et al's (2015) framework.  The drivers, according to TNI, are the emergence of a 
corporate seafood regime rearranging production chains and concentrating power and 
control; the privatization of sea-scapes; and the financialization of natural resources 
(2014). 
 
  In response to these concerns about new enclosures, some have posited the 
marine counterpart to food sovereignty: seafood sovereignty. "Blue Growth is an 
extension of the sustainability discourse that does not promise substantial change to 
capitalism’s environmentally and socially destructive practices, whereas Seafood 
Sovereignty advocates environmentally friendly and labor intensive practices which 
should receive recognition and protection as traditional or acquired fishing rights" (Doerr 
2016).  In this discourse, blue growth is a cover for continued exploitation, and some 
technologies even decrease seafood sovereignty.  As Harris writes, "Seafood sovereignty 
is threatened and challenged by the introduction of exotic species, inshore aquaculture, 
inshore harvesting by non-traditional technologies, allocation of access to offshore 
fisheries to foreign interests with non-traditional technologies, the tendency for foreign 
interests to deplete and depart, the creation of marine protected areas, the introduction of 
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frankenfish and supersalmon, habitat destruction, and exploitation for exportation"(Harris 
2013).   
 
 To understand this basket of threats, it's helpful to understand the contemporary 
moment in terms of another "blue" catchphrase: the Blue Revolution.  It imagines the 
counterpart to the Green Revolution.  “Within the next fifty years fish farming may 
change us from hunters and gatherers on the seas into ‘marine pastoralists’—just as a 
similar innovation some 10,000 years ago changed our ancestors from hunters and 
gatherers on the land into agriculturists and pastoralists”, writes oft-quoted management 
guru Peter Drucker (1999). This idea also featured in groups like the Seasteading 
Institute: “We’ve pushed agriculture and the Green Revolution to its limits on land, but 
remained hunter-gatherers on the ocean. A Blue Revolution in ocean farming technology 
would launch seasteads to center stage” (SI n.d.). And, of course, aquaculture companies 
would also be on stage: “by 2050 the human population is projected to be at 9.6 billion ... 
We currently stand astride an historic moment when aquaculture is finally overtaking 
capture fisheries as the largest source of protein from the sea, just as in our distant past, 
animal husbandry eventually overtook hunting as our primary source of meat,” states 
Henry Clifford, the VP at Aquabounty Technologies, who makes AquAdvantage GMO 
salmon (BioMarine 2013: 15).  
 
 The rise of aquaculture takes place upon the backdrop of the decline of capture 
fisheries, which have faced falling catches since the 1990s.  So far, aquaculture has been 
able to make up the shortfall. There are numerous potential problems with industrial-
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scale aquaculture: feces and waste feed falling to sediments can create sterile zones, 
nutrients can fertilize the water and create noxious algae blooms, waste from culture 
ponds can cause algae blooms, cultured organisms could transmit disease to wild 
organisms, cultured fish could escape, genetic diversity can change, etc. (Stickney, 30). 
One key problem is that 1/3 of the wild fish caught on earth end up as fish meal, and of 
that 81% goes to feed farmed fish (Myers and Worm 2003). A chief critique of the 
aquaculture industry is that instead of raising smaller fish, it’s raising carnivorous ones, 
which is nonsensical from a sustainability standpoint. Yet carnivorous fish are just 7.1% 
of aquacultural production, with omnivores and hervibores at 34.4%, filter feeders (like 
mussels) at 35%, and photosynthetic plants at 22.9% (World Bank 2007). So there really 
is a diversity of animals and plants being domesticated in the water beyond the press-
grabbing carnivorous fish. Moreover, 90% of global ocean-cultivated tonnage is from 
ecologically friendly crops like seaweeds, herbivores, omnivores and detritivores (Neori 
2007: 117).  
 
 But it's clear that there are all kinds of quantification practices necessary to enact 
a Blue Revolution — the scientific application of extending domestication and control 
into the seas requires measuring the species under cultivation, examining their growth 
rates, examining their impact, and so on.  This is a highly regulated sector in many 
countries.  Aquaculture broadly has generated a wealth of empirical social science 
studies, and the work on this new form of production is beyond the scope of this article to 
review.  Political ecologists have looked at ecological, boom-bust, and valuation 
dimensions of the transition to seafood farming (e.g. Hall 2003; Martinez-Alier 2009).  
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Few people, though, have looked at the Blue Revolution discourse more broadly — 
perhaps because it rings as hubristic and unrealistic, or perhaps because empirical 
scientists are often grounded at local scales. 
  
 
Blue carbon and blue infrastructure 
 
 Many of the key concerns in the literature inspired by studying effects on 
fisherfolk — such as the degradation of the global commons and unjust resource 
allocation — also crop up in the literature about measuring not just the stocks, but the 
flows, of marine life.  New science offers new ways of conceiving, and measuring, the 
flows.  One prime example is the concept of blue carbon, which was first introduce by 
UNEP and other organizations in a 2009 report, Blue Carbon: The Role of Healthy 
Oceans in Binding Carbon (Nellemann et al 2009).  Blue carbon is the carbon dioxide 
stored in coastal ecosystems like mangroves, marshes, and seagrass meadows.  However, 
the current push to value blue carbon needs to be seen in the context of a broader push for 
valuation and commodification of nature, argues Barbesgaard (2016).  As of now, there is 
very little literature on it, save for Wylie et al's review of four case studies (2016).   
  
 A related concept is that of "blue infrastructure", defined by Edwards et al as "the 
coastal and near shore habitats that provide the physical matrix for ecological functions, 
which in-turn provide important services and ecological benefits to society" (2014).  
These authors measured the economic impact of restoring blue habitats, finding that 
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habitat restoration projects funded through the 2009 American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act created 17 jobs per million dollars spent — a similar number to other 
conservation industries such as parks and land conservation, and much more than 
industries like coal, gas, and nuclear energy generation (ibid).  This case points towards 
how efforts to value habitat and services that occur within it can have outcomes that are 
not necessarily just marketization for capital's sake: rather than the state valuing the 
ecosystem to create new markets for capital, it valued the ecosystem in order to justify 
restoring it.   
 
 
Marine bioresources and bioprospecting 
 
 Marine biotechnology products are a multibillion dollar industry, with marine 
genetic products found in pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, nutrition supplements, and more.  
Marine bioprospecting, or the discovery of new genetic resources in marine life forms, 
has yielded several thousand novel molecules in recent years (Leal et al 2012).  
Bioprospecting is occasionally cited in reports as a countable, and exciting, part of the 
blue economy.  Leary et al (2009) reviewed the literature about bioprospecting in marine 
areas.  There has been a push for international policymaking in recent years, with the 
issue negotiated in five different international institutions and mechanisms (ibid).  What 
does this have to do with measurement?  The Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working 
Group— one part of the UN process— noted the "socio-economic value of marine 
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biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction" among knowledge gaps that 
need to be filled for policymaking (Leary et al 2009).   
 
 There is an implicit link between counting something and conserving it — and 
between counting marine genetic resources and recognizing their value. Many marine 
invertebrates are "undervalued", but hold great potential for new drugs, and exploring 
these organisms could offer great revenues for countries holding legal rights over the 
EEZs where bioprospecting happens, provided that countries conserve these resources 
(Leal et al 2012).  The hidden potential in lifeforms is a call to value life.  Biotechnology 
also creates value across sectors: deep-sea discoveries affect the development of 
applications from biotechnology, which can be quite diverse (Leary et al 2009).  For 
example, the company Verenium has developed an enzyme for cellulosic ethanol 
production on the basis of samples collected by the deep sea submersible Alvin (ibid.).  
The ways in which the search for genetic material is regulated can have far-reaching 
impacts on multiple non-marine sectors. 
 
 One of the only critical analyses of marine genetic biotechnology was done by 
Stefan Helmreich (2007), who develops the concept of "blue-green capital" in his 
ethnographic study of a marine biotech research center in Hawaii. In his analysis, "blue 
stands for (a particularly American vision of) the freedom of the open ocean and for 
speculative sky-high promise, and green for belief in ecological sustainability as well as 
biological fecundity" (2007: 289).  Helmreich describes how marine biotech was 
imagined as biocapital, which has a promissory character: the resources are expected to 
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replicate wealth through their biological processes. Given the promissory excitement 
around marine bioresources, it is interesting that there is not more scholarly work on the 
underlying assumptions.  Perhaps this is simply because these organisms are some of the 
most remote on earth, and because this arena of measuring life or "ocean grabbing" is the 
least accessible to social scientists and critical scholars. 
 
 
5. Conclusion: Quantification Between Extractivism and Protection 
 
 
 This exploration has delved into how geographical and biological methods of 
counting collaborate to inform economic valuations of ocean space and ocean life.  
Underlying these calculations are questionable assumptions about the importance of 
calculation and data in managing the oceans — and the ability to manage the lively, fluid 
seas itself. At a time when cultures and organizations are obsessed with data, and when 
technology has made massive datasets possible, a focus on data as the key to 
management is understandable.  However, this can obscure other factors key to 
management: the wellbeing of labor forces, stable climatic conditions, freedom from 
corruption, cross-sector cooperation, etc.  Moreover, underlying the quantification 
practices and the discourse around them is also a deep, and yet predictable, tension 
between generating wealth and conserving ecology.  All of this leads to two key 
questions.  Firstly, can there be measurement-informed management of these lively 
spaces?  Secondly, can there be management that is not simply extractive?  Subquestions 
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emerge: Where does data-driven managerialism work?  Why does it fail?  What actors 
are involved, who bears the risks and wins the profits of these endeavors, and what do 
they mean for local, regional, and global ecologies? 
 
 Empirical research may be able to partially answer these questions in the future.  
The empirical research done thus far, which in some aspects is quite minimal, does not 
give cause for optimism about a data-driven managerial approach.  Many of the studies 
mentioned above have drawn a picture of an ocean relentlessly monitored to turn 
lifeforms into profit.  Analyzing attempts to calculate ocean wealth also illuminate how 
the state works for capitalism, in creating these ocean wealth fantasies for investors.  
Ocean calculations are performed in a dual sense: they are also a performative tool for 
engaging promissory capital.  Performing the calculations is one stage in the process of 
state facilitation of the enclosure of marine resources, as described by TNI, where the 
state acts as "the ultimate broker in allocating how, for what purposes and by whom, fish 
water and land can be used" (2014).  Looking from the perspective of the state, one can 
see an example of how states envision their role in Ireland's strategy, which lucidly 
sketches out an integrated marine plan with a strong focus on private investment.  It states 
that the government cannot dictate market demand, but it "can facilitate economic growth 
by delivering a business-friendly and robust governance, policy and planning 
environment, which is supportive of private investment and entrepreneurship. In other 
words, governments can create the right conditions for growth" (“Harnessing” 2012).   
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On one hand, there is cause to fear that states have been co-opted into facilitating 
private extraction of ocean biopower and natural wealth, in many cases also impacting 
people who derive livelihoods from the sea.  On the other hand, the measurement 
practices attempted by states may be useful tools in some cases: they are packaged with a 
mandate to consider conservation, and within the sustainable development discourse, this 
is a large part of the rationale for enacting these practices.  Some measurement of ocean 
life is done to further conservation goals, and restoration goals.  The US ocean strategy, 
for example, points out that one needs planning to restore an ecosystem, and monitoring 
to know if the restoration is going to plan (NOC 2013). It is hard to imagine the 
ecological healing this era demands without some types of quantification.  The question 
is, what types of quantification can coexist with other types of valuation, awareness, and 
appreciation?     
 
 Insomuch as a risk of these quantification practices is that they omit the social, or 
make assumptions about how the social relations around future marine production will be 
arranged, social scientists can help fill these knowledge gaps.  Further research is 
particularly warranted into three areas.  First, more empirical studies of the changes in 
social relations already wrought by Blue Economy calculations and practices are needed, 
including ocean grabbing, new forms of cultivation, and new oceanic extraction: what 
have these initial attempts to contend with the Anthropocene ocean brought communities, 
ecosystems, and nation-states?  A second area of research is alternative metrics, such as 
measurements of ocean health, though complementary indices will not be a strong 
synthetic solution to the tension between extraction and protection as long as they can 
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practically be ignored.  An important third line of inquiry could use deliberative and 
anticipatory methodologies from social science (2008; Guston 2013), in order to generate 
and record citizen's narratives of possible life with the Anthropocene ocean.  Key 
questions might include: What do people want to measure?  Who should perform these 
measurements, and how?  Who can access and use the results?  What would 
quantification, monitoring, and caretaking by local communities look like?  What 
happens to those dimensions of living with the ocean that aren’t easily measured?  How 
do measurements support forms of responsibility like accountability?  Together, research 
along these three streams can highlight how metrics might be used for responsibility-
making on oceanic terrain, which has for so long been beyond the bounds of legal 
responsibility. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Choosing a future for California's Salton Sea:  
Making and taking responsibility in the Anthropocene 
 
 
Abstract 
 
California's largest lake, the Salton Sea, is shrinking and becoming more saline. As part 
of a rural-to-urban water transfer agreement, its inflows will be lowered at the beginning 
of 2018, placing the sea at an ecological tipping point. Failing to intervene will allow an 
environmental and public health crisis due to fish and bird die-offs and exposed dust 
blowing off the receding shores.  Based on site visits and 30 semi-structured interviews in 
the Coachella and Imperial Valleys, this paper analyzes how the options for the sea's 
management or care have been formed, chosen, and rejected.  How do people legitimize 
or sell a limited, interim, or incremental "solution" to environmental crisis?  How does a 
society come to accept ecological sacrifice, or generate other options?  Though the State 
of California is attempting to take action with a new ten-year plan, it is possible that it is 
not even technically capable of dealing with the issue due to fiscal, political, legal, and 
regulatory constraints, and so responsibility for the sea has been made but not yet fully 
taken.  In the absence of sufficient responsibility-taking by the state, other actors such as 
citizens, environmental startups, and farmer-led private sector initiatives are attempting to 
take responsibility, but they face systemic constraints.  The paper explores how these 
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actors wrestle with and attempt to move around these constraints via approaches of 
reframing the issue in terms of social and environmental justice, media production, 
citizen science, and participating in formal processes.  This study offers insight into how 
responsibility for ecological flourishing can be made and taken via collective social 
processes, and also reveals some of the limitations of the increasingly popular narrative 
that the Anthropocene represents a new era of ecological responsibility. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
I had drunk in a certain doctrine, whose sources are as obscurely ubiquitous and whose 
substance is as tainted as New River water, that only an "expert" has the right to judge 
the acceptability of the water of life. The Salton Sea is a ding sump or the Salton Sea is 
the most productive fishery in the world.  
— William Vollman, Imperial 
 
 
 The Salton Sea in southeast California is an ecosystem whose days are numbered.  
On Dec. 31, 2017, provisions in an agreement to transfer Colorado River water from the 
Imperial Irrigation District to the sea expire.  At this point the sea will contract more 
rapidly, exposing 48,000 acres of dust laden with farm chemicals over the next ten years.  
	 116	
Salinity will begin to rise more dramatically, tripling over the next thirty years. (SSMP, 
2017)3.  
 
 
 
 																																																								
3 Currently, the sea is about 59 ppt, with model estimates of 153.1 ppt by 2045 — ocean water is 
approximately 35 ppt (SSMP, 2017) 
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Figure 1.  Map of Salton Sea and surrounding communities, California Department of 
Water Resources 
 
 
 In another sense, the Salton Sea's days are cyclical and eternal, as there has been 
an intermittent lake in this sink which has appeared and disappeared several times over 
the centuries.  This most recent incarnation is commonly attributed to a human blunder: 
from 1905-1907, a cut in a canal made by the California Development Company changed 
the course of the Colorado River, creating what's been called the "lake by mistake."  It 
has no outflow, and dwindling inflows, as it is fed by agricultural water — in fact, some 
farmers observe that it hadn't been created in 1905, it would still need to exist today in 
some form as an agricultural sump for the lush desert farms.  An agreement to transfer 
water from this desert agricultural area to the thirsty urban coast means that less water 
goes into the sea.   
 
 For decades, technical committees and Salton Sea citizens across the Coachella 
and Imperial Valleys have been evaluating options for the approaching ecological and 
public health crisis. This paper explores the processes for selecting environmental 
futures, particularly recent efforts, and examines how some options for the sea are viewed 
as realistic while others are rejected.  In particular, we will look at the State of 
California's plans for a "smaller, sustainable sea" and dust suppression, the land 
management options put forth by farmers and private entities, and the hopes for 
importing ocean water into the sea.  This paper then discusses these options and their 
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promoters with regards to notions of responsibility and agency in environmental 
modification: Who is responsible for the sea's continued functioning as a viable place for 
human and nonhuman life?  How is responsibility made and taken?  Who must act, and 
who can act?  
 Part of the coming-of-age story of the Anthropocene — the idea that humans are 
in a new geological epoch due to human activity — involves recognizing a responsibility 
to care for the earth, either in terms of repairing past damages or actively helping to 
design and maintain novel ecosystems.  While much Anthropocene literature looks at risk 
and responsibility on a global scale, it is illuminating to look at a landscape-scale process 
of making and taking responsibility.  There are a number of reasons why the Salton Sea 
makes an interesting study for interrogating this responsibility-in-the-Anthropocene 
narrative more deeply. Firstly, the current incarnation of the sea was created by human 
error, and the idea that this is already not a natural ecosystem modifies perspectives about 
what kind of obligation we have for it.  Secondly, the sea is within a heavily managed 
industrial agricultural landscape — in some ways, it could be seen as a byproduct of 
environmental irresponsibility by agribusiness.  Thirdly, it is at a recognized ecological 
tipping point — almost every actor agrees that there is a mandate for increased human 
responsibility of some kind.  Fourthly, the responsibility for the sea has been legally 
taken by the State of California as part of a water transfer agreement, which is a unique 
situation. In the rest of this introduction, we'll delve into the environmental history of the 
sea and explain its current situation.  
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The "lake by mistake": A creation story 
 
 The Imperial Valley is one of the harshest landscapes in North America, with 
three inches of rainfall a year and typical temperatures over 110 degrees Fahrenheit 
(43°C) in the summer months.  It is also a socio-economically distressed landscape, with 
25% unemployment and 1 in 5 residents living in poverty (LHC, 2015).  It should not be 
taken as inevitable that this valley would boast 500,000 acres of irrigated farmland 
producing millions of dollars worth of melons and lettuce, not to mention sudangrass, 
Bermuda grass, and alfalfa for Chinese cattle and Saudi camels.  But the inhospitability 
did not dissuade the dreams of "the pioneers", who materialized at a time when the 
frontier was closing elsewhere. 
 
 The two engineers who built the valley's irrigation system were George Chaffey, a 
self-taught maritime engineer who in the 1880s combined irrigation, electric light, and 
telephone lines to build foundational examples of the modern southern California 
lifestyle, and Charles Rockwood, a surveyor and engineering-school dropout who was 
determined to build a canal to bring Colorado River water downwards via gravity into the 
Salton Sink (Starr, 1990: 15).  With partners, Rockwood created the California 
Development Company (CDC), an enterprise which by 1900 was desperately in debt.  
George Chaffey had just returned financially ruined from a decade of learning about 
irrigation in Australia, and took on the project of building the canal as a design challenge 
that could repair his reputation.  
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 Chaffey renamed the Salton Sink the Imperial Valley, and the task of the next few 
years was to attract settlers to the desolate landscape through an imaginative marketing 
campaign.  This was successful — cropland expanded at a remarkable rate.  However, 
political discontent was swelling over how private entrepreneurs were abusing federal 
legislation designed to give land to homesteaders.  In the desert, land was worthless 
without water, and settlers had to buy "water stock" from the CDC and its mutual water 
companies. So there was a conflict between the CDC’s private model of development and 
the public-good model espoused by irrigationists such as William Ellsworth Smythe, who 
believed that California could be a culture "in which each square foot of the land would 
be cherished and crafted as either irrigated agriculture, landscaped garden, or fallow soil 
resting for future productivity" (Starr, 1990: 31).  This crafted landscape, Smythe 
believed, should be developed by government, whose role it was to fairly distribute the 
water.  Irrigation also implied other developments: education and "mental development", 
building homes, setting up permanent towns with post offices, and other endeavors which 
government might have a role in.  In short, some of the early irrigationists imagined 
responsibility for ecological design as the foundation of a whole society.  
 
 However, this model of development lost out in southeast California — a water 
cooperative member who debated the head of the CDC on stage got tarred and feathered 
and ran to Mexico on a rail (Starr, 1990: 36).  It was irresponsibility which ended up 
creating the Salton Sea.  The hastily constructed canal system was silting up precisely 
when the CDC was under pressure to meet new demand.  In a move to avoid US 
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jurisdiction, the CDC negotiated with Mexico to make a cut in the canal and irrigate the 
valley with Mexican water.  To work around the silting problem, in October of 1904, 
Rockwood made a cut into the western bank of the Colorado with a temporary headgate.  
The river flooded five times between February and March 1905, and Rockwood realized 
in March that this “temporary” cut in the river, with its inadequate headgate, needed to be 
closed. The engineers made a futile attempt to close it with piles, brush, and sandbags.  
Further attempts proved useless, and the river continued to flow northward instead of 
southward, flowing downhill into the Salton Sink.  Desperate, the CDC turned to the 
Southern Pacific railroad, which assumed control of the rapidly-becoming-worthless 
company.   The federal government declined to help out with this problem, which it saw 
as created by private enterprise.  For nearly two years, the railroad labored to close the 
cut in the river.  Finally, in February 1907, Southern Pacific engineer H.T. Cory and 1500 
laborers— many from the Pima, Papago, Maricopa, Cocopah, Digueno, and Yuma 
tribes— closed the breech with 2500 rail carloads of rock, gravel, and clay comprising a 
15-mile long, eight-foot-high levee (Starr, 1990: 40, DeBuys, 1999: 115).  With damage 
claims piling up from a submerged salt mining company and the Mexican government, 
the CDC declared bankruptcy in 1909.  
 
 In these early days, people thought the sea would evaporate within a few years: 
they did not imagine that agricultural runoff would perpetuate the sea for decades. Yet 
the sea persisted and the Imperial Valley grew, weathering the Great Depression.  The 
Salton Sea shared in the postwar boom, with visions of the California Riviera. But by the 
1960s and 1970s, the collapse of speculative property deals and the foul-smelling algae 
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blooms and fish die-offs had worn off the sea's luster.  In 1988, the Salton Sea Task Force 
was formed, which dissolved for lack of funds; but the Salton Sea Authority was created 
in 1993 (LHC, 2015).  They set numerical targets for the sea: salinity between 35,000 and 
40,000 ppm, and an elevation of 230-235 feet (DeBuys, 1999: 247). A 1996 evaluation 
came up with a price tag of  $100-200 million for constructing a dike in the shallow 
portion of the sea (ibid).   
 
Perhaps this would have remained a technical or engineering issue, but in the late 
1990s, thousands of pelicans began dying from botulism outbreaks.  These charismatic 
and photogenic fauna sparked public attention and won a celebrity campaigner, Sonny 
Bono, who made the sea a key issue of it during his time in Congress.  An imaginary of 
the sea as an engine for economic growth arose— with first-class resorts and casinos, 
perhaps a navigable lock-lift system, or an inland seaport (Morrison, 2014).   While a 
grandiose plan failed to materialize, the interest fired up imaginations, and mainstreamed 
a new way of thinking about the sea: not just as a technocratic problem for environmental 
managers, and more of a space for economic or community development. 
 
The "water transfer" 
 
December 31, 2017 looms large for the sea.  To understand how an ecosystem gets a 
definitive date where it will get worse, it is necessary to review the 2003 "Quantification 
Settlement Agreement" (QSA), commonly known as the "water transfer", as it creates the 
largest farm-to-city water transfer in US history.  The QSA is actually a set of agreements 
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between the State of California, the Department of the Interior, and state water agencies.  
Key to understanding the water transfer is the basic math of Colorado River allocations: 
the Imperial Irrigation District, through the doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial 
use, gets 3.1 million acre-feet per year of the Colorado's water, or about 70% of 
California's 4.4 million acre-feet allotment.  By comparison, Mexico receives 1.5 million 
acre-feet, Arizona 2.8 million, and Nevada 0.3 million.  In short, Imperial County gets 
more than 20% of the entire Colorado River's average annual flow.  Recall that the 
population of Imperial County is about 180,000, and that this water is used by about 500 
farms.  With an urbanized coast of 19 million customers and a drought, the massive 
allocation to the Imperial Valley may seem difficult to defend. On the other side, Imperial 
residents can look northward across the sea to the Coachella Valley, and see over a 
hundred lush golf courses for the nation's fly-in elite: certainly a flagrant use of water 
compared with the proud task of feeding the country fresh vegetables in winter. 
 
 Under the water transfer, 30 million acre-feet over 75 years are sent to San Diego 
and the Coachella Valley.  The idea is that Imperial County farmers can make up for the 
water transferred away by implementing more efficient methods of production— lining 
canals to reduce seepage, installing advanced sprinklers, etc.  For an initial 15-year 
period, the IID has been required to send "mitigation water" to the sea— water "saved" 
from fields they were paid to fallow. After 2018, the 15-year start-up phase ends, and the 
requirement to send any "mitigation water" to the Salton Sea expires.  About 200,000 
acre-feet less will be flowing into the Salton Sea per year.  Ideally, the IID and farmers 
would also use this 15 year start-up period to ramp up water conserving methods and 
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technologies, since new systems require an initial outlay of capital.  The state, for its part, 
was supposed to use these 15 years to figure out what to do about restoring the sea. A 
crucial part of agreement is that local water agencies would pay the first $133 million 
towards mitigating the impacts of the transfer upon the Salton Sea, and then California 
would pay the rest.  That “rest” was not well-estimated at the time of signing the 
agreement. 
 
 When the mitigation water stops flowing, the sea will start shrinking more 
rapidly.  The receding shoreline leaves behind fine silt containing sodium sulfate and 
selenium, and desert windstorms blow it across surrounding communities. By 2045, the 
150 square miles of exposed playa will be adding up to 100 tons of dust per day into the 
air (Cohen, 2014). In humans, selenium’s effects include neurological problems and 
cirrhosis; sodium sulfate causes respiratory problems (Adee and Moore, 2010). Air 
quality already has surpassed federal standards for particulate matter less than 10 microns 
in diameter (PM10), and asthma hospitalization rates are twice that of California as a 
whole (LHC, 2015).  Within fifteen years, salinity in the sea will triple (Cohen, 2014), 
making it unsuitable for most forms of life (besides algae, bacteria, and viruses). The 
ecological convulsions cause hydrogen sulfide events, as decaying algal blooms send up 
"burps".  As one resident of the Coachella Valley told me, on high-odor days they say, 
"The Salton Sea's come to visit." Not just an aesthetic problem, the traveling stench has 
tremendous impacts upon property values and the resort economy to the north: the rotten-
egg odor has previously made visits all the way to Los Angeles.  The sea is also a critical 
habitat for over 400 species of resident and migratory birds, whose habitat along the coast 
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and the Central Valley was consumed by development.  In short, an impending tipping 
point in the sea's ecology brings economic and health impacts for a wide geographic area, 
as well as a number of species. 
 
Finding a way forward 
 
What is next for the sea?  In the next section, I will discuss how citizens evaluate the 
available options for moving forward — namely, (1) the state's incremental plan for 
habitat construction and dust mitigation; (2) the idea of building a pipeline to import 
water from the ocean; (3) trees, tillage or alternative land management led by farmers and 
private citizens; (4) political options involving changing the QSA.  The third section will 
look at how stakeholders view the responsibility and agency of various actors in 
developing and choosing between these options.  The fourth section discusses the 
approaches citizens are using to make and take responsibility at the sea, and the 
concluding section draws from this case to suggest some modifications for the 
Anthropocene narrative of responsibility more broadly. 
 
 But first, a brief note on methods.  This paper draws from fieldwork conducted in 
the landscape of the Coachella, Imperial, and Mexicali valleys during July 2014, January 
2016, and Oct.-Dec. 2016.  This involved site attending community activist meetings and 
official hearings about the Salton Sea, meetings about other environmental justice issues 
in the valleys, and visits to farms, water infrastructure, and existing and planned energy 
production sites.  Thirty semi-structured interviews were conducted, as well as several 
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other in-depth but informal conversations; 27 of these interviews were of appropriate 
recording quality to be transcribed and coded using NVivo 11.  In Appendix A, the 
respondents are listed with brief descriptors of their role in the community — though this 
does not represent a fixed typology of respondents, since farmers could be entrepreneurs 
or work in environmental activist roles; community advocates could work with 
vulnerable people and yet act in entrepreneurial ways; and so on.  Rather, it is more 
helpful to see all these people as having a valuable situated perspective, rather than 
playing one neat and discrete role in a social structure. 
 
 Through observing formal and informal participation in decision-shaping 
processes, and interviewing stakeholders in depth, I learned about how residents 
evaluated the possible options and how they felt about opportunities to participate in 
creating and deciding about these possible futures.  Because many of the respondents 
were identified and selected through their participation in issues related to the sea, the 
sample is decidedly non-representative of the greater demographics of the Imperial and 
Coachella Valleys.  For example, only about a quarter of my respondents were of 
Mexican-American descent, as many local officials who work on Salton Sea issues are 
white males.  I attempted to address this by reaching out to advocates from the Latino 
community who work on environmental justice and other civic issues, and women in 
particular.  While I did interview several respondents from this community, others 
declined to formally participate and mentioned past negative experiences with researchers 
and NGOs who had “partnered” with them in unequal or self-serving ways.  Many people 
in this area generally question the helpfulness of academic study, given that the scientific 
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studies conducted have not produced action or change at the sea. While I speak broadly 
about the concerns of this community based upon the interviews I did conduct, it remains 
a limitation of the study not to be able to include a wider range of people speaking in 
their own words. 
 
2.  Citizen views of the future landscape 
 
Imperial is a dream without details. — William Vollman 
If you don’t dream, you can’t set a target for the future. — Michael Clinton, consultant 
(Goolsby, 2016) 
 
 
Phase I: The State's Current 10-Year Plan 
 
 In March 2017 the State of California announced its much-anticipated 10-year 
plan, the first phase of the incremental "Salton Sea Management Plan" (SSMP).  "Phase 
I" calls for measures to expedite construction of habitat and dust suppression by 2028.  
This first step of the yet-to-be-written larger plan includes "shovel-ready" projects like 
habitat restoration and wetland construction, water backbone infrastructure, and saline 
impoundments to support fish and wildlife.  As a local official put it, this is the most 
"common sense", "bang for the buck" plan of action.   
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However, there are some glaring issues.  Phase I calls for $383 million, with only 
the aforementioned $80 million from a prior water bond currently in the bank — there is 
not a committed funding stream.  Another is that this $383 million is still just a fraction 
of the billions needed, according to prior assessments; critics point out that it does not 
solve the underlying problem of the shrinking sea and its spiking salinity.  Essentially, it 
is a stop-gap measure to cover up some dust and mitigate some air quality impacts while 
a long-term solution is devised.   
 
 To understand how this stop-gap plan emerged, it's useful to have some backstory 
about the state's previous attempt to create a more comprehensive plan. In 2007 the 
California Department of Water Resources produced a report detailing eight options, the 
cheapest of which cost $3.3 billion for a saline habitat complex of 75,000 acres.  An 
ambitious $8.9 billion option featuring a marine sea was chosen as the “Preferred 
Alternative”.  It was influenced by criteria added from the 32-member Salton Sea 
Advisory Committee and members of the public, but was vague on how to pay for it all 
(LHC, 2015).  The $8.9 billion number was enough to scare away anyone, and illustrates 
the potential perverse impacts of pinning a precise number on a problem.  Moreover, 
people were concerned that suggesting interim or incremental ideas would give the state 
an excuse not to do more (Delfino, 2015).  Some community members recalled the 
process as a stakeholder process, but not necessarily a democratic one.  As one resident 
remembered it, "The state put all this money and effort into people's participation, getting 
their information, getting their feedback. They basically said, Excuse me, fuck you, we're 
going to come up with our plan. All of that time and effort and threw it in the trash can” 
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(C21).  Or, as a local business owner who had been on the State Water Resources 
Committee in 2006 and 2007 recalled, the committee posed a $6 billion option, but "then 
the guy from the Department of Water Resources, he picked and choosed from all the 
different plans, just a little bit of everything in the basket, mixed it all up, for 8.9 billion 
with 150 million O&M [operation and maintenance] costs per year.  I think it was done 
on purpose because they knew they couldn't afford it” (C18). 
 
Another observer saw the plan as designed to fail, but not necessarily on purpose: 
 
They insisted that tourism be retained. They insisted that the fish 
be retained. There were certain criteria by which the various plans 
had to be reviewed and interpreted, and they were self-
contradictory and utopian. As a result, they ended up with an 
enormously expensive monstrosity. The plan that they came up 
with was to divide the sea in half with a dam that runs across the 
middle. The middle of the sea is 50 feet deep. You're talking about 
a 50 foot dam that runs 30 miles across the sea, on a muddy 
substrate, immediately adjacent to the San Andreas fault. That was 
selected because it was the best of the alternatives. The process 
was clearly flawed. I think if you look at what the criteria were, I 
think it was flawed in the sense that they were insisting that 
everybody come out happy. (C12) 
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 Since this comprehensive, multi-stakeholder effort stalled, the official vision is 
now a “smaller, sustainable sea”, promoted by the Imperial Irrigation District, who 
launched the “Salton Sea Restoration and Renewable Energy Initiative” with Imperial 
County.  As described by IID general manager Kevin Kelley, the sea would be two-thirds 
its current size — with the southern part featuring renewable energy projects with 
habitats areas interspersed, a kind of multifunctional renewable landscape (Than, 2014).  
This dovetails with the state plan.  A local official describes it this way:  "The Salton Sea 
will be smaller than it was in the 2000s, early 2000s, but it will be managed, there will be 
managed habitat at the Salton Sea for fish eating birds, and for the fish and for the wading 
birds .... The center of the sea will be a sink, a very salty area. Around the edges we will 
build this habitat and the air quality mitigation” (C7).  This official acknowledged much 
uncertainty about the ecosystem's eventual transition: 
 
The other thing, from a climate change perspective and maybe just 
from a long range planning perspective, is over time even that 
habitat we've developed is going to become increasingly salty. At 
some point in time in the future we're going to have to transition 
from what we have now for an ecosystem to a Great Salt Lake 
ecosystem or Aral Sea type of ecosystem.  ... That doesn't mean the 
wildlife goes away, it means a different kind of wildlife, to some 
extent the invertebrate population will change and so some of the 
bird populations will change. We don't quite understand the 
increase of the climate change or the increase in temperature well 
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enough to predict exactly when we're going to get to that point. I'm 
talking even about the managed habitat getting more salty, we don't 
know exactly when we're going to get to that point. It's probably 30 
or more years down the road, but it is something long term to look 
at. (C7) 
 
 
Water import 
 
 The state's plans, in the eyes of many citizens, don't solve the underlying problem 
of reduced inflows to the sea.  If the problem is a loss of water, the solution seems to be 
to put water in.  Though some have proposed bringing in water from the Pacific via the 
California coast, I will focus here on the specific idea to import ocean water from the Sea 
of Cortez.  This does not fix salinity, unless you either desalinate the water or pipe salty 
water out again.  But as for the other problem, elevation, "Sea to Sea certainly fixes 
elevation. You could fill the lake back up to what it was in 2000 if you wanted to, and 
that's tantalizing to people. I get why people like that idea. If you look at that aerial 
photograph for instance, it's close. It's downhill most of the way," explained one official 
(C7).  Another official pointed out that "it's extremely doable technologically speaking. 
In other words, it's not rocket science, it's not science at all, it's totally doable.  And that's 
where people are getting hung up. Because just because it's technically feasible doesn't 
mean that there aren't other factors involved" (C24).  These "other factors" include (1) the 
cost, (2) dealing with the excess salt, (3) an endangered porpoise, the vaquito, which lives 
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in the sea of Cortez, and (4) having to negotiate the water import with Mexico.  Another 
official had concerns about ecological unknowns (C11): "Say, what if shark and stingray 
eggs are imported to the Salton Sea? Are they going to be viable and reproduce here and 
create a whole new dynamic? All of a sudden ... it's a whole different Salton Sea than 
what the people that live along the shoreline remember- not this tranquil body of water, 
but maybe this shark-infested body of water and it's like ‘Wait, wait, wait, we didn't plan 
for this.’"  
 
 Proponents suggest that desalination could deal with the salt, and that negotiating 
the water import through Mexico would be doable as Mexico would also have a stake in 
the issue.  As for the cost, could a private entity construct the pipeline, and generate 
power and profit as a part of delivering the water?  One entrepreneur has worked hard in 
partnership with the native Cocopah people in Mexico on a scheme that would benefit 
them through renting the land the pipeline would cross.  The costs are a matter of debate, 
with varying estimates and a number of proposed funding mechanisms. 
 
 At the heart of the conversation about sea-to-sea is a debate about who is being 
more realistic.  Everyone seems to agree that the plan is not technically sophisticated.  
People with government experience tend to find it politically or economically unfeasible.  
On the other hand, proponents of the sea-to-sea concept see the government as equally 
lacking a feasible plan for actually dealing with the real issue.  They also see the state and 
water import plans as potentially compatible — and some officials have considered at 
least studying the concept.  As one proponent explained: 
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The dust is the big issue.  When you look at the numbers, I can put water 
on dry land for five thousand dollars an acre.  The wetlands are 35,000 an 
acre.  If you fill the lake up to the proper level, like 235, then that wipes 
out 100,000 acres of dust, potentially dusty land, because it's under water.  
Then, the wetlands people can go build enough of the material that they 
need to deal with their birds.  And the two people can get along just 
fine.  But the way they're doing it now, they need two or three billion 
dollars, which equates to like 200 million a year, and they have less than 
20 million, like 18-19 million per year, and they need 200.  And they only 
have money for 3 years and they need money for 20 years.  They just can't 
get there.  The legislature's not going to do it — they should do it, they just 
won't.  So they'll fail at a very high level, because they just are horribly 
underfunded, and when you need 200 million and you get 20, that means 
you'll never get there.  It's like showing up and paying rent when you have 
a quarter of the bill in your hand.  It just doesn't work.  ... We all pray ... 
that IID will put their foot down, and we all pray that the homeowners will 
file class action lawsuits against the state, and we all pray that the state 
people come back to the table with a sense of reality.  Because today 
they're just not realistic about what it's going to take.  (C19) 
 
 
Farmer and citizen-led revegetation and land management  
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 Farmers and other private citizens also have propositions for revegetating the sea.  
Farmers "want to raise their families here, they like it here and they're willing to put their 
work boots on and see what they can do to address these issues," in the words of one 
community member (C9).  Propositions include planting local trees as windbreaks, or 
creating a ridge and till system.   Six-foot wide furrows would break up the wind, and 
salt-loving plants could grow at the bottom of the furrows — salt cedars, iodide bush, etc.  
According to one farmer, this waterless dust mitigation could be done for 28.50 an acre, 
or a fraction of the cost of constructing wetland habitat (C18). 
 
Another farmer developed a private-sector led approach to planting trees 
interspersed with wetland habitat, drawing on existing expertise with permanent crops, 
including planting half a million pistachio trees, “each one perfect in a certain way”. 
“We've got a couple hundred acres of date palms we planted in the Imperial Valley, and a 
couple hundred acres of citrus. Those are exotic species. What about Colorado River 
species? Cottonwoods and willows? Shit, just give me a tree source, and I need to clean 
up some of the salts, just like I would for citrus of dates, and I know how to do that, and 
I'll grow original Colorado River woods” (C5). 
 
 
Political solutions 
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 While habitat construction, water import, and land management are all 
engineering solutions to a problem defined in terms of aspects of the environment, the 
crisis of the impending shrinkage on Dec. 31, 2017 is actually a political crisis.  It follows 
that it may be easier to negotiate a social solution to a social problem, rather than 
engineer one.  One expert suggested tying removal of water from the Imperial Valley to 
the state's ability to mitigate the dust, which could protect public health without taking 
away water rights. 
 
You're not just saying, "Oh, well I entered into a contract 15 years ago, so 
you guys all have to die. I'm sorry." I just think that's a completely 
irresponsible position for the state to take. They have to do something 
about it. What can they do? Well, they can start putting out their straw 
bales, or whatever it is else they're going to do, gravel and whatnot, and 
build marshes. The problem is they can't do it fast enough, and they don't 
have the money for it. Limiting the water transfers from the Imperial 
Valley is much cheaper. The estimates are that it might be $50 million a 
year to buy that water away from San Diego. They could do it for 10 years 
and still be cheaper than the straw bale idea. It protects the water rights of 
San Diego, but at the same time it protects the health of the people. It's a 
direct, inexpensive, immediate relief that meets all the criteria that you 
would want, except San Diego doesn't get its water next year. That 
criterion's not met, but they still have their water rights. (C12) 
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 There is a precedent for this idea, as it was what happened at Mono Lake, where 
the water board tied the ability of Los Angeles to draw water to markers of elevation at 
the lake.  However, this idea has not been discussed much.  It is possible that the QSA 
was so difficult to negotiate that the stakeholders would rather consider the problem as an 
engineering one, or an environmental one, rather than revisit the political decision that is 
giving the problem its urgency.  
 
 
3.  Citizen views on responsibility and agency 
 
We have been accused of gross negligence and criminal carelessness in making this cut, 
but I doubt as to whether any one should be accused of negligence or carelessness in 
failing to foresee that which had never happened before. — Charles Rockwood 
 
 Whose responsibility is it to do something about the sea?  Collectively, farmers 
and the Imperial Irrigation District are key shapers of the already heavily-managed 
landscape.  The QSA, however, assigns legal responsibility, and most respondents 
specified that the state of California is the responsible party.  The QSA works as a 
responsibility-assigning device.  Yet the codified responsibility of the state also occludes 
some of the other potentially responsible parties.  In what follows, I will discuss 
stakeholder perspectives on potentially responsible actors.  In doing so, I will also 
examine the constraints they face on action, including the relationship between 
responsibility and their agency. 
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The State of California 
 
 Before the water transfer, people couldn't decide whose problem the Salton Sea 
was; afterwards, the State of California had a contractual obligation to mitigate the 
transfer impact.  In 2014, the Imperial Irrigation District petitioned the State Water 
Resources Control Board and threatened the whole water transfer deal, which made the 
state realize the problem must be dealt with.  One might think that after a clear 
delineation of legal responsibility, a solution would unfold — but making responsibility 
doesn't mean the responsibility is fully taken up.  The QSA, according to a few who have 
read it, is poorly written, because it doesn't specify the consequences for not carrying out 
the responsibility.  A scientist explains that the state said they would take care of the 
Salton Sea in order to get the IID to go along with the water transfer, thinking that it 
wouldn’t be too expensive — but then looked into it, and found that the plan would cost 
$8.9 billion. “At that point, they just went, ‘Oh my god, we had no idea. Don't worry, it's 
the Schwarzenegger administration, and we'll be gone soon.’ Sure enough, they were 
gone, and then the Brown administration came in and they didn't want to deal with it, and 
then it was 2008 and we had the financial crisis.” (C12) 
 
 A businessperson's interpretation reflects some of the emotion in the community: 
"When they did that deal 15 years ago, no one really anticipated what that number was 
going to cost.  But today they know exactly what it's going to cost.  And this is a number 
the state just does not want to pay for any reason, ever.  And it's wholly dishonest.  I 
	 138	
mean, they made an agreement, they have a contractual obligation, they're the owners, 
and they collect about a billion dollars in taxes from this region, and they're just being 
cheap.  They're basically saying, we don't want to pay.  There lies the problem.  They're 
not honest about it” (C19). 
 
 Why has the state not acted, when the responsibility is so clear?  Aside from the 
cost, respondents speculated upon three key reasons: (1) peripherality, (2) vested 
interests, and (3) systemic incapability.  Firstly, there is geographic peripherality: it's in 
the "farthest corner of the state".  Secondly, there is peripherality in terms of voter base, 
with a population of only 180,000; and thirdly, 80% of those people are Latino, many 
living in disadvantaged communities (to use the State of California terminology).  Many 
respondents also speculated on types of vested interests — the Salton Sea crisis has been 
going on for so long the Salton Sea Authority, its board members, and related people are 
something of an institution. There is also a bevy of contractors who have been used for 
everything from dust mitigation to stakeholder consultation; dust mitigation is already a 
big industry in this area.  It is difficult to assess how much influence vested interests have 
in the lack of action, but it is worth noting that some respondents were concerned about 
this. 
 
 Either the state is intentionally dragging its feet, either because of vested interests 
or because it's not paying enough attention to this peripheral area — or it is not 
intentionally dragging its feet, but it is simply unable mount a response. This is a 
frightening prospect, as it begs the question of whether governments more generally are 
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capable of dealing with complex environmental challenges that require long-term vision 
and high-capital infrastructure.  As one scientist put it, the state "is both financially and 
technically incapable of dealing with this issue": 
 
The reason that I say that ... is another major project in the state is to build 
two tunnels to take water from the Sacramento River and funnel it to the 
south. ... The state has been working on that for 10 or 15 years with federal 
help, and they have gotten nowhere. The state is also planning to build a 
high speed train from Los Angeles to San Francisco. They figure that is 
going to cost $64 billion, and they can't have made any progress on that 
either.  When I see them trying to work on complex projects that are 
engineering projects and require a lot of funding, I don't see the state with 
the capabilities of actually completing those projects. Quite frankly, they 
don't have the capability of starting them, much less completing them. 
That makes me skeptical about what they would do with the Salton Sea. I 
am concerned that we are actually just on a treadmill to have this be an 
ecological disaster. Then the question is, was it intentional? Was there 
some clever person who thought, this is what we'll do, and we'll save $3 
billion? I find that hard to believe. The amount of money that's going to be 
spent on trying to solve this problem after the fact will be huge, and 
unsuccessful. (C12) 
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 Why, though, is the state systemically incapable of these large engineering 
projects now — given the history of successfully modifying this region's environment 
throughout the twentieth century?  Firstly, California has budgetary issues, related in part 
to things like Proposition 13, the ballot initiative which limited property taxes in the state.  
Secondly, some suggest the state is just too large, compounding complexity as well as 
making regions far from the coast compete with other big projects like restoring the 
Sacramento Delta.  Thirdly, the population explosion through the last century means that 
the landscape is already built out; there is existing infrastructure to contend with. 
Fourthly, it has a very intense regulatory system, and permitting and contracting for 
projects can take years.  
  
 
The federal government 
 
 The federal government is not prominent in conversations about the Salton Sea. 
Like the state government, the federal government is seen to have a capability issue with 
large engineering projects. One official pointed out that people cite the Central Arizona 
Project and the Central Valley Water Projects as examples of people "dreaming big and 
getting it done," but "those days are as gone as the 1950s Salton Sea is."  Another official 
mentioned that while agencies are committed to environmental protection, they are not 
designed to do something. "They're designed to stop some things from being done."  
 
	 141	
That's very different than probably 1935 or 1955, where government 
agencies in this country did things like built Hoover Dam, or big freeways, 
or a big piece of infrastructure. Those served purposes and had major 
impacts, environmental impacts, cultural impacts and others. Well, the 
pendulum has certainly swung, and at the Salton Sea, there is no one 
agency and entity that can correct the Salton Sea, but there are 30 that 
could stop it. (C16) 
 
Some argue that the federal government should have a stronger role because they have 
the funding to do something.  However, a farmer suggested two reasons why the federal 
government is largely absent from the picture, aside from the responsibility being given 
to the state of California: first, that the Obama administration did not want to criticize 
Sacramento because Pelosi, Feinstein, and Boxer were influential politicians, and second, 
that the US government played a significant role in creating the air quality issues faced in 
the valley because military training activities in the late 1930s and 1960s out of the El 
Centro Naval Air Force base and surrounding areas basically ground up the desert 
vegetation (C5).  This farmer expressed concern about the federal government getting 
involved, citing three big issues that would "put a hammer in the hands of people in 
Washington, DC”: that the Salton Sea would cease being a viable ecosystem, that levels 
of Lake Mead would drop below the 1074 foot limit, and the dust.  “Now the worry is 
that the EPA is gonna start declaring an air quality emergency at the same time the 
Bureau of Reclamation starts declaring a water emergency on the Colorado River,” and 
expressed that “I've seen what's happened with water issues in the San Joaquin Valley, 
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and they decided we've got a hammer and all we can do is take water away. We can't deal 
with exotic species, we can't deal with sewage treatment plants, we can't deal with delta 
islands that minimize habitat, all we can do is take farmer water away, so let's start 
swinging hammers, hammering farmers” (C5).  This farmer wanted the government 
involved in some ways, but feared for the form it would take. 
 
 In short, while stakeholders here held the state government responsible, this also 
mingled with frustration about an incapable or broken federal government, which 
resonated much more wildly on both sides of the political spectrum.  One expert on the 
sea commented that the 2016 election evidenced “a real feeling that the government has 
not addressed the problems of people, particularly people who are not well-to-do, urban 
entrepreneurs. I'm sorry to say that the Salton Sea strikes me as the prime example of this 
kind of neglect, and so does Flint. ... In both cases, you have unelected officials making 
decisions that profoundly affect minority populations, where decisions are made on the 
basis of money as opposed to public health. I'm afraid that that's a very common 
phenomenon across the country” (C12). 
 
 
Farmers, the Imperial Irrigation District, and Imperial County 
 
 Imperial Valley farmers are key to the sea's health, because their irrigation 
provides its inflows.  At the same time, they're also a source of pollutants in the sea.  As 
one resident explained: 
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This is anathema. If I were to say this publicly, I would probably be tarred 
and feathered, but the farmers have not taken any responsibility 
whatsoever for their problems with the Salton Sea. Part of those problems 
... I know that there's a lot of selenium that comes into the sea naturally 
from the Colorado River. It's just the way Mother Nature is, but the 
fertilizers, the pesticides and all of the other parts to being a farmer down 
here that ultimately end up in the Salton Sea, they contribute to the 
problem. Don't ever think that a farmer is going to take any accountability 
or responsibility in any way, shape or form, particularly signing the front 
side a check to deal with that issue. They're just not. They pay 20 bucks an 
acre-foot for water. It's a pretty sweetheart deal. (C9) 
 
One community advocate describes the historical responsibility of agribusiness, noting 
that agricultural runoff over 100 years sent the pesticides and selenium into the sea, and 
the Imperial Irrigation District had a role in allowing it to happen (C10).  Farmers along 
with the IID have a history of strong leadership and power in this particular valley, and 
historically have played a large role in decision-making.  On one hand, the IID and 
county leadership have been instrumental in pressing the state for action on the sea.  On 
the other hand, the IID and county leadership are seen by some as an obstacle; one 
entrepreneur names “those 15 guys, 20 people, they're 99% guys, they're all 60 year old 
white guys no less” as “the reason nothing ever gets done” (C19). 
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Some farmers grew up here, and "they want to see it be beautiful and happy and 
booming again”, as a local businessperson put it (C9).  But others have moved to the 
coast and run their operations from afar, and now there are only about 435 farmers in the 
valley.  The community advocate describes the transformed social structure: “Now you 
have agribusiness that can come in and bring their city, move their city now, an army of 
workers that migrate into Arizona, to California, into Northern California, Salinas Valley, 
and they just will bring in their army of workers. What's left for us is a lot of the residue, 
and that's what's created the Salton Sink. That's what's created that sea. Now, the ones 
who have created it, which is the farmers with the approval of the Imperial Irrigation 
District, somehow want the state to solve it” (C10). 
 
 At the turn of the century, big agribusiness served on the boards of the small 
cities, but today, they aren't concerned with running a small community because they 
have enough money to do what they want outside of the community.  This community 
advocate describes not only an outflow of resources, but a deep disparity in what remains. 
 
For 100 years, they've benefited off of the cheap water. Even the rates 
today, $20 an acre foot.  ... It's ... I can't find the right word. It's immoral. 
It's ... I don't know, but I just can't find the right word. How bad it is that 
this disparity exists in our neighborhoods and in our inner cities, because 
our streets are in such bad shape. Our homes and our gardens and our 
yards are drying and dead because we can't afford the high price of water 
to water our lawns. We're asked to make reductions when they're being 
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paid not to grow, to make their reductions. It just doesn't seem moral to 
me, and definitely that the public utility controls the water that was made 
for the benefit of the agribusiness community, bends over backwards to 
give them whatever they want and however they want it. Because they 
have the economic wherewithal to mold their political agenda, and that's 
just the way it is. It's the people's problem, but agribusiness created it and 
why aren't they weighing in on the solution? Where are they in the 
conversation? Where are they?  (C10) 
 
Through one lens, the taxpayers of the state of California are responsible for cleaning up 
the mess where big agribusiness and a select group of people have run away with large 
profits.  But from another perspective, some farmers are engaged and have ideas for 
remediating the situation at the sea (as well as expertise in local land management), and 
yet are not listened to by decision-makers.   
 
They don't want to listen to farmers. ... They have to listen to someone 
who is an expert, that they pay a lot of money to hire as a consultant.  I see 
it happen so many times - they'll hire these people that come down and are 
brilliant.  They don't have a lick of sense.  They've never seen the Salton 
Sea - they get hired and come down here.  I told [a state official], if you 
want to hire someone you ought to chain them down to the sea for a year.  
And then turn em loose, and if they still want to take the job, then OK. 
(C18) 
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 Some farmers do have a deep tie to the land and have actively been stewarding it 
for decades.  The term “farmers” can connote family farms in which the farmers are 
engaged in daily activities, to farms in which the farmer is a manager of a large enterprise 
— but it seems that both varieties of farmers feel disenfranchised from Salton Sea 
decisions.  How do any of these farmers get a seat at the table?  Is there an institutional 
structure that would enable responsibility-taking?  There are a number of institutions, like 
IID's water conservation board, or the farm bureau, where cross-conversations occur.  As 
the above farmer described, though, the decision-makers ultimately privilege outside 
expertise over local knowledge (C18).  One respondent suggested a tax on agribusiness 
for Salton Sea cleanup (C10), which in essence would serve as a responsibility-taking 
device — the responsibility would be indirect and channeled through another entity.  One 
issue with this is that farmers are already struggling to compete with cheaper produce 
from Mexico and South America: even though this discussion is focused on restoring a 
local site, it is deeply entangled with global flows. 
 
 
The private sector 
 
 Right now, the private sector — agribusiness or otherwise — bears no 
responsibility for the Salton Sea.  Could private sector actors take responsibility in 
improving it?  People on various sides of the political spectrum say this is challenging 
due to regulations.  One developer points out that to propose a project regarding habitat 
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restoration, "you have to have deep pockets and sufficient money. You have to have a lot 
of folks that know and understand the business and what it takes" (C8).  Another group 
wanting to start projects for remediation explained that "there's no real conduit for 
funding, and for testing and demonstrations" (C4); it's hard to cross from pilot-scale to 
commercial expansion, because the state hasn't made the sea's future clear.  With grant 
funding, universities are better equipped to apply.  The review process for different ideas, 
as this person described, sucks the life out of efforts: "Everyone that's in a position of 
power, they get paid to administer and review things, so that's why nothing ever happens, 
is they're just turning their wheels, and they're getting paid to turn their wheels, and 
they're getting handsomely paid to go to meetings that don't ever have an eventual 
endgame in mind” (C4). 
 
 Perhaps because of the QSA's assignment of responsibility to the state, or perhaps 
because of the nature of the problem, no one saw the private sector alone as the key agent 
of change.  Rather, the private sector was hoped to be one part of the solution. 
 
 
Whither citizens? 
 
 Do the people who live by the sea have a responsibility to make it better?  A few 
people working in civil society and environmental organizations mentioned this as part of 
various conceptions of citizenship in general, or in terms of a "do your part" 
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environmentalism, but because most of the residents neither caused the problem nor have 
means to solve it, they were not seen as responsible per se.  
 
 Do they have agency to make it better, or to choose or participate in its future?  
Here again the answer is a qualified no.  One basic challenge is that very few living in the 
general area even know that it is there, much less in an impending crisis.4  One Latina 
community advocate wondered why it is mostly visited by tourists.  "I don't know if it's 
because of the smells and the perception that it's a contaminated lake and people don't 
want to go there. I grew up here and I probably only went there once" (C15).  Another 
challenge is that the people who do live here have other responsibilities. One community 
advocate explained: 
 
There are so many immediate hazards or immediate threats to our health 
and our well-being in this area, that it's very difficult for people who have 
grown up here, people that live here, to see like broader, bigger-picture-
type things. I don't mean because they're not able to, but just they don't 
have the time or the energy to look at those bigger issues, because they 
don't have potable water to drink, or they don't have a sewage system to 
treat their waste, so it's an interesting sort of dilemma, I guess, because it 
prevents us, sometimes, from reaching the bigger pictures. Or from even 
																																																								
4  In turn, the invisibility goes both ways: as discussed, the state doesn't seem to care that these people are 
there.  In the Coachella Valley, there are a segment of citizens that are virtually invisible to the state, those 
who live in mobile home parks scattered among the agricultural fields — one nonprofit used satellite 
imagery to count 135 mobile home parks, ranging from a few homes to 300-400 homes per park.  These are 
often informal or unpermitted, and their residents are undercounted in the census, sometimes including 
undocumented migrants or communities of indigenous Mexicans which do not speak Spanish or English.   
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joining coalitions or making partnerships to address those bigger issues, 
because we're too focused on more immediate needs. (C13) 
 
Another community advocate related that people aren't really asking questions about 
environmental futures: "When it comes to things like technology, or even where folks 
work, people don't ask questions about where they work, or about the technologies that 
have been implemented in their communities. People travel hundreds of miles. They 
immigrate here, sometimes under dangerous conditions, just to work. So they're not really 
asking questions about, ‘Why is this the way it is? I'm just here to work and make money 
and send money back to my family.’” (C2) 
 
 There have been public meetings held about the Salton Sea, but they are often not 
well attended.  One citizen reported that the audience was mostly investors or 
businesspeople.  A constant gripe is that the meetings are not always held in convenient 
locations — often at water agency or institutional headquarters in Palm Desert or El 
Centro.  Important state meetings are in Sacramento, and public testimony at all of these 
meetings is limited.  One resident explained, "I don't have the money to be attending 
meetings.  Oh, in Sacramento.  Let's see, Sacramento's a six and half to eight hour drive 
one way. Gasoline's anything from 2.50 - 3.50 a gallon. Your motel's 80-150$ a 
night.  You know, you're talking hundreds of dollars to attending a meeting.... By 
California law... you're allowed to speak for three minutes. It used to be five” (C21). 
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 Not just individual residents, but entire groups, have been distanced from 
decision-making. While some tribes have seats at the Salton Sea Authority, such as the 
Torres Martinez Desert Cahuilla Indians who are landowners, others which are more 
remote have capacity challenges with officially engaging — which can be seen in the 
context of a long history of struggles to "engage in consistent intergovernmental 
relationships" over the past century, as well as efforts to join United Nations processes on 
climate decisions (C23).  One person working with a Native American group explained 
that "it's burdensome to have us travel far distances to kind of quixotically scheduled 
meetings where the opportunity to present to the record are limited" (C23).  There is a 
very strong normative and substantive rationale for greater inclusion from tribes in the 
area.  As this respondent explained, their knowledge of species from close observation 
over thousands of years is important to the record, and reliable to journaled science that is 
"really fairly limited in review."  The testimony on the record “lacks the depth of 
testimony from the peoples who have lived in that environment and understand its 
mechanisms and its fickleness, and how it changes to different effects and inputs that 
we've seen over time,” and the respondent identified a need for “a more reliable platform, 
less burdensome to our resources, in order to provide [such] information.” (C23) 
 
 In addition to lack of awareness about the sea, the presence of more pressing 
problems, and the practical challenges of engaging in official processes, active citizens 
are facing another challenge: burnout from dealing with this issue for decades without 
seeing meaningful progress. 
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 — When you've been at this at ten years and you've seen no progress 
whatsoever, you tend to get upset and not want to do anything anymore. I 
can't let that happen, because I don't want to leave here. I don't want the 
state of California and the federal government going, oh you have a toxic 
situation out here, you have to move. Oh, by the way, and we're going to 
buy up all your property at 80 cents on the dollar.  No, you're not. I'll stick 
here until they absolutely have to drag my ass out of here. 
 — Do people out here talk about moving? 
 — No.  The long-term residents?  Over my dead body.  And the problem 
is, as the sea dries up, our dead bodies get closer in time. (C21) 
 
 Burnout and the burdens of systemic constraints on action seem to mingle with a 
root sense of malaise about no longer being a nation of builders.  The paralysis itself 
becomes another obstacle to overcome.  A nonprofit worker describes the situation as one 
of fear of risk-taking: 
 
The Salton Sea we see today was in part due to people dreaming big and 
people daring to build communities for the betterment of the future of their 
livelihood. They were farmers, engineers, building canals from the 
Colorado River all the way out to the middle of the desert to produce food 
for their families. If that's not dreaming, if that's not ambition, if that's not 
going after something big, then I don't know what is.  I think we have lost 
that, I think in our government especially, in our leaders. I'm not sure why. 
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I think a lot of people nowadays are afraid to take risks and dream big 
because they're afraid of failing. (C14) 
 
 A farmer with very different political affiliations has thoughts rooted in the same 
narrative: 
 
In 1919 there was a group of pioneers in this valley. The aquifer was going 
down at that time because agriculture was pumping water out. Aquifer's 
going down. They made a trip to Washington, D.C. and said, "We want to 
get river water." They made a pact. We have what priorities we do have 
because of those guys in 1919. Can you imagine getting on a horse in 1919 
and then going to a train station and going all the way across the country? 
The foresight. What's the foresight there? It's amazing. Yet here in 
California they haven't built a water project since Jerry Brown's dad did. 
When Jerry Brown came in, he canceled every water project. You go back, 
the last big reservoir was built like in 1964 when the population was 18 
million people. It's doubled. It's 36 million, and there's been no new water 
projects. (C3) 
 
 "The Salton Sea confounds the region's and the nation's traditional confidence that 
physical problems must inevitably yield to engineered solutions", writes William DeBuys 
(1999: 246).  Viewed through one lens, the basin holds the salty ruins of the American 
Dream. Importantly, these narratives about foresight and dreaming big omit key parts of 
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the environmental history, such as the greed and incompetence of the California 
Development Company and the tension between private-sector and government-led 
irrigation development which at times resulted in physical violence.  Yet in analysing 
how people who hold completely different sets of politics often view the problem in the 
same terms, we can see the roots of possible allegiances and opportunities. 
 
 
 
4.  Analysis: Future prospects for responsibility making and taking 
 
Even at the Salton Sea, the face of death has its smile.  In the morning the wind is still 
blowing but the sun is bright, and life is stirring.  Even at the bottom of a well, there’s 
life.  
— Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Salton Sea Notes, 1961 
 
  
 There are three key avenues citizens are using to make and take responsibility and 
agency: formal processes, citizen science, and social movements.  This section discusses 
their prospects. 
 
Formal processes 
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 Ulrich Beck, writing about global climate risk, describes "organized 
irresponsibility", which occurs when there is a fundamental distinction between those 
who produce the risk and those who are affected by it — those who take decisions are not 
accountable to the people affected, and those people who are affected cannot participate.  
This is a key way in which the Salton Sea differs from global risks: the situation is not 
one of organized irresponsibility, as decision-takers are accountable to the people, and the 
affected people do have structures for participating in decision-making.  Those structures 
are imperfect and underused, but some people do try and use them.  In my interview set, 
people described participation in other environmental decisions in myriad ways: 
advocating for procedural changes to the electoral system of the water district, organizing 
town hall meetings about hiking trail closures, enacting legislation to make sure impacts 
from a new power plant were offset into funds for community betterment.  One nonprofit 
worker describes the value of formal participation at board meetings as being able to 
"kind of put the heart back into the equation, put the human element back into the 
equation," noting that hearing community voices "has been critical and crucial into 
changing the minds of the players” (C14). 
 
 Participating in these processes requires the education, time, money, and leisure to 
get organized, and confronting people who have much more of those resources.  A 
community advocate describes how the “little guys”  have “not a lot of recourse” when it 
comes to going up against the agribusiness lobby: “We could get elected into positions, 
but we can only push so hard and then we'll get stomped on big time" (C10).  At the same 
time, this community member notes that for the first time, "we have a Latino State 
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Assembly member, a Latino State Senator, a Latino United States congressman, a Latino 
Speaker of the State assembly, a Latino Speaker of the Senate, a Latino Attorney 
General, a Latino Secretary of State. Now, these are now an evolution of Mexican-
American community members that have lived in communities of color, that have 
suffered and now are in positions to cut the pie up a little bit more equitable, and that's all 
we want” (C10). 
 
 Responsibility is, in a sense, labor.   At the moment, responsibility is 
professionalized, as the state hires consultants not only to mitigate the dust and create the 
habitat, but to facilitate stakeholder meetings and conduct public outreach.  One can't 
fairly argue that volunteer labor should replace this: one option would be to pay 
community members and advocates to develop solutions for the sea, instead of hiring 
outside consultants to come in from the cities, but then there are questions of what kinds 
of knowledge and education are needed, and how that capacity can be built locally. 
  
Citizen science 
   
 If the government is unwilling to fulfill its responsibilities in terms of 
environmental care, can citizen science fill the gap?  One scientist comments on some of 
the opportunities and challenges, describing how citizens are putting up air quality 
monitors as well as using the monitors to fly colored flags at schools to advise students 
and teachers about air quality: “They're fulfilling a need there that the government is not 
fulfilling. On the other hand, only the government can really step in and do something 
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about air quality not meeting standards. Citizens can't say, "Okay, you can't drive any 
trucks up and down the street today." That's managed by the government.”  (C12) 
 
 This academic scientist points to an important problem: even when citizens have 
data, they are often not equipped to fix the thing that is causing the phenomena they're 
observing.  Secondly, citizen science is not the same as citizen engineering — some of 
the actions needed to mitigate dust at the sea are high-capital projects that citizens would 
be unable to fund.  However, citizen science, particularly in the absence of government 
biological monitoring at the sea, can provide important insights as to the state of the 
ecosystem, and these insights can be shared on social media and used by social 
movements to create pressure.  There is a remarkable lack of official biological 
monitoring at the sea.  Citizen science could also generate baseline data that would be 
used in future legal proceedings, as pointed out by one resident, who wants to collect 
baseline health data now, before the mitigation water ceases and the lake becomes more 
exposed. 
 
Social movements and media production 
 
 Social movements connected with environmental justice or community 
development have important strategies for making and taking responsibility for 
ecosystem restoration.  The Salton Sea has not received the attention that places like Lake 
Tahoe or Mono Lake have garnered from green groups, perhaps due to its reputation for 
being unnatural or "man-made"; one activist also lamented a general failure to make the 
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desert an iconic landscape (C22).  However, small local organizations as well as local 
chapters of large NGOs like the Sierra Club are increasingly involved.  NGOs focused 
upon saving or restoring the sea have been important in (1) producing visualizations of 
alternative proposals,  (2) education about the sea, and (3) helping local people 
participate in formal processes.  Media production, particularly social media, is key to 
this work.  Another important part of the responsibility-making work these organizations 
do is reframing the problem definition.  
 
 One way a few respondents alluded that the problem could be reframed is in terms 
of geography, though this is a challenging prospect.  Is the problem the Salton Sea, or 
water allocation on the Colorado River and the dessicated Colorado Delta?  Or is the 
problem with water in the West, and Southern California's water needs?   What about 
upriver at Lake Mead and being able to store more water at Hoover Dam?  Experts tend 
to believe that this would get into too many other conversations, which is probably why 
relatively few people argue for a geographical reframing. Another respondent saw the 
problem definition in terms of food systems: "it's a socioeconomic issue, it's an 
environmental issue, it has to do with our food, it's a lot of our food production. This is 
70 to 80% of our nation's winter vegetables grown right here" (C1).  This reframing also 
gets into tough terrain fast, because it gets into questions of virtual water, what crops are 
grown, and water rights.  
  
 However, quite a few people argue for the problem definition to extend beyond 
the environmental box.  Broadening the problem definition allows for a broader vision of 
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ecosystem and community restoration, as well as economic development (in more 
familiar terms).  As one local official stated, nobody's listened to the environmental pleas 
for 25 years, but making it an economic development issue would “get a lot more legs 
from everybody involved; state, feds;” the official noted that “there's a thousand reasons 
to fix it and there are no reasons not to fix it. It boggles my mind that it's not being done” 
(C17). The broader problem definition didn't work in 2007, when the $8.9 billion 
"Preferred Alternative" attempted to incorporate multiple goals and failed.  But many are 
still raising the problem as an economic or social development issue, and actively 
attempting to reframe it as such, illustrating that this is still a tension to wrestle with.  
Efforts to combine framings of the Salton Sea problem with discussions of energy have 
been moderately successful, as the IID's Salton Sea Renewable Energy Initiative 
illustrates.  The notion of the Anthropocene, and all its entanglements, may justify 
renewed attention to just how broad the problem definition should be. 
 
 There is one looming problem which is rarely discussed in regards to the Salton 
Sea: climate change.  From a macro-scale, one reading of this case is that we are 
watching the process by which sacrifice zones are decided upon: not all will thrive in a 
new climate-change era, and how much will the broader society be willing to subsidize 
the failure of specific regions?  As Donald Worster muses, "Will this place turn out to be 
one of the West's biggest ghost towns ever?" (2016, 136).  Ironically, a world that is 4°C 
warmer, with 30 feet of sea level rise, could bring the ocean to the Salton Sea via the Sea 
of Cortez for free, without the need for multibillion-dollar pipelines (Mayton, 2016).  Yet 
it seems that in the Imperial Valley, climate change is still largely outside the bounds of 
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discussion.  The river, as Polk points out, is expected to maintain a constant flow while 
the practices made possible by the river "are expected to increase without end" (2014, 
15).  Climate change, however, is upending what is constant.   
 
 
 
5.  Conclusion: Refining responsibility 
 
The story of the future will be more like the story of the Salton Sea.  It will concern 
society's efforts to live with and at times ameliorate the consequences of what was 
broken.  We have entered an age of obligatory adjustment and repair. — William deBuys, 
Salt Dreams 
 
 Many writers on the Anthropocene have commented on the need to "take 
responsibility"; in the Anthropocene-as-bildungsroman, this is the moment of our growth; 
“humanity” steps up to the challenge.  Responsibility crops up everywhere in the 
burgeoning Anthropocene literature — in environmental ethics, where duties and 
obligations to the future are explored; in jurisprudence, where responsibilities for 
environmental damage are challenged; in climate governance, in discussions of historical 
responsibility and loss and damage; in science policy, where innovation should be 
responsible; in business, where corporate social responsibility is taking hold.  What's new 
and different in the Anthropocene, though, is (1) that humans are geological agents, and 
(2) we are aware of it.  Earth system scientists have argued that new knowledge brings a 
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responsibility for stewardship (Steffen et al, 2011).  Sometimes, this responsibility is 
extended to a stronger role in managing ecosystems or natural processes, whether it be 
ecosystem restoration towards a prior baseline, or designer ecosystems optimized for 
some function (Ross et al, 2015, see also Mansfield & Doyle, 2017).  However, many 
scholars critique "the new grand narrative in which Man becomes conscious of the fact 
that his activities transform the earth at the global scale of geology, and that he must 
therefore take responsibility for the future of the planet," as Stengers (2015) puts it, for 
the historical responsibility of particular actors that it occludes — the general 
responsibility erases particular responsibilities.  Responsibility looks backward and 
forward. While the increased (general) acknowledgement of historical responsibility and 
accountability for environmental damage is welcomed, as is the idea of responsibility to 
future generations, many scholars do not extend this responsibility to ecological 
maintenance.   
 
 In short, the example of the Salton Sea has pointed to some refinements that need 
to be made in the narrative of humans taking responsibility in the Anthropocene.  I will 
mention three.  First, "responsibility" needs a stronger distinction between making actors 
accountable for past harms, and being responsible for future environmental decisions, 
which is something everyone should have a role in.  The backwards-looking 
responsibility should enable the forwards-looking, and the discussions should 
acknowledge each other, but there should also be some analytic separation.  
Responsibility is not the same thing as being able to respond, as the Salton Sea example 
illustrates.  The notion of "taking responsibility" is rife with questions of capacity, of 
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responsiveness, of agency and power.  In some cases, power allows for the avoidance of 
the responsibility to manage ecosystems, as is largely the case with the state of California 
in this instance as well as agribusiness.  In other cases, the lack of power precludes 
citizen actors for taking responsibility for shaping their environments.  A more systematic 
look at forward and backward-looking responsibility, as well as a separation of 
responsibility from capability, would be helpful.  
 Second refinement: responsibility is continual — not a decision or a moment of 
responsibility-taking, but a process.  Kearnes and Van Dooren (forthcoming), following 
Derrida, argue that what responsibility is defined in part by is its continual nature; the fact 
that it unfolds amidst undecidability and is revisable in the face of an uncertain future.  
The fact that responsibility is an ongoing process highlights the labor involved.  One 
doesn't want to place undue labor on those who did not create the problem, and place 
responsibility on the already burdened.  This attention to the work demands of 
responsibility-taking — the actual physical work — brings up questions of 
professionalization of responsibility, of expertise, and of education in the Anthropocene.  
For example, “responsibility” looks a lot different depending on where you are standing: 
“taking responsibility” might mean something different to a woman working the second 
shift of childcare on top of her job.  An understanding of responsibility as continual labor 
could help the burden be distributed more fairly.  On the other hand, it’s important not to 
simply see the caretaking as a burden, as this impedes one from taking the agency and 
benefitting from potential opportunities. 
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 Third refinement: there is a type of responsibility which creates a space for 
ecosystem health which does not go so far as to complete control or design of 
ecosystems: call it co-responsibility with nature.  Critique of the Anthropocene often is 
critique of a vision of controlling nature, but in this example, something more like co-
responsibility would be more true to what various actors are proposing. Local officials 
describe management programs not as ecosystem control, but a kind of doing-ones-
"best", offering up habitat — the rest is up to the other lifeforms.  As one official put it, "I 
think the wildlife will adapt and they'll figure it out, all we can try to do is give them 
some kind of stable environment with a reasonably decent water quality, a reasonably 
decent salinity level over time and make that there is some kind of forage opportunities 
there for them, and we'll see how they evolve" (C7).  Or, as a farmer explained, “We're 
suppressing the Colorado River delta riparian habitat, and if you put water on Imperial 
Valley, and stop farming it, it will come back. Mother Nature will come back on its own, 
and if you give it a little bit of a hand, by planting some trees and moving some dirt 
around so that you've always got wet spots, it'll come back quicker” (C5). 
 
 In fact, another farmer (C18) argued that the birds on the Pacific flyway would be 
better off without the sea; that they have become dependent and should be fending for 
themselves, opining that “they ought to let the birds find other sources.”  His experience 
with pelicans makes clear how complicated taking responsibility for an ecosystem is: 
perhaps one tries to create habitat and ends up making a death trap. 
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The pelicans - they can go to the Pacific Ocean, the coast.  They go back 
and forth all the time to the Sea of Cortez.  Matter of fact, the Salton Sea 
becomes a death trap in the summer when the juveniles have just got their 
wings, they're flying good, like all teenagers, you know, they're ready to 
try anything.  They hang out in groups, just like teenagers do. 
 
So their parents take them down the Sea of Cortez, they go down early in 
the morning - they leave when it's still dark, they go early and it only takes 
an hour and a half to fly down there.  And so they spend the day down in 
Mexico, fishing and what-not, and the teenagers, they go off by 
themselves, they go, Hey let's go back to the Salton Sea, maybe there's 
something going on there.   
 
So they start back at two in the afternoon.  And there's sixty miles of 
desert, and the surface temperature of the desert is 160 degrees.  And all 
those heat waves coming off it, they just run out of gas.  We have pelicans 
crashing down all over here in the summertime.  And they're all juveniles, 
trying to make it back to the sea.  Pelicans don't drink water.  They get all 
their moisture from the fish they eat.  So if they're dehydrated, they lose 
muscle control and they can't fly.  If they can't fly, they can't hunt, and if 
they can't hunt, they can't get fish, and if they can't get fish, they can't get 
moisture.  That's the end of the pelican.  You see them laying alongside of 
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the road, crashing into powerlines, knocking up transformers, hitting 
buildings. So, you know, it's a death trap in that sense. (C18) 
 
This firsthand experience of the sea’s dual nature is why people talking about 
maintaining the sea here don’t speak in idealistic terms about control or perfection.  This 
is not “Imperial”; it’s not a grand vision.  Those days are over.  This is about ecological 
design by doing just enough.   
 Even by modifying responsibility to include a distinction between forward-
looking and backwards-looking forms, extending it to a continual process encompassing 
care and recognizing labor, and construing it as responsibility not for control but for co-
responsibility, we still don’t have a perfect language for what needs to be done.  Speaking 
of making or taking responsibility makes it seem like the default state is neglect or 
absence, when really responsibility in this case is taken up somewhere, by some actor, 
either nature or other humans.  In this case, responsibility will be taken up by citizens 
who will become responsible for managing the damages, in terms of their health care 
costs; like in neoliberal environmental governance more generally, the individuals bear 
the cost.  We have not fully evolved the language or concepts for the task at hand.  But 
for the context of the Imperial Valley, responsibility has some resonance, and it might be 
the best language for the job. 
 
The stakes here are high, because they are not just about one ecosystem failing.  
The stakes involve the legitimacy of institutions, and what it means if the state is seen as 
willing to essentially declare an ecological sacrifice zone.  Beck observes that the 
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ecological crisis brings a crisis of basic rights “whose long-term effect in weakening 
society can scarcely be underestimated,” where dangers “are being produced by industry, 
externalized by economics, individualized by the legal system, legitimized by the natural 
science and made to appear harmless by politics. That this is breaking down the power 
and credibility of institutions only becomes clear when the system is put on the spot” 
(1996: 18).  In this case, the credibility and legitimacy of the state of California is being 
stretched to the breaking point; this was clear in nearly every interview.  That the state is 
attempting to perform some responsibility with Phase I of the SSMP is either heartening, 
or a legitimacy-extending tactic.  At a Salton Sea Authority board meeting I attended in 
late 2016, an Imperial County official and board member quipped that “the State is like 
me with finals in college, waiting to the last minute.”  He said that he woke up later in 
life to the realization that this is not the best way.  
Perhaps these realizations are making waves.  On June 1, 2017, SB 701: Salton 
Sea Obligations Act of 2018 was brought forth by Imperial County legislators and 
approved in the California State Senate.  If approved in both houses, it will send a ballot 
proposal in Nov. 2018 to have voters authorize a $500 million bond.  The director of the 
Salton Sea Authority, Phil Rosentrator, lays out the options: “A ‘Do Nothing” scenario is 
the most costly of all options, predicted to cause $70 Billion in damages to human health, 
property values, environmental degradation and the connected economies of agriculture 
and tourism. Conversely, a YES vote for SB 701 provides a positive alternative and a 
realistic path forward.”  Initial financing, at least, is being made selectable; it now looks 
like the responsibility will be spread to the voters of California.   
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Financing the state’s plan, and the responsibility-taking by the state implied, is not 
the same as giving Salton Sea residents the means to shape future there.  Ongoing 
community consultations reflect the continued interest in water import, as well as 
continuing efforts by the environmental justice community to stop the exposure of playa 
dust in the long term.  Metrics and economic calculations, and the ability to produce 
them, remain key to both these future goals.  Community advocates do not have the 
resources to produce the engineering outcomes they seek, and their ability to collect the 
data they need to produce arguments is mixed.  But they are successfully engaging with 
and deploying concepts of the “long-range” and seeking a more permanent vision and 
solution than the state’s ten-year plan.  The time horizon of present action has 
successfully been put up for debate, and with it, notions of responsibility have been 
extended beyond the short-term.  This is not a minor victory, as it can pave the way for 
further deliberation of what long-range future is desired. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Climate change technologies in California’s Imperial Valley:   
Prospective challenges for negative emissions at the landscape scale 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Negative emission technologies have emerged in climate models as a global-scale 
solution to a planetary problem.  If negative emissions technologies attempt to cross the 
fraught threshold from global imaginary to local carbon infrastructure, what social 
dynamics will they face?  This paper looks at how carbon practices are evolving in one 
particular landscape: the Imperial Valley in southeast California, a desert landscape 
highly engineered for industrial agriculture.  Local officials, community activists, and 
business ventures are re-imagining the valley as a renewable energy landscape, some 
with interest in carbon-negative technologies.  At the same time, actors from farmers to 
desert environmentalists often contest aspects of this development framework: either for 
technical reasons, or for questions around how the vision is executed and for whose 
benefit.  Based on semi-structured interviews and site visits, this paper examines how 
community actors have received, participated in, imagined, or contested solar, wind, 
geothermal, biofuels, and on-farm soil carbon sequestration.  It also examines local 
understandings of climate change, which can vary from global perceptions — and these 
variances may shape the deployment of negative emissions technologies and practices. 
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Analyzing these social processes offers a concrete illustration of how local, particular 
dynamics around (1) landholder adoption, (2) contestation of how the technologies are 
scaled up, and (3) lack of policy for technology investment will confront the 
environmental politics of different negative emissions technologies if they are 
successfully scaled up.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction: Viewing negative emissions on a landscape scale 
 
The origin story of “negative emissions” is that the concept emerged in the early 2000s 
from the efforts of integrated assessment modelers to “solve” the problem of how society 
might achieve global mean temperature targets.  Bioenergy with carbon capture and 
sequestration (BECCS) in particular was used as a “tool to allow for ambitious climate 
targets”, according to one modeler, who in an interview said that the concept had been 
misused in regular emissions scenarios when it was intended to be a backstop (Hickman, 
2016).  Though the concept emerged in different places by different groups, it has its 
grounding in a global modeling perspective.  The problem definition is global (global 
mean temperature), and the view of the climate solution is also global.  “Negative 
emissions” is the object, but the process has also been termed “carbon removal”, and also 
features as one half of the umbrella concept “climate engineering”, meaning large-scale 
intentional interventions in the climate system, which emerged around the same time. 
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Fast-forward 10-15 years after this concept was created, and the majority of the 
scenarios for curbing temperature rise to 2°C now rely upon negative emissions, typically 
in the form of BECCS.  The models are essentially pointing to the massive and 
widespread deployment of a technological system with heavy, capital-intensive 
infrastructure that has not been proven at scale.  Some of the challenges are obvious and 
familiar, such as land use competition, competition for water and inputs, shocks to food 
prices (Boysen et al, 2017; Fuss et al, 2014; Heck et al, 2016).  It is difficult to think 
through or even see potential challenges and friction points when governance discussions 
are on a global scale.  Analysis on varying scales would help generate appropriate policy 
for negative emissions — either to support the growth of these technologies and nurture 
possible co-benefits, or to mitigate their impacts upon communities and in climate policy 
more generally, depending upon how people and policy-makers see them.  While 
regional, nation-state, and community-level analyses would be valuable, this paper 
focuses on a landscape scale of analysis, smaller than a region but encompassing multiple 
communities.  In this paper, the premise is that exploring the dynamics of nascent carbon 
sequestration practices as well as the scale-up of renewables can indicate potential 
challenges and opportunities for negative emissions.  The research question addressed 
here is: in the landscape of the Imperial Valley, how have varying actors have received, 
participated in, imagined, or contested technologies related to negative emissions?   
 
Why consider the landscape scale to illuminate a global practice like climate 
engineering?   Holism is one reason to think in terms of landscapes: a landscape scale of 
analysis, smaller than a region, encompasses both ecological and political processes, as 
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well as the feeling of the land.  This unity forces us to think holistically about how and 
why land is altered, and what ecological and social feedbacks result from modifying it, as 
Hunsberger et al point out in their study of climate mitigation activities (2015).  Though 
these authors are writing about climate mitigation, the same rationale extends to thinking 
about negative emission technologies on the landscape level.  A landscape scale of 
analysis could also work counter to a logic of viewing landscapes in terms of their 
climatic attributes or carbon content, calling attention to what place means beyond the 
“green gaze” of carbon, nutrient, or hydrological flows (Fairhead et al, 2012).  The 
landscape view invites human habitation.  The value of this perspective here is to get 
away from seeing negative emissions "technologies" as objects or artifacts that are 
deployed, but part of the "socio-technical landscape" (see Rip and Kemp, 1998).  Part of 
the value of this particular case is that we understand the deployment of landscape-
altering technologies and practices not just in space, but also through time, as part of 
continuation of the landscape’s history.  The temporal dimension is important for carbon 
removal, as it is imagined to unfold in time-scales of centuries. 
 
 Why consider this landscape, the Coachella-Imperial Valley in southeast 
California, to illuminate how negative emissions might be scaled up?  Firstly, it’s the site 
of advanced agricultural production as well as a rapid transition to renewables, so there is 
data there to draw upon about how the landscape is already put to work for specific 
human goals. This chapter is necessarily speculative; it extrapolates from the current 
energy transition into the future, and in fact sees negative emissions as an extension of 
this decarbonization process. Secondly, this landscape is in California, which has some of 
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the more advanced energy policies as well as environmental regulations, as well as a lot 
of technical innovation.  We can imagine that if negative emissions technologies are 
going to gain a foothold somewhere in the United States, California might be an early 
adopter.  I draw upon data from visits to biofuel and geothermal production sites, farms, 
laboratories, and community meetings, as well as ~30 extended interviews with 
community members, businesses, and scientists, conducted in July 2014, January 2016, 
and October – December 2016.  Most were conducted in the Imperial Valley; some were 
conducted in the neighboring Coachella Valley and others in Mexicali (all are essentially 
part of the same geographical area, the Salton Sink). These interviews included questions 
about the future of the landscape in 2050, and touched upon many environmental and 
economic themes — some focused upon energy systems, and a few mentioned carbon 
removal explicitly, but most also discussed the future of agriculture, water rights, the 
restoration of the Salton Sea, and other topics that respondents felt germane to their 
vision of the future landscape.5 
 
 
Climate change and imagined energy futures in the Imperial Valley 
 
The Imperial Valley is one of the harshest landscapes in North America.  It 
receives an average of three inches of rain a year, and summer temperatures routinely 
climb into the 110s.  Water is drawn here through 80 miles of desert from the Colorado 
River via the All-American Canal, and so the valley is also a lush salad bowl, producing a 																																																								
5 Interviewees are referred to numerically, along with a descriptor of their choosing.  See appendix for 
interviewee list. 
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significant portion of the nation’s winter vegetables.  Because climatic conditions are 
already so harsh and dry, an observer from afar might think it is especially vulnerable to 
climate change — and because it is relatively sparsely populated, that far-off observer 
might also think of it as an empty desert in which to place renewable energy.  
 
There are disconnects between how the Imperial Valley under climate change 
might be viewed on a wide-zoom scale, and how the valley resident might perceives it.  
This variance may be fundamental to people’s support for (or resistance towards) 
negative emissions practices, in that when it comes to rural landscapes in the United 
States, people may resist something that feels like it’s mandated by outsiders.  Firstly, 
from the local perspective, the idea of empty land for solar evaporates — as one desert 
activist put it, urban activists don’t see what the desert is about.  “It's easier for them to 
go, ‘Well, that would be a good place’ [for solar deployment]” (C22).  Nor does the “high 
modernism” approach practiced by the Bureau of Land Management / Dept. of Energy 
see other ways of valuing the landscape, as Moore and Hackett describe in their analysis 
of public engagement with renewable energy siting in another California desert valley: 
the cartographic lens, they argue, should be ground-truthed to help maintain “a goldilocks 
principle between high modernism and narrowly constrained, intractable controversies 
about specific sites” (2016). 
 
Secondly, and perhaps more surprisingly, some residents don’t see water 
shortages as threatening the agricultural future of the valley.  It might appear on the front 
lines of climate change in climate models, and yet the Imperial Irrigation District has 
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senior water rights to a large portion of Colorado River Water — what one farmer 
emphasized as “the strongest water rights of the river” (C18).  Despite general water 
security, due to the water politics of the area, some respondents were still worried about 
the impacts of climate change upstream, and the needs of the other seven basin states of 
the Colorado River.  A few commented on how Lake Mead was approaching historic 
lows, and what conservation situations that could trigger.  But in general, water is seen as 
a political battle and an allocation challenge, since the landscape is not dependent upon 
rain. 
 
A third factor is the lukewarm concern about climate change is the already- 
extreme heat: “The heat is a real thing, but it's one of those things that people just think, 
‘Okay, this is how it is in the valley’” (C2). On the other hand, people wondered about 
the ability of the body to actually tolerate such high temperatures.  Farm workers are 
particularly vulnerable; employers provide minimal protections such as shaded resting 
places and water breaks.  In short, people are already adapting to extreme conditions, so 
in a sense they must just pile on more adaptation.  
 
 In the Imperial Valley, as in many rural regions, many people are skeptical about 
anthropogenic global warming.  Farmers in particular are attuned to variability, and some 
question whether climate observations just reflect natural variability.  One farmer 
explained: 
 
	 176	
I was born in this valley, and my grandfather was here in the '30s. …I've 
been around here for so long that the one thing you learn as a person who 
pays attention to weather ... For example, I can't prune unless I have 
enough dormancy. I have to watch heat spells coming in the summertime 
and so on and so forth, that the one thing you learn is that it's very 
unpredictable, and for the comments to be made that we're been 
continuously warming, or continuously cooling, however you want to do 
it, are just false. I mean, it's up and down, it's up and down. It's 
unpredictable. ... Normally everything averages out… There is no such 
thing as normal weather. There's average weather, and you will notice 
things average out. (C3) 
 
Another farmer had a similar line of questioning:  “The word climate change, or phrase, 
I'm not sure what people mean by it.  Is it just a drought that we're in, a drought 
cycle?  That certainly has changed the climate; that's for sure.  Is it man-made?  I don't 
know.  There are a lot of different thoughts on that … You go to look at tree rings, back 
2000 years, you see cycles that are very similar to what we have today” (C18).  
Moreover, it’s not just a matter shaky science — some growers see the climate change 
discourse as politically motivated. “Lookit, they've raised a lot of money through carbon 
taxation, they changed the way people live, which was really the goal in the first place. 
It's all about money. They've done it” (C3). 
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Yet despite the mixed concern for climate impacts, and a fair amount of climate 
skepticism, visions of renewable energy in the Imperial Valley are thriving.6  Local 
development officials celebrate the valley’s natural blessing: 360 days of sunshine a year, 
a 1° slope on most lands, and the geothermal resources of the Salton Sink — 
geographical features which are buoyed by the state’s renewable energy portfolio 
requirement of 50% by 2030.  The potential is seen for both energy and jobs in a region 
with 25% unemployment: as one former county supervisor put it, "Renewable energy is 
going to give Imperial County a shot in the arm” (Li, 2013).  Local agencies such as 
Imperial Irrigation District — a large landholder as well as an electricity provider — as 
well as the Imperial Valley Economic Development Corporation are actively promoting 
development of this “21st century gold” in the region, with fair success. The growth of 
renewables has exploded as utilities such as San Diego Gas & Electric buy from massive 
Imperial County solar and wind projects to fulfill their mandate.  Even if not everyone 
buys into anthropogenic global warming, many see the benefits of participating in the 
boom. 
 
While developers build mega-projects, citizen scientists have viewed the 
landscape as an area of experimentation.  Both local entrepreneurs / activists and large, 
established institutions see the Imperial Valley as offering a global model for new energy 
futures, in different ways.  One citizen trying to bring technology companies together in a 
scientific collective discussed a vision for  
 																																																								
6 This should not surprise, as support for renewable energy research in the US tends to be strong even when 
belief in anthropogenic global warming is low (Marlon et al, 2016). 
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…incorporating renewable energy, like geothermal energy, solar energy, 
maybe solar gradient ponds, algae, biofuel technology, taking technologies 
that already exist and work to filter water and to create better water quality 
for wetland habitat, and even drinking water, like desalination.  … 
Healthier people, healthier communities, cleaner air, cleaner water, cleaner 
food, cleaner habitat, it's all possible. Just got to see it and believe it, and 
then build a road map to get to that point. It's really that real to us. (C14) 
 
 The vision is for a demonstration area where a number of diverse companies can 
learn from each other:  “"Where's the hydrogen?" It's over there. "Where's the solar 
testing area?" It's over there, and there's 20 different solar companies that are trying to be 
more efficient than the other one, and be more productive” (C4).  Rather than being a 
strictly entrepreneurial vision, the idea is landscape transformation and changing the 
microclimate: “What would it do when you have an arid desert that now is lush green, 
and all the mangroves there are sequestering carbon on a regular basis, and all of the 
animals there are only there because you have created a new habitat for them?” (C4) 
 
 In short, there are a few different ways to imagine the future renewable energy 
landscape: large-scale mega-projects for energy export, a smaller, diverse sampling of 
pilot projects with community engagement, and things in-between. But these visions 
won’t come to materialize easily. In what follows, we will take a look at the challenges 
inherent in three major components of a carbon-removal landscape: biofuels, renewables, 
and on-farm sequestration. 
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2.  Biofuels: Tough lignin in a tough investment climate 
 
Bioenergy with carbon capture and sequestration has become a fundamental negative 
emissions strategy, and the Imperial Valley is considered an area favorable for biofuels 
due to its abundant sunlight and cheap water.7  Sugarcane and algae are under 
development as biofuel feedstocks. Until now, there was no cane processing facility in 
the valley, though the warm climate is favorable to production.  California Ethanol & 
Power’s large processing facility is about to come online, which is projected to catapult 
sugarcane to Imperial County’s third most valuable product (Rubenstein, 2017). 
 
Whether it makes sense to use Colorado River water to grow bioenergy for export 
— or potentially for negative emissions — seems like an obvious question to an outsider 
concerned with climate change.  But not everything that is contestable will be contested.  
Though the water footprint of biofuels, and cane in particular, has received attention 
when it comes to large-scale land acquisitions in the developing world (Borras et al, 
2011; Johannsen et al, 2016; Tejada and Rist, 2017), it’s likely this might not be 
contested here.  For one, the main crop is alfalfa, which goes to China and the Arabian 
Peninsula, so there’s already a large water export — one could argue that it might as well 
																																																								
7 Whether there is local carbon sequestration potential in the underlying Salton Trough is unclear from the 
geological literature (Downey and Clinkenbeard, 2006), and no bioCCS plant is planned, so I don’t 
mean to suggest that biofuels for BECCS would definitely be grown in this valley.  It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to suggest how far the supply chain would stretch; research suggests that BECCS 
would exhibit diseconomies of scale in biomass transportation and supply costs (Sanchez and Callaway, 
2016).  
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go to biofuels than to foreign cows.  Farmers whom I asked about this virtual water trade 
countered with questions about the balance of trade and the embedded water content of 
electronics produced in China.8  Secondly, one farmer pointed out that the Imperial 
Irrigation District is currently underusing its allotment, so the unused water could be used 
by new sugarcane production (C18).  This virtual water discussion is a bit nuanced to get 
into here, but suffice it to say these are the kinds of questions that can come up when 
envisioning BECCS at scale.  Yet they might not come up everywhere, or may be raised 
primarily by outsiders.   
 
In order to avoid issues of competition with water, land for food, inputs, etc., 
BECCS is imagined to use cellulosic ethanol, e.g. from switchgrass grown on non-
agricultural land or from farm residues.  But the story of cellulosic ethanol has some 
important lessons of technical barriers and vested interests.  In the words of one biofuel 
scientist: 
 
We started about 20-30 years ago to do cellulosic ethanol. We're going to 
take cellulose and melt it down and turn it into ethanol. Many of us 
thought, "Well, that's kind of a crazy idea because plants spent the last 500 
million years evolving not to be turned into ethanol.  In fact, there are 
plants in California that have sat outside for 6,000 years, a single tree, 
bristle cone pines, there's lots of them. They're four, five, 6,000 years old. 
																																																								
8 Because of the abundance of empty containers in California which need to be sent back to China anyway, 
it’s very affordable to fill them with alfalfa.  However, farmers are a bit more skeptical when it comes 
to “Arab” firms making large-scale land purchases and then using the cheap water to grow grasses 
which get shipped away; this is seen more like land grabbing. 
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They've sat outside in the Sierras exposed to every bacteria and insect and 
animal and everything else for 6,000 years and they're still there. That's 
because evolution got cellulose not to turn in to something other than 
cellulose, and it had five million years to perfect that.  Why we thought we 
could un-perfect that with our invention is beyond me but it became very 
clear to everybody in science four years ago, five years ago that cellulosic 
ethanol was going nowhere. That we had spent a billion dollars in research 
in the previous five years and got nowhere…. 
  
Four years ago, we all knew this was a bad idea. What happened? We put 
another billion dollars in, why? How on earth could this happen, right? It 
happened because people who had centers and people who worked on this 
went to Congress and told them, "We are almost there. I know we put a 
billion dollars in, in the last five years and we didn't make one discovery 
that changed it one bit but if you just give us a billion more," and 
Congress did, because these are the best scientists in the world.  
 
One of the most influential guys … actually said, "Well, we're going to 
need an enormous breakthrough for this to work, something that I can't 
even imagine yet." This is after 10 years and $2 billion and that's not a 
trivial number. That is virtually 80% of what we spent on all renewable 
fuels. 
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We knew it didn't work, still spent all of our money that way. Why, 
because it was 5,000 people and those 5,000 people are real people. There 
was a real postdoc in Berkeley who was going to get put out of a job. 
Now, it's true that somebody else in another university was going to get a 
job working on algae or working on jatropha or working on cyanobacteria 
or working on something else. They weren’t going to get a chance to do 
that. Nope, those people didn't get a chance, they didn't get funded. All 
right. 
 
It's funny, people always say, "Aren't those big oil companies bad and they 
try to block you guys from doing something." … It actually turns out that 
scientists will be at least as self-serving as the worst oil company 
executive ever. (C28) 
 
There are a few takeaways here, if you take this scientist’s perspective to be accurate, 
which is supportable.9 One is that vested interests in science, when committed to a certain 
research path, can keep going in the absence of evidence that it’s a good path.  Another is 
that being committed to one research trajectory can come at the expense of researching 
something else.  Investing in the wrong idea can be costly.  Furthermore, the underlying 
scientific conundrum described by this scientist is not yet to my knowledge solved; yet 
assumptions of BECCS potential seem to rely on it.  I have called this a technical issue, 																																																								
9 Dale (2017) writes about the slow scaling of cellulosics, writing of difficulties in pre-treatment at scale, 
but also pointing to upstream issues like biomass storage and the cost of setting up supply chains — while 
chemical engineers think about feedstock for their processing operations as a given, farmers have no 
commodity markets to participate in for residues, and think of supplying residues as a distraction from their 
work of growing food. 
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but it’s also a cost issue: it’s certainly possible to break down lignin when processing 
feedstock, but the enzymes required are expensive, and this is one key limitation to cheap 
biofuels (NRC, 2011: 267). 
 
Another feedstock suffering from low cost-competitiveness is microalgae.  Hopes 
were high in the Imperial Valley for algae: cheap water and land, abundant sunshine, and 
proximity to the blue biotech hub in San Diego made this an attractive place to develop 
algal biofuels.  In the past decade, companies like Kent Bioenergy have garnered sizable 
grants from the DOE for utilizing microalgae for carbon sequestration and greenhouse 
gas abatement; companies like Carbon Capture sprouted up, with their algal ponds to be 
later sold or rented to Synthetic Genomics, General Atomics, etc.: there are now empty 
raceways among the desert scrub.  In my analysis, microalgae biofuels have not had great 
success thus far because (1) oil prices dropped, and (2) there hasn’t been a coherent 
national-level energy policy.  Algae companies have pivoted to other non-fuel products 
such as nutriceuticals and food dyes.  
 
In theory, the valley could go beyond microalgae to macroalgae (seaweed), a 
favorite of some carbon removal visionaries. As one scientist pointed out, seaweed is 
almost an ideal biomass for making energy as it gets around the aforementioned lignin 
issue: “Any other kind of terrestrial biomass had to hold itself up against gravity and it 
does that with lignin and cellulose. Cellulose and lignin, right? Seaweed doesn't need any 
of that. It's neutrally buoyant” (C26).  In one proposal, the excess CO2 from a natural gas 
power plant would be eaten up by seaweed, which could be grown with a media of salts 
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and sewage water sprayed on the seaweed.  The biomass could be used to make food or 
fish feed, or with a hydrothermic liquefaction process to make more fuel (C26).  While 
this isn’t the same as negative emissions (as the carbon has to be reliably stored 
somewhere), it is another example of a new energy technology intervening with carbon 
that would need to be scaled up.  It is hard to see these ideas prospering without national-
level support sustained across several administrations and legislative sessions. 
 
  While the investment climate is rough and technical challenges are rife, in the 
Imperial Valley context, biofuels don’t face some of the social acceptance issues that 
other technologies do — or that biofuels might elsewhere.  For example, it seems likely 
to me that BECCS on a scale large enough to make a difference in global warming would 
involve genetically modified feedstock or genetically modified enzymes in production.   
Thus far, genetically modified organisms do not seem to have faced much social backlash 
in this valley.   
 
In short, it’s quite possible to see a massive scale-up of biofuels in this region, 
given the cheap water and lack of criticism about using that water for biofuels.  While 
previous efforts in advanced biofuels have faltered, and questions arise about committing 
to the wrong technologies at the expense of others, it appears that the incentives offered 
by state and local entities are beginning to generate growth for sugarcane ethanol 
(perhaps at the expense of algae development).  Production of biofuel feedstock, 
however, does not translate into BECCS here any more readily than it would elsewhere 
without incentives to remove carbon on a much wider scale.  Renewable energy, on the 
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other hand, is in a somewhat opposite situation — it has benefitted greatly from state-
level policy, but faces various forms of social contestation, as the next section discusses. 
 
 
 
3.  “Choking on daytime electrons”: Solar, geothermal, and wind as California’s 
“21st century gold” 
 
Why talk about renewables in a paper about negative emissions?  Aside from it being a 
good analogy for developing a large-scale infrastructure, many negative emissions 
technologies are energy-intensive, and they would have to be powered by renewables to 
actually be net-negative.  Hence any scale-up of negative emissions implies a significant 
expansion of renewables. 
 
The Imperial Valley has been making use of the potential here for several 
decades.  Geothermal first began in 1982, and there are now 21 plants in operation in the 
area, most of them operating on old technology.  The Salton Sea field in particular has a 
potential of almost 3,000 megawatts; right now, only 380-390 have been developed.  
Geothermal is part of the vision for the shrinking Salton Sea, as it could take place on the 
soon-to-be exposed lakebed.  An industry expert believes that this development will be 
concurrent with habitat building: “We're going to need roads and plant sites and well 
pads ... Transmission lines, everything that is part of a geothermal project. All of that can 
be developed in a manner that is consistent with the development of habitat. You can 
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have a power plant right next to a duck pond, say, for example” (C9).  At present, 
geothermal plants are interspersed with fields and solar farms.  In theory, all of these 
renewables and other land uses would cohabitate and support each other.   
 
However, there are ways in which these technologies compete.  Some people are 
cynical about geothermal’s future because it isn’t cost-competitive with cheap solar, 
which benefits from tax credits.  “It's a very, very unlevel playing field and anybody that 
has worked in this business would be able to tell you that. It's not a secret. Solar 
companies, perhaps you're aware, are exempt from property taxes, whereas our property 
tax bill is 20% of our annual O&M [operations and maintenance]” (C9).  Utilities love 
solar, this expert explained, because transmission lies are used by solar for six hours a 
day. 
 
With gas prices at arguably historic low cost, utilities, they can say what 
they want, they can talk about it and spin it however they want, but they 
love it, because they have to have the spinning reserves, they have to fill 
up the other 18 hours in the day that solar is not producing with electricity 
that they can generate from their own generators with incredibly 
inexpensive fuel and still charge the same prices, so they make a lot of 
money. They pay their dividends on their peaking plants.  (C9) 
 
If you look at it from this standpoint, you could argue that solar was able to be scaled up 
so rapidly because of cheap fossil fuels — at the expense of other renewable options. A 
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different policy design could have created a different scenario for geothermal: as one 
geothermal expert pointed out, a price could be put on the “greenhouse gas value for not 
burning a little bit of natural gas when the sun's not out”, and geothermal could get a 
greenhouse gas offset credit to make it more competitive (C9).  But at present, as pointed 
out by the solar developer: “The cost of geothermal hasn't changed in 20 years, whereas 
the cost of solar has dropped by 90%, and it's gonna continue to drop. Why would 
anybody want to sign up for expensive geothermal when you can get cheap solar?” (C5)   
Cheap solar sounds great, but there may be a case of oversupply in the works.  “As a 
solar developer, there are so many sunny places in California where you could put solar, 
and California already has a lot of it, with another 15 gigawatts in the supply chain ready 
to be built, and when that 15 gigawatts is built, California will be choking on daytime 
electrons” (C5). 
 
It’s not that policymakers are unaware of the uneven situation and the challenges 
that a successful solar scale-up could bring— California Senate Bill 350, passed in 2015, 
requires utilities to take on “integrated resource planning” and figure out how to integrate 
their renewable portfolios.  The point is that as an observer, it’s not intuitive to look at 
these renewable technologies as competitors — we imagine they will all be used.  
Similarly, it’s taken for granted that a portfolio approach to carbon removal technologies 
would be used.  But the case of the renewable scale-up in California illustrates that there 
might be tensions between different technologies, and their actor-interest groups, as they 
mature.  
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The scale-up of renewables also points to lessons about the role of vested or 
entrenched interests in commercialization strategies as these technologies scale – in the 
renewable case, the role of the utilities with their access to cheap natural gas, and the 
regulatory role of the California Public Utilities Commission.  When it comes to scaling 
up NETs, there may be a similar role for entrenched fossil fuels, at least when it comes to 
direct air capture — the main markets right now for the captured carbon are enhanced oil 
recovery.  CO2 to fuel with lower carbon intensity (as required by California’s Low Fuel 
Intensity standard) are the commercialization strategy of direct air capture startup Carbon 
Engineering, and would likely figure into markets for other firms as well.  This of course 
does not meet the long-term objectives when it comes to net-negative emissions.  
 
In the Imperial Valley in particular, the scale-up of solar looks like a success in 
terms of acreage, though the reception is not always warm.  Solar in the valley is about 
1,200 MW, but the economic development council claims a potential of 42,000 MW, 
enough to power 31 million homes (Miller, 2017). Both activists and farmers have issues 
with way solar has been rolled out here.  In the words of one, “It's ridiculous to build 
solar projects 100 miles away [from San Diego, in the Imperial Valley], or 150 miles in 
the case of LA, to where the energy's going to be used, because then you have to destroy 
a whole bunch more desert with these high-power transmission lines, which are ugly and 
ruin the wildness of the desert. Absolutely crazy” (C22).  What is the alternative to this 
style of scaling up renewables?  “The best-case scenario is don't put up a single other 
large-scale, remote, renewable energy or other kind of energy project, and start covering 
the goddamned parking lots,” this activist stated, explaining that “San Diego could be 
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energy independent if we used all our parking lots and rooftops and public buildings and 
abandoned landfills, and right around the city, create the renewable energy in the 
microgrids right where people live” (C22). 
 
 Wind energy has faced similar types of resistance in the valley. “Those big, tall 
turbines, there's 112 of them on either side of Highway Eight there in an area that's 
considered part of a sacred Native American cultural landscape. Indeed, it's adjacent to a 
federally designated area of critical environmental concern for cultural use, the Yuha 
ACEC. It's essentially part of the Yuha ACEC” (C22).  A conservation group filed a 
lawsuit against the federal government for doing this project.  
 
They did it anyway. They said, "We'll just remove ... We'll stay away from 
the cultural geoglyphs and what not, and everything will be fine," but 
you're destroying the landscape by breaking it up with wind turbines, 
which are hideous. You may have read in the paper and on everybody's 
Facebook last week, one of the wind turbines actually collapsed.  The 
point is, we didn't need to do that, and also Ocotillo Wind Energy Facility 
is not producing the wind in the capacity that the developer had promised 
it would do. …. Yeah. We have solutions right here at home, if we would 
only get together and form community aggregations to create our own 
power. (C22) 
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Resistance and promotion does not always map onto familiar narratives.  In this 
environmental conflict, one of the Native American groups in this area had been 
attempting to set up a wind installation on reservation land but faced resistance by both 
the Forest Service and by environmentalists . 
 
Even though the reservation has no utilities, no grid, no telephone or cell, 
radio or anything, we've made ourselves a part of a wind project, so there 
are 20 turbines intended for the southeast ridge of the reservation as part 
of a larger wind energy project.  And that has been opposed at every point 
by the same environmentalists that we join in common cause with on the 
Salton Sea, that oppose even one take of a predatory bird - a golden eagle, 
in this case.  We are protectors of the environment, the golden eagle is a 
spiritual entity for the tribe.  It has great power with the tribe.  And we 
would not engage in a project that would harm or intend to harm or would 
cause harm to the golden eagle population.  We took golden eagles for 
ceremonies for thousands of years and choose not to do so now.  But that 
we would be opposed by environmentalists, environmental organizations, 
for the potential take of even one golden eagle over a twenty year 
operating span of a wind project, which is a green energy project, which 
displaces carbon-based energy, which is a net positive and GHG reduction 
and supports climate change, is really difficult for us to 
understand.  Development takes many forms.  (C23) 
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In the view of this local official, non-tribal people tend to use tribal lands “as mitigation 
banks for their own adverse development” (C23).  This appears as a case of a local group 
not being allowed to benefit from the renewables scale-up.   
 
While some of the resistance to these projects can sound at times like aesthetic 
complains or not-in-my-backyard-ism, the resistance is shot through with environmental 
justice concerns, and to dismiss it as NIMBY-ism would obfuscate that.  First, these 
people have to bear the harms from the development.  Some contend that solar 
development creates particulates in an area suffering from low air quality: “They scrape 
the entire desert. In order to keep the desert sand from blowing, they use huge amounts of 
water to tamp it down, at least while they're putting in the solar project. Then they go 
away, and … there's been a couple of amazingly huge dust storms in the last year from 
the solar project … a huge, ugly thing, with not a thing growing underneath it. It takes 10 
minutes to drive by it, it's so large” (C22). 
 
Second, the benefits — both financial and energy — are flowing elsewhere.  
While the above quote was from someone working for a nearby environmental group, a 
Latino community advocate in the center of the valley reflected similar concerns : 
 
You’ve got Semper coming in here and putting 1,000 megawatts of 
power and it's all going out. Then you've got all these other 20 some solar 
facilities around us too, that have dug out the desert and then we have 
these episodes of wind now where all these dust is blowing. Now because 
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of the water transfer, the Salton Sea is drying and more dust will be 
blowing. We see our hospitals with acute respiratory disorders in 
newborns and the elderly. Somehow, again, the word to me is immoral 
that this is happening and somehow our decision makers feel like they 
can't do what they need to do with this. (C10) 
 
 As a Latina environmental justice advocate put it: “Time and time again, in this 
community where, yeah, it's cool, technologies are proposed, but who do they really 
benefit? And who continues to suffer?” (C2). Farmers, too, have questions about who 
benefits and who loses from these megaprojects.  Part of the objection is the economic 
impact: solar only brings a few jobs, and so the economy of the whole community can 
change.  But part of it has to do with the loss of a way of life, and an identity; an ongoing 
loss that solar is seen as one part of.   In a video with 41,000 views, which garnered 692 
tearful and angry emojis, a farmer shows up at an Imperial County Board of Supervisors 
meeting with several boxes of the last cantaloupes from what used to be known as the 
Bacon Ranch, and is now the Iris solar project:  “The ground my family’s farmed for 50-
60 years, which is some of the best farm ground … there was hundreds and hundreds of 
people working out there last winter; I’ve got a hundred people out there today – this is 
the last crop off that ground” (ICFB, 2016).  There is also an urban/rural divide here; 
some in the agricultural community do not appreciate these lands being used for 
powering big cities.  
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The local contestation of renewables, which might on the surface seem like an 
unquestionable good — especially to those outside this place — is relevant to discussions 
about NETs which would use renewable energy, as well as to broader discussions of 
energy system change.   Crucially, the opposition is not to the technologies, but in the 
occasionally place-blind ways they are being implemented.  Some legislation at the state 
level attempts to address the issue of how disadvantaged communities can benefit from 
the renewable scale-up, such as the 2012 California Senate Bill 535, which requires that 
25% of the revenue from CA’s cap-and-trade system be spent on projects benefitting 
disadvantaged communities, and 10% of that be in projects actually in these 
communities.  It will be interesting to evaluate the success of these measures in the 
coming decades. 
 
 
4.  On-farm carbon sequestration 
 
 Given that Imperial Valley has over 515,000 acres of agricultural land (USDA, 
2012), it could theoretically sequester a lot of carbon in its soils.  California has a Healthy 
Soils Initiative, a multiagency plan with multiple soil health goals, including sequestering 
and reducing greenhouse gases.  However, there is often a disconnect between the 
legislators and the farmers in this area: as one agricultural expert noted, “the state of 
California makes all kinds of proclamations, and it's really out of touch with reality of 
whether that could ever work, and then when it doesn't work, there isn't real 
consequences there” (C20).   
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On-farm carbon sequestration is tricky because of issues of monitoring and 
verification.  Beyond the technical challenges, incentives are required for landholder 
adoption — a new Healthy Soils incentive program funded through CA’s Greenhouse 
Gas Reduction Fund is currently under development.   Carbon farming is an idea talked 
about by smaller farmers in the Bay Area, noted one respondent, but many of those 
farmers only have a very small acreage and could be considered gardeners from the 
Imperial Valley scale.  In the Valley, “there's some that are really into the whole idea of 
trying to defeat global warming, but that's a small portion.  If it affects their bottom line, 
or their livelihood or whatever, then just like anybody else, it becomes more important” 
(C20).   Another factor in adoption is that biochar was initially oversold, according to this 
respondent, which led to some disappointment. 
  
 Even though many farmers might be climate change skeptics, there are ways in 
which on-farm sequestration is still a promising strategy in this area. The region is deeply 
committed to farming as an identity, and to building good soil health.  
 
Farmers take a much more global, long-term view of things than any other 
business.  And it's obvious, because farms stay in a family for generations, 
just having a farm means something to them.  In CA, where most of them 
own their land, most of them would be better out if they just cashed 
out.  But they don't.  They really will take a longer term view.  You just 
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need to help them along enough so that they will do that; so that at least 
they aren't losing money doing it. (C20) 
 
The valley has a lot of profitable, large farms who have the capacity to 
experiment with different growing techniques.  Irrigated agriculture has also increased 
the soil carbon storage in the Imperial Valley in agricultural soils, due to organic matter 
decomposition and plant respiration over several decades (Wu et al, 2008).  There are 
opportunities to deliberately build upon the work farmers are already doing with regards 
to soil carbon sequestration. On the other hand, non-farmed soils in the valley are 
vulnerable to losing carbon. Carbon is stored underneath California desert ecosystems as 
inorganic caliche (calcium carbonate), and when the land is disturbed, as can happen 
when building out large solar developments, the stored carbon can be released into the 
atmosphere; the desert is no longer sequestering that carbon.  Scientists recommend 
revegetating solar developments with short-stature plants and building carbon in the 
underlying soil (Allen et al, 2013).  In short, there is good room for improving soil carbon 
sequestration practices in both cultivated and non-cultivated soils. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Through examining the possibilities of biofuels for BECCS, on-farm carbon 
sequestration, and expanding renewables, we can picture a sociotechnical landscape of 
carbon sequestration practices overlapping in this valley in the latter half of this century.  
Whether this landscape is appealing to live in depends very much on how it evolves. 
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Evaluating the evolution of these practices in this particular place has made 
visible five types of challenges: financing challenges, technical barriers, landholder 
adoption, broader social acceptance issues of the underlying technologies, and 
environmental justice concerns.   Some of these challenges can be addressed by smart 
policy design, but some are fundamentally cultural and will be more difficult to address 
through “governance”, especially at macro scales.   
 
An important point is that while some of these issues are “local”, they can’t 
simply be placed in a box of “local issues” that people working on the global or other 
scales can simply ignore or delegate to the local scale.  Many of these concerns that are 
evident when examining the local are actually only addressable on state or national 
scales, such as the challenges to investing in new facilities and helping them cross the 
valley from demonstration-scale to commercial-scale, or properly incentivizing 
landowner adoption. 
 
There are a couple of crosscutting issues beyond the ones mentioned above.  One 
crosscutting issue is underlying climate denial, as perceptions of climate change are 
going to be important for attitudes towards negative emissions technologies — this is 
something that modelers and far-off policymakers are not well equipped to confront, but 
ignoring it is likely to result in policies that are distant from reality.  From the Imperial 
Valley, one important lesson is that climate skeptics here are not anti-science.  In fact, 
every skeptic I spoke to valued the scientific method.  As one put it, “Science should be 
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challenged. Then, if it stands up, then great, right? Then a bunch of these counter 
arguments are not true. You're still not sure whether anthropogenic global warming is 
true, but you know that certain counter arguments have been disproven, and I'd be much 
happier with that” (C5).  When discussing research and development of technologies 
designed to address a problem that’s based upon scientific understanding of the carbon 
cycle, policymakers and others should communicate the situation as one of managing risk 
rather than dealing with certainties — an approach that stakeholders like farmers may 
appreciate. 
 
A second and perhaps underappreciated crosscutting issue is that NETs imply vast 
new infrastructure in a world that’s already built out, and infrastructure is newly 
contestable.  This is something to be celebrated in some respects — imagine if native 
peoples around the world had the ability to contest infrastructure and new production 
across their lands without being killed.  But it also makes it more difficult to make 
sweeping transitions to new systems that require land or changes in land use, especially 
when many of the agencies dealing with land management have mandates that focus 
more on restricting activities.  As one local official put it: 
 
In our world— and perhaps California is more pronounced than the rest of 
the country— we have a number of government agencies whose mission it 
is to protect the environment and other agencies who, increasingly, are 
focused on protecting the environment. But most of the agencies and 
organizations, at least the official ones, are designed to say, "No," and 
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they're not designed to do something. They're designed to stop some 
things from being done. …  That's very different than probably 1935 or 
1955, where government agencies in this country did things like built 
Hoover Dam, or big freeways, or a big piece of infrastructure. Those 
served purposes and had major impacts, environmental impacts, cultural 
impacts and others. Well, the pendulum has certainly swung …   These 
agencies that are designed to protect the environment or society or cultural 
resources are so geared toward stopping the bad thing from happening, 
they don't know how to make a good thing happen. (C16) 
 
 On a national level, there are a few agencies like ARPA-E (the Department of 
Energy’s Advanced Research Projects Agency – Energy) which are designed to make 
something like negative emission technologies happen, but they are few and far between, 
and don’t appear at all scales.  So, if you combine the newly politicized world of 
infrastructure with the lack of agencies that have a strong mandate to build out new 
systems and deal with those politics — it doesn’t seem like carbon removal has a bright 
future, at least not with the set of institutions we have.  Something this large may require 
the design of new for-purpose institutions on varying scales. 
 
But proposing new institutions brings up the issue of bottom-up support.  A third 
challenge for something like negative emissions is the issue of narrative.  Negative 
emissions are by definition some invisible thing; it can be difficult to get a widespread 
coalition of actors involved with a narrative about the benefits of negative something.  
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The “Global CO2 Initiative” has a philanthropic push towards carbon utilization, which 
might be more attractive – turning carbon into a usable commodity rather than a pollutant 
– but the scientific feasibility needs more work; a recent analysis by MacDowell et al 
(2017) in Nature Climate Change finds it to be a negligible contribution to the mitigation 
challenge and a risky narrative.  At least with renewables, regular people have the 
potential to make money and see tangible benefits from them.  Advanced monitoring 
technology might help make visible the invisible, especially if it could gamify the carbon 
removal somehow, and “governance” of negative emissions should focus a lot on 
monitoring and verification not just at the national level, but at the level of individual 
landowners.    
 
In general, these three crosscutting issues of climate skepticism, the lack of 
institutions focused on new endeavors, and the lack of a strong citizen narrative around 
carbon removal — plus the other challenges mentioned — indicate that an attempt to 
raise “negative emissions” around a global goal like curbing global mean temperatures is 
not going to do very well.  Success would entail clear social and economic benefits 
tailored for various landscapes, as well as some level of citizen interest.  The curious 
thing about negative emissions, though, is that very few people are arguing for them — 
probably because they know it’s a technocratic dream with all these underlying material 
and social challenges.  The policy world is relatively silent.  States like Saudi Arabia 
bring up carbon geoengineering in meetings of the IPCC (IISD, 2017), but there’s very 
little communication about it elsewhere.  Companies are similarly silent — Shell, for 
example, has a scenarios report on a net-zero world (Shell, 2016).  Yet the vision of how 
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one would get there is extremely vague.  No one is making strident efforts to forge a path 
through the fog between the present moment and this imagined net-negative end-of-
century: and yet the models say these phantom technologies will inhabit the landscapes.  
Given the lack of effort to date, it is questionable whether anyone will forge a path 
through the fog at all.   
 
However, sketching out the picture of negative emissions in one particular 
landscape, it’s almost possible to see biofuels, on-farm sequestration, and renewables as 
part of an agro-energy negative emissions system.  If it will happen anywhere, here is one 
of the likelier places: and if it can’t happen here in industrialized agricultural California, 
it’s time to rethink what work “negative emissions” is actually doing.  Geden (2016) 
describes how carbon removal technologies have had the effect of masking the “growing 
inconsistency between political talk, decisions, and actions”.  If this “co-production of 
irresponsibility” between policymakers and modelers has in fact become the point of 
negative emissions — which the available evidence suggests to be true — empirical 
social science research and speculative exercises such as this one can help point to the 
inconsistency, so we can be honest about the future. The examples here illustrate the 
tensions or failures that can arise when ecotechnical imaginaries are selected from afar — 
such as large-scale solar installations, investment in cellulosic biofuels, or incentives for 
soil carbon sequestration — without engagement from the people who will be living with 
these practices and infrastructure.   In this case, it is not simply a disjunct between visions 
of ecotechnical imaginaries, but a disjunct between local and remote interpretations of 
what climate change means for a particular landscape.  However, these disjuncts are not 
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insurmountable: the ongoing work at the state level to reformulate policy around soil 
carbon incentives and renewables, as well as the engagement of the environmental justice 
community and green groups, indicate opportunities for various actors to shape the 
landscape through activism as well as participation in state and local processes. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Perspectives on albedo modification from Finnish Lapland: Viewing a global 
imaginary from a regional context 
 
 
Abstract 
 
While some scientists have proposed albedo modification10 or “solar geoengineering” as 
a way to cool the Arctic and perhaps avoid some global tipping points — e.g. by injecting 
particles into the stratosphere — this concept has generally remained a global imaginary, 
an impersonal engineering technique based upon global models of coarse resolution.  
How do local people experience a global imaginary, and how do they imagine themselves 
shaping it?  What agency might they have in determining its research trajectory or use, 
and what experience can they bring to bear?  How can reading albedo modification 
through a local context help us see new things about the prospects of governing this kind 
of global intervention?  This paper synthesizes perspectives from extended interviews 
with citizen stakeholders in Finnish Lapland.  While citizens took a global perspective on 
geoengineering governance, and questioned their agency in influencing when, whether, 
or how solar geoengineering would be employed, they also used the topic of solar 
geoengineering to spark broader discussions of questions of how to live in the 
Anthropocene in ways which were quite unique to their northern / Arctic context, 																																																								
10 Albedo modification is the umbrella term for techniques that would modify the earth’s albedo, potentially 
on the ground but also in the atmosphere or stratosphere. 
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including how to live with loss and unfamiliar climates, relocalization and new rural 
livelihoods in the north, and dematerialization of economies.  The results challenge some 
key aspects of governance discussions: (1) that people’s climate preferences are obvious 
or quantifiable; (2) that people will look at geoengineering as a local concern, or through 
an individual utilitarian lens, when in fact they might have much more of a cosmopolitan 
or interconnected systems-perspective; and (3) that states act in the interests of their 
citizens, when in fact they may act in the interests of elites.   
 
 
1.  Introduction and Rationale 
 
 It could be possible to cool the earth by placing particles into the stratosphere that 
would reflect a fraction of incoming sunlight.  Whether these “solar geoengineering”, 
albedo modification, or climate intervention ideas are even worthy of scientific research 
has been the matter of some debate.  Moreover, “understanding of the ethical, political, 
and environmental consequences of an albedo modification action is relatively less 
advanced than the technical capacity to execute it”, as noted in a recent National 
Academies of Sciences report (2015).  A common question in the literature on solar 
geoengineering is: “Whose hand will be on the Earth’s thermostat?”  
 
 Even though we understand that the earth doesn’t have a thermostat, and there 
wouldn’t be one hand making a choice, there are decisions about this technology that 
may need to be made, including whether to stop talking about it.  These choices are 
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manifest, and could only be done by a collective over a vast period of time due to their 
complexity: where to place the particles, what sort of particles they are, who will do it, 
how it will be paid for, how many to form, how to monitor their progress, when to adjust, 
and, most importantly, how to decarbonize the energy system into net-negative emissions 
and ensure we would be able to stop the particle deployment — since without lowering 
carbon dioxide concentrations, the level of solar geoengineering would need to be 
maintained indefinitely.  One person would not have the knowledge to plan out 
something this complex.  But perhaps fifty people could.  Better, perhaps, a thousand 
people having input — or a million?  Or ten billion?  For we would all be clients of the 
engineers, with a stake in the project — even regional climate interventions would in 
many cases have global repercussions.   
 
How to design a governance system for an intervention of this scale seems in 
some ways intractable, but a worthy first step is gathering multiple perspectives on it.  
Most of the literature on climate engineering has addressed the global scale, even though 
social science studies have happened in particular places.  This paper aims to address 
regional and local dimensions of climate engineering, and examine how they interact 
with the global.  In particular: How do local people experience a global imaginary, and 
how do they imagine themselves shaping it?  What agency might they have in 
determining its research trajectory or use, and what experience can they bring to bear?  
What does placing albedo modification in a local context help us see regarding the 
prospects of governing this kind of global intervention?  
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 A few studies have examined geoengineering “in place”, namely Carr (2015), 
who focused upon vulnerable populations in Kenya, the Solomon Islands, and indigenous 
Alaska.  Wibeck et al (2015) studied public sense-making of geoengineering in Sweden, 
and Asayama et al (2017) studied views of citizens in Japan.  Much deliberative and 
qualitative work also happened in the UK (reviewed by Bellamy and Lezaun, 2015), and 
there has also been survey work in the US, Canada, and Germany into attitudes about 
solar geoengineering (see Burns et al, 2016, for a review).  Most of these studies, 
however, look at views from a broad scale, rather than analyze how cultural knowledge 
might have shaped perspectives on climate engineering.  
 
It is interesting that in this small sample of 20-30 empirical studies, educated 
laypeople in developed countries had relatively similar views about geoengineering: 
ambivalence about geoengineering experimentation, and concerns about its 
controllability, but support for researching the idea in case it might be needed in a climate 
emergency.  Carr also found strong commonalities among his three very geographically 
diverse study populations in Kenya, the Solomon Islands, and Alaska (2015: 43).  These 
commonalities might indicate that placing geoengineering in a specific context would not 
affect people’s views — and, in fact, in this study, people had similar concerns to 
participants in the research mentioned above.  The curious similarity of views on 
geoengineering may simply be that (1) this is a limited number of studies with 
participants with relatively similar milieus, or (2) that most of the studies were topic-
blind recruitment with low familiarity of respondents going into them, so the participants 
were mainly hearing about climate engineering for the first time — there may be a 
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similar set of “initial thoughts” between respondents that could change later.  Another 
possibility is (3): that researchers saw the similarities because their analysis was more 
focused upon those, rather than asking questions about how local context figured into 
people’s views on geoengineering.   
 
This relatively coherent set of concerns is at odds with some prevalent ideas in the 
governance conversation: that people will necessarily want to set the thermostat at 
different levels, that they will rationally choose climate preferences based on their self-
interests, and that they will hold widely divergent views on whether or how to embark 
upon geoengineering research (e.g Barrett, 2014; Victor, 2008; see review by Harding 
and Moreno-Cruz, 2016).  Bodansky (2013) summarizes major governance challenges:  
Who should decide whether and how to engage in geoengineering? Should 
individual countries be allowed to weigh the potential benefits and risks 
on their own? Or should geoengineering require collective decisions and, 
if so, what international body should have this responsibility? What 
limitations, if any, should be placed on individuals to prevent them from 
undertaking geoengineering? And how should the international 
community address attempts by individual states to engage in 
geoengineering?  
These questions are set in terms of competition between actors, and who holds 
power to permit or limit— while the empirical social science research thus far seems to 
indicate that citizens have remarkably similar views of the problem and how to address it 
(including approaching it with caution, conducting scientific research to learn more about 
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the risks, and establishing international governance of it).  Are the tensions between these 
worldviews simply because there is a difference between the geopolitical or economic 
understandings of climate engineering, and individual citizen understandings?  If so, what 
does that mean for prospects for governing this technology in a way that people in civil 
society feel content with?   Delving more deeply into the local context and how it affects 
people’s understanding of climate engineering is one way to explore the tension between 
these two views.  If people reveal concerns and questions that are specific to their place, 
culture, or history, the idea of a universal rational-economic or rational-nation-state 
response to climate engineering begins to disintegrate. 
  
Looking at the far north 
 
 While it would be valuable to study local and scalar perspectives of 
geoengineering in multiple regions, this project took the Arctic as its object of study.  The 
rapid and nonlinear changes in the Arctic have been brought up as reasons for researching 
albedo modification in the Arctic (Caldeira and Wood, 2008, MacCracken 2016, Moore 
et al 2014, Tilmes et al 2014), and there are also proposals to regionally modify the 
Arctic, e.g. to stop ice melt and other follow-on climate impacts (Tilmes et al, 2014, 
Jackson et al, 2015).  Corry (forthcoming) has argued that “the Arctic has become a site 
of virtual geoengineering experimentation and intervention,” tracing the history of this 
interest back to Cold War times.  There are a few different strategies proposed for how 
regional albedo modification could be done — injecting aerosols into the stratosphere, 
brightening marine clouds, or even refreezing ice (Desch et al, 2016).  However, no one 
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except Carr (2015) has asked Arctic residents how they might feel about the concept.  
This study is essentially a first attempt to think through methods that might be used to 
help fill this void, though the Arctic is a heterogeneous region with a diversity of 
perspectives, and many inquiries would be needed in various places.   
 
The specific study area, Finnish Lapland, has a complex relationship to “the 
Arctic”.  Most interviews were done in the regional center of Rovaniemi, and nearby 
smaller municipalities to the north.  Rovaniemi, with a population of about 50,000, sits on 
the Arctic Circle and is considered the “home of Santa Claus”.  When respondents were 
asked if they felt themselves to be Arctic residents, the majority did, but with 
qualifications: many mentioned that they didn’t experience permafrost or Arctic fauna, 
and that the Arctic was a political concept that came more recently.  People here have 
multiple, overlapping identities: Lappish, Finnish, Nordic, European, and “citizen of the 
world” all came up.  While Finnish Lapland may not be definitively Arctic to all citizens, 
they did identify their region and identity as “northern”, with themes that may be familiar 
to northernness in other northern areas: sparse population, feeling themselves on the 
periphery, an interest in self-sufficiency, and feeling close to nature.   
 
 
2.  Methods 
 
The material in this paper was gathered through twenty-two in-depth, semi-structured 
interviews, ranging in 30-120 minutes in duration and conducted in August and 
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September, 2016.   The interview guide was loosely modeled after Carr (2015), but 
focused more upon the Arctic, and also asked respondents about ideas for further 
scientific research.  I asked respondents about climate change and impacts they had 
already observed or expected.  Respondents were then read a paragraph about albedo 
modification through stratospheric particle injections, and shown a diagram of the 
technique.  They were asked for their concerns, ideas, or questions, and asked about 
Arctic perspectives on the issue as well as questions about how decisions about this 
approach should be made.  Interviews were coded in NVivo to identify primary themes.   
 
To date, most of the qualitative work on climate intervention has been through focus 
groups or deliberative workshops (notable exception Carr, 2015).  Group public 
engagement methods may be well suited to a particular cultural context.  As Pidgeon et al 
note, these methodologies have worked in Europe for over two decades, they were 
developed in the context of Danish civic culture and the “consensus conference”, and 
may not always transfer to countries with different cultures of citizen participation 
(2013).  The one-on-one conversation of the interview may be a more portable and 
versatile way of gathering qualitative, in-depth data, where citizens can speak freely 
without being judged by their peers (though of course, there is always the issue of the 
presence of the interviewer biasing responses).11  In-depth interviews allow the 
																																																								
11 Intensive interviewing is not a public engagement method in the sense that it develops a 
dialogue between science and non-scientists (see Corner et al, 2012), though these interviews 
were conducted alongside a project which aimed to incorporate public questions and ideas 
gathered from focus groups into the scientific process.  To that end, part of the interview 
design asked participants if they had specific questions that they wished scientists would focus 
upon. 
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respondent to go into personal histories and contexts that have shaped their understanding 
of the phenomena in question. 
 
The twelve men and ten women respondents ranged in age from mid-twenties to mid-
sixties.  Recruitment was by email, word-of-mouth contacts, or professional networking 
sites, and aimed to recruit persons with a variety of backgrounds who might have a stake 
in the issue, broadly construed.  I strove to reach a balance of ages, and initially had 
difficulty recruiting women, so made an effort in the recruitment process to invite more 
women than men to assure near-equal numbers.  Persons working in politics from major 
political parties were reached out to, with people affiliated with at least three of the most 
significant eight registered parties participating.  While some participants had Sami 
heritage or had lived and worked in areas with more Sami residents, none of the 
participants officially represented Sami institutions.   
 
The invitation letter was not topic-blind; it included mention of climate change and 
climate engineering, which means that participants were likely to be interested in climate 
issues.  This does not necessarily make the sample less relevant, as the people who will 
be engaged with the issue and shape the initial politics around it will likely be those who 
are interested in climate and have the resources to engage.  It does mean that the sample 
is likely more interested in climate change, and it is notably a well-educated, professional 
group: not strictly a “lay public” nor an “expert group.”  Several people brought their 
professional experience from sectors like wildlife research, tourism, or education to bear 
on the topic, but most spoke more generally from a personal or citizen standpoint— 
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climate intervention was sufficiently unfamiliar that people did not seem to feel they had 
authority to connect it to their expertise.  Even though recruitment mentioned climate 
intervention, most people reported no familiarity with the topic.  One issue of note is that 
interviews were conducted in the English language— while 85-90% of Finns can hold a 
conversation in it, not all might feel comfortable with it, and one invitee did turn down 
the invitation due to feelings of insufficient English. 
 
 
3.  Results 
 
3.1  Thoughts about climate change 
 
Uncanny winters 
 
Every respondent interviewed was concerned with shorter winters.  The changes 
to winter duration and quality — noted by most respondents as already in progress — 
have economic, cultural, and mental health impacts.  Economically, Rovaniemi is the 
“home of Santa Claus”, and scores of Christmas tourists come to visit him in Santa’s 
Village.  Now, snow is expected in the beginning or middle of December, while twenty-
five years ago, the white season could be guaranteed to customers in November —“If 
there's no snow during December, it kind of loses the magic” (F8).  Even respondents not 
connected with tourism noted the regional economic impacts of not having a white 
Christmas.  But the impacts are also cultural — for example, people who traveled to 
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school by skis in their childhood wondered if the coming generations would even learn to 
ski (F7).   
 
Respondents were concerned about the distinguishability and predictability of 
seasons.  Winter seems to be a season whose integrity was deteriorating, slipping away.  
One interviewee related an anecdote told by a longtime resident:  
 
When he was a child they used to play with snow, they used to make balls 
and used to throw, this ball could break a window as well.  But now the 
snow becomes like that ... it is losing its cohesion or something.  ... there's 
something changed, the quality of the snow is not strong like previous 
times.  This is a practical example. (F2) 
 
Many cited worries about an endless autumn, a “dark long season”, and concerns 
that “in the end we won't have anything but autumn all the time” (F4).  In other places in 
the northern hemisphere, autumn may have bright and pleasant connotations, but in 
Lapland, it is rainy and dark, a cloudy burden.  The stretching autumn has mental health 
implications: in the words of one respondent, “in October it's already very dark here, it's 
not much daylight… and when the snow comes it changes everything, the light and 
people's minds, you get more energy because there is brisk air and white everywhere” 
(F20). To have a “real winter” or a “good winter” is a part of the identity here, and it’s 
more than an aesthetic preference.  Winters getting “worse” include changes in the 
quality of the snow, the amounts of it, and the integrity of it.   
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Two thirds of respondents cited the impacts of a deteriorating winter on reindeer 
— many mentioning that with warmer winters, the snow melts and refreezes, forming  a 
layer of ice that reindeer cannot crack to get to the lichen below, which they need to eat.  
While only three or four respondents had actually worked with reindeer herding, this 
seemed to be common knowledge — as one respondent explained, “People here live very 
close to nature, and that’s how they know it” (F6).  In fact, the majority of reindeer in 
Finnish Lapland— perhaps three-quarters— are actually fed hay and other food over 
winter (F20).  But the image of the reindeer digging with their sharp hooves into the ice, 
unable to reach food, was well-known, and resonant.  A reindeer expert described the 
problems that reindeer have when spring comes too early – the streams are opening 
earlier, and they have problems crossing the rivers which they normally had crossed on 
ice (F20)– the image is of a fragmented landscape, perceived through the eyes of the 
reindeer, but resonant with some deeper sense of fragmentation. 
 
I would summarize these images of fragmentation, indistinguishability, lack of 
cohesion, and lack of predictability as being “uncanny” — the sense is that the familiar is 
now strange; that the future climate is unknown.  However, not everyone expressed a 
sense of the uncanny, especially when speaking from a professional standpoint.  An 
expert in agriculture in Lapland also opined in a quite rational or matter-of-fact way 
about the challenges of finding new cultivation techniques for plants who would have to 
deal with thawing and dramatic refreezing (F3).  Or, as a tourism security expert put it,  
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From industry point of view I don’t see any drastic damages right now … 
Industry is going to adapt to circumstances and the environment.  New 
program services for tourism will be developed.  Of course story or 
narrative of Santa Claus can change if we don’t have snow in Rovaniemi 
for example, but global-wise or European-wise this is not a big issue or 
drastic issue.  It’s only economical thing now. (F17) 
 
In summary, people were unanimously concerned with the changes to wintertime’s 
duration and quality, and were both experiencing it as unfamiliar or uncanny as well as 
thinking about how to adapt to it. 
 
 
Global turmoil 
 
While shorter winters were the most frequently mentioned concern, it was not 
often the primary concern. Many people interpreted the primary, key, or most urgent 
concerns with climate change to be global suffering— for example, food and water 
security in the global south.  In the big picture, Arctic concerns were not as important: 
 
The impacts in the Arctic - even though they are supposed to kind of be 
earlier, they are already visible in a way - they are sort of miniscule in 
comparison to droughts that could happen in the south that affects 
hundreds of millions of people….  I’m just imagining the sort of 
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instability we will have in the next generations ... If you look at history, 
this kind of big migration always causes huge upheavals, huge problems, 
social problems and economic issues.  I'm not sure if Europeans are 
capable of economically, socially, politically accepting these kind of flows 
of people who will have nothing else to do.  They will have no other 
choice.  They will simply have no water, no food, not enough kind of 
wellbeing on a very very low level.  So, I guess this is my main concern 
for the future.  I don't think Arctic will be such a big deal when things go 
further. (F1) 
 
 
This was perhaps altruistic or empathetic, but also rational, as many believed that 
changes abroad would eventually affect them via migration and economic impacts.  In the 
words of one politician: 
 
Of course, my biggest worry is the not so direct impact, but what happens 
to the global economy and how third world countries can cope with the 
uncertainty with the climate. How the food security and all kinds of issues 
related to health and then extreme, severe weather causing lots of 
problems for people. How that affects the globe and mankind, because of 
course that has a global effect to us as well.  (F8) 
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Though many cited potential benefits from climate change, such as agricultural benefits, 
none seemed to believe that their region would be an overall “winner.”  Participants had a 
more sophisticated, nuanced view of benefit and detriment than a “winners and losers” 
discourse would suggest.  “If the losers are big areas, tiny areas who are winners cannot 
compensate it.  We are in the same boat,” explained one respondent (F12).  Participants 
were also cognizant of a temporal dimension to winning and losing.  As one entrepreneur 
put it, “in business we here in north are in short term winners, but in longer term 
difficulties reach also us” (F21)  Or as a grandmother put it,  
 
Sometimes I close my eyes and ears, because it hurts to think about the 
future, because there will be refugees because of the southern Europe 
drying and the storms will be very hard and there will be many kinds of 
problems coming along with climate change.  I don’t see any profits and 
any good things.  Coming in three years, there will be some good things.  
Or some five years.  But if we think of tens of years, the changes will be 
very difficult and dangerous. (F16) 
 
 
 
3.2  Thoughts about climate intervention  
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After respondents had answered questions about expected climatic changes, I read 
a brief paragraph explaining albedo modification through stratospheric particle injection, 
and asked for initial thoughts, followed by eliciting people’s key concerns.  Interestingly, 
even though the interview guide had in some ways primed them to think from a local or 
regional context, most people generally didn’t express concerns or questions about how 
climate intervention would affect their region in particular.  When specifically asked 
what “people in the Arctic” would think about climate intervention – not themselves, but 
other Arctic residents – the impressions ranged widely, and many people remarked that it 
was difficult to know, or that it would depend upon the framing.  On one hand, some 
remarked that Arctic people might feel like a “test laboratory” and be very skeptical or 
afraid (F17).  Others commented along the lines that since people in traditional lifestyles 
were concerned about the effects of climate change, “people could be quite open if we 
had new solutions that would actually affect quite fast” (F15).  Some thought that other 
Arctic residents would be approving, and invoked what’s been called as the “moral 
hazard” of avoidance of change:  “I suppose that some of them would be very delighted. 
‘Okay, wonderful. Now we've got a technical solution. So we don't have to do anything.’ 
That may be. Perhaps that's also the risk in that kind of thing. ‘Wonderful. We can just 
continue as before and we don't have to change anything’” (F16). 
 
Across the board, people were concerned about unforeseen ecological 
consequences.  They viewed the earth as a complex system — “there is not a mechanical 
system” but a “very very chaotic system” (F5).  It is difficult to say whether this systems 
perspective is part of the generally well-educated Finnish society, or if this study 
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population was perhaps even more socialized into systems thinking because of their 
professions.  As one political scientist commented, 
 
As much as I want to trust the science behind it, I've heard so many times 
from climate scientists and from people dealing with weather modeling 
and with climate modeling there's so many factors that it's simply 
impossible to predict everything, to take into account everything.  There's 
always some wild cards in the climate system that we still don't 
understand very well.   (F1) 
 
Because of ecosystem complexity, many participants viewed it as difficult or impossible 
to accurately predict the outcomes of engineering the climate.   They were concerned 
about unknown interactions once the particles were released into nature— this was an 
environmental concern, but not limited to “nature” or “the environment.”  As one tourism 
researcher commented, “if the environment is harmed, then human systems are harmed as 
well” (F10).  This concern about unknowable effects has been frequently noted in other 
studies (Wibeck et al, 2015).   
 
 The difficulties in climate intervention were explained not simply via 
understanding earth systems as complex; they were seen to be linked with history. “We 
have quite a bad history as humankind, of doing things that shouldn't be done or taking 
risks,” noted one respondent, mentioning nuclear weapons, chemicals with unknown 
impacts, and an ocean full of plastic (F4).  Another explained: 
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I have seen that the humankind has thought before that when we do this A 
operation, then it creates the consequence B and C, and they have never 
figured it out in time that there has been consequences D, E, and F also - 
which are a pain in our ass today in our ecological net.  And this is the 
master scale of manipulation which should be done … and the scale that 
it's global wide, it could never work in the way that it could be 
useful.  (F14) 
 
Most of the concerns that emerged about climate intervention’s impacts were 
global or abstract, and often touched upon effects of climate intervention about people in 
other places. However, their concerns were still informed by particular contextual 
histories.  For example, a few mentioned how residue from Chernobyl affected Sami 
reindeer herders, or the recognition that persistent organic pollutants were in the Arctic 
food chain.  The Arctic appears as a place where contaminants end up: “anything people 
are doing somewhere, it affects them although they don’t get any use, or they don’t 
benefit” (F4).  As one explained, 
 
You have the pollution coming from the outside, the persistent organic 
pollutants, climate change is being triggered from outside, mercury is 
coming from outside, black carbon is coming from Asia and from Europe 
and from the central northern America.  So... so I guess that maybe, and 
this is just a guess, I think maybe when people start thinking about climate 
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intervention, they also think as this kind of something that south is doing, 
is impacting somehow Arctic.  I guess this could be also the feeling that 
one shares with all peripheral regions, peripheral in any sense, 
economically peripheral - so developing states, the least developed states, 
or people also away from these centers of governance.  (F1) 
 
 People read the idea of climate engineering not just through northern or Arctic 
histories, but European ones — including dark histories of barbarism and colonialism.  
One respondent discussed the relationship between recent terrorist attacks in France and 
turmoil with French colonies in the 1950s and 1960s, and the difficulty of integration, 
commenting on the relationship to nature during colonialism, which questions of climate 
engineering brought up: “If our attitudes towards nature and attitude towards the globe 
and human race is the same as it was 150 years ago — at the moment, I think that it's 
very close to that — what will happen?” (F3)  Another referred to the history of Europe 
before nation-states:  
 
My concern is that the climate is going to change so quickly and rapidly 
that it's going to cause these kind of international consequences, like the 
people has to leave in a big masses from another area to go to some other 
area. If we go back to the history when the nations were born in Europe, 
that you know the Huns and the Germans, Barbarians go to one area, they 
went to Rome - they were, if the climate is going to change, it's going to 
change the way of the nations that we are used to.  You know the raw 
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materials, first water is going to run out, whatever it is, whatever it is, it's 
going to be violence of the last resources who is going to get them.  That's 
what I see if the climate is going to change quite quickly.  (F14) 
 
These types of concerns are not found as commonly in the geoengineering governance 
literature, which tends to steer away from prospects like neocolonialism and the 
breakdown of nation-states, and also bounds topics like racial integration off from 
environmental governance.  This is not to say that the references to European, Nordic, 
and northern histories are entirely pessimistic — some discussed, for example, previous 
referendums on nuclear energy as evidence of people’s ability to choose a technological 
future.  Similarly, Wibeck et al (2015) found that Swedish laypeople often referenced the 
1980 referendum on nuclear power in Sweden. 
 
 
3.3  Beyond climate intervention – Questions of how to live in the Anthropocene 
 
Living with loss, insecurity, and the uncanny 
 
These conversations were about climate change and climate intervention, but the 
evoked broader and deeper issues that people wanted to talk about.  Loss was a major 
theme:  loss of climatic conditions, species loss, and a more general cultural loss or 
disruption in memory that had to do with modernity more generally.  Some of these 
losses were spoken of broadly, e.g. “I’m worried about the future of my children because 
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I know that the world is changing so rapidly.  Perhaps their life won’t be anything like 
what we have” (F4).  People also brought up very specific examples, like whether and 
how to relocate a population of 400 Saimaa ringed seals, who only inhabit lakes in 
southern Finland (F4).  Or “small things”, as evidenced in one artist’s example about the 
willow grouse — it changes color to be while in the winter, but ten years ago, the grouse 
changed color two or three weeks before the snow, and the population declined.  Now, it 
is protected and not hunted, while in the respondent’s youth the willow grouse was 
hunted by the hundreds (F19).  The loss affects the very color of the landscape: “If you 
go and walk in the forest, this kind of white, pine tree forest with this lichen …. They 
have vanished away and now they are these kind of blueberry fields. Nature is changing. 
The color of the nature is changing and the animals are changing a little bit. It's obvious.”  
However, this respondent also reflected, “I think that it's not very often only about the 
climate changes, because there are a lot of changes like tourist business, mining industry, 
those mixed together with these and we never know what are the effects or the reasons in 
reality” (F19). 
 
Many spoke of the permanence of extinction — “when you lose some species or 
parts of your nature we will never have it back”(F15) — but also related extinction to 
human loss.  “Loss of biodiversity is terrible and of course loss of livelihood for people 
as well,” commented a cultural worker; who put it as part of an active process and a 
struggle: “I think we are losing” (F18).  Another interviewee focused on northern 
societies, and warned that “this invaluable unique culture could change and vanish away 
immediately” (F19). 
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 The stories and comments about loss, and the sense of the uncanny and 
unfamiliar, relates to climate insecurity in its many facets, and a sense of vulnerability.  
Even in the global north, and with a strong welfare state, there were ways in which the 
human systems here were vulnerable.  A few spoke in terms of the climate security 
discourse “in the north, exploration of raw material can become more intensive and it 
might have safety and security impacts on state relations, relations between great powers 
in circumpolar regions for example” (F17).  But others saw the vulnerability in more 
everyday terms: 
 
So, for the whole region, to live here - now the snowplow is driving three 
times a week, we get more snow the snowplow is driving every day, 
someone has to pay for it.  Is the state ready to pay for something like 
this?  This is the thing - it influences everything; we have to pay even 
more taxes to pay for this infrastructure that works.  We can't live over 
here if the snowplow is not running; we can't drive.  I even can't get to 
work.  It's interesting, if you start to think which influence is possible ... 
it's endless.  (F6) 
 
Context is about time as much as place, and many respondents brought up worries about 
the current zeitgeist.  Climate insecurity was just one component of a greater malaise. A 
tourism operator noted that customers who used to ski in the Alps are coming to Lapland 
not just because of poor snow in the Alps, but because of terrorism: “they feel the loved 
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ones is still safe” (F7).  These sentiments about rising insecurity or global instability were 
absolutely relevant to perceptions about climate change or climate engineering, and how 
they could be governed.   
 
I think we must do something [about climate change] quite soon, probably 
in the next 20 years or something like that, but we don’t have enough time 
to have all those negotiations and deliberations … because in a political 
level, the world is now more chaotic.  Those crazy people are going into 
power like the president of the Phillippines, the Turkish Erdogan, Donald 
Trump, Putin.  Rationality is going away.  The people in the UK voted to 
exit from the EU even though some of them didn’t even know what is the 
EU. … China is trying to govern natural resources everywhere in the 
world.  In Africa, in Iceland.  … National interests are back.  I think it 
would be very difficult to have those kind of consensus which you need. 
(F5) 
 
In many cases, participants vacillated between democratic liberal ideals of what 
should be, and pessimism about how things seemed to be trending.  One, who had been 
quite optimistic about positive change, ventured into worries about migration: 
 
And ... what about if we have here, in this tiny area called Finland, good 
conditions, but we have very strong border, and there is people who are 
suffering, and they decide, let's go to Finland, it is nice place to 
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live!  There is water and good climate.  What about if 50 million people 
from south of Europe decides so?  We cannot do anything.  It is always a 
stronger boy who takes the candy from a small boy's hands. (F12) 
 
Another echoed that human history is “a game for the fittest, strongest,” stating that there 
wasn’t a democratic way of making decisions about climate engineering because of the 
“pure power politics behind everything which are not shown to us normal 
people,” elaborating that “they show it to us after 30 years in the memoirs of Hillary 
Clinton, and even not then” (F14) 
 
I think if somebody hits the nail on the head and figures out a way that we 
manipulate in this way, the climate, whatever it is, he or she will be the 
master of the universe.  He will use this kind of information to have the 
rest of the humankind to be his or her slave.  It's the role of the god, then, 
if someone figures it out that we have the powerful system to suck carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere and put that into the ocean or into the space, 
whatever it is.  When they have their research, when they have their 
possibility, and the life gets hotter and hotter on the globe, then they will 
announce that you have to pay us and we will take 3 centigrades off the 
warming, and that's the system. (F14) 
 
In some of the interviews, respondents alternated between perspectives of 
pessimism, and liberal hope about democratic decisions, evidencing the fluidity of 
	 229	
positions about what is realistic or possible.  The war about what is realistic or possible is 
waged in people’s minds.  While expressing pessimism about human nature and human 
values, the same person could moments later express optimism about it.   
 
We have the wrong kind of values.  Total wrong kind of values.  This 
generation. And as I told you, this year I have been visiting a good lecture 
.. how the identity of here, a Lappish person, is developing, and how it is 
changing every 4th or 5th generation, and then we have everything what 
people believed in 1850 is now gone.  And if we think 4 or 5 generations 
in the future, they don't have that kind of values what we have.  And then I 
think about it.. actually, it's good that they have different values.  And it is 
changing automatically.  It is like skin.  People have new values, and they 
think about different way.  That time, 1850 we have believed in king, or 
priest, and nowadays not.  We don't believe anyone. [laughs] And we ... 
believe in decision-makers, or we think ourselves.  But we want a lot of 
property and use natural resources.  But in the future, I believe they are 
different.  I believe the future is better that way.  (F12) 
 
Some spoke about a loss of faith in progress — which helps to make sense of the 
ambiguity about geoengineering, which can be seen as a breakdown of the master 
narrative about scientific, economic, and cultural progress.  One respondent even stated 
that “I don't believe in this paradigm of scientific and technological progress anymore,” 
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and saw geoengineering as connected with American optimism, juxtaposed perhaps with 
Finnish reflectiveness or questioning. 
 
I think that in Finland ... people in north, they're more suspicious, they 
think more than the people down in south in rat race, and if you go to see 
the reindeer farmers and herders in Lapland, local people, they keep on 
thinking.  All of them they are thinkers.  …  So I think that many people 
possibly think very positively about that maybe they do something, but I 
think we still could have a really big pessimistic part of the population 
thinking, oh well, that's another Russian invention, and that's another 
Yankees invention, and oh, whatever, this kind of a normal Finnish 
pessimism … I hope in Lapland that in the middle of the forest, we still 
have these open-minded people who will tell what we should have done 
when they invented the first steam engine, James Watt invented that in 
1700 in England, that it should be broke down.  It should be broke 
down.… and since then we have lost the game. (F14) 
 
 Could albedo modification be a remedy, a salve, for insecurity?  Notably, climate 
intervention was not really seen as something that would relieve these concerns about 
security.  At this stage, solar geoengineering just seems to add to the insecurity, or to 
compound it, rather than being something that “saves” people from loss or instability.   
Several people brought up being afraid of geoengineering, though this may have been 
associated with gender – seven women mentioned fear, but only two men.  One of the 
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men qualified “scary” with “a little bit” (F1), and another spoke about not fear of 
geoengineering, but fear of a post-secular society (F5).  While it is possible that women 
are more afraid of climate intervention than men, it is also possible that gender is one 
factor of many that conditions how free people feel about expressing their emotions.  But 
in short, no one at present indicated that climate engineering was something that made 
them feel more confident or comfortable about any perceived global trends. 
 
 
Responsibility and agency in decision-making 
 
Respondents were asked both whose responsibility it is to do something about 
climate engineering, and who should make decisions on climate engineering.  Some 
noted the responsibility of big polluters like the US and China to act.  Climate change 
itself had multiple realms of responsibility and solutions, from the individual or regional 
to corporate, nation-state and international levels.  But across the board, they believed 
that climate engineering would need to be governed by some international process or 
body.  People were able to visualize different scales of climate solutions with more 
familiar methods of mitigation; no one mentioned smaller scales or areas of responsibility 
in terms of climate intervention, though in one case regional geoengineering was brought 
up: the idea that reindeer modify albedo through their grazing habits (F14). 
 
  There was a disjunct between ideas of responsibility and agency: who should be 
responsible for solving climate change differs from who has the power to do so.  
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Geoengineering was seen to complicate this: “It’s like transferring the responsibility from 
myself to somebody else in tacking climate change,” commented one respondent (F17).  
Climate engineering was also seen as something that would be hard to have a say in; hard 
for citizens to shape.  There were at least three reasons: complexity, peripherality, and 
history.  Firstly, as one respondent explained, the climate regime “now looks like a crazy 
web of different provisions and measures,” only some of which are implemented.  “I 
think that the problem with climate intervention is that this would develop a similar 
network or similar framework, a patchwork of different measures and different ideas, so 
it would be very complex” (F1). 
 
Secondly, in many instances, there was a sense of being on the periphery despite 
being in the “global north”— people did not see Lapland or even the Arctic as very 
powerful.  Moreover, no one who was asked thought it was very plausible that potential 
Arctic interests in a warming climate would figure into decisions about climate 
engineering.  First, there was a sense of being on the periphery even of Finland: that for 
southern Finland, Lapland “does not exist.  They don't need Lapland.  There's nothing. 
There are only trees” (F6). Another elaborated, 
 
Decisions are kind of made in the south, and then the north is this kind of 
colony, or periphery, that is being used, extracted, controlled, 
protected.  So there is this kind of resistance by many people to this 
southern environmentalist - Helsinki, Stockholm, Washington-based 
environmentalist who come to the north and tell people that they are not 
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doing, that they are not protecting their environment.  And then you have 
the big companies that are in the south trying to get at the resources. (F1) 
 
Thirdly, citizen participation in a geoengineering regime was hard to imagine due 
to the history of non-participatory decisions around the world.  One participant who had 
migrated from Bangladesh explained that normatively, there should be collective 
decision-making, it would be difficult to actualize: 
 
[The decision to do climate engineering] should be made actually 
together.  Because nobody, not even the developed or rich countries, they 
are not the owner of this planet.  So I think all the countries, they are the 
stakeholder and owner. So I think it should be taken in open forum, it 
could be - at the beginning it could happen with meetings, and then they 
can make some committees in order to introduce this idea, and then they 
can take opinion country-wise, but before the countries are participating in 
this forum, each and every country, they need to know this and they need 
to discuss with stakeholders inside the country, kind of clusters, like 
political groups, researchers, civil society members.. and then actually, 
then they can consider if this is going to work or not, or what is better. 
Because nobody can take this decision by themselves. (F2) 
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This respondent saw mitigation as something that a developing country could take 
part in, but participation in climate engineering was more difficult both in terms of 
capacity and in terms of a history of unequal global relations. 
 
Despite the challenges, when it comes to regional geoengineering, people felt that 
local perspectives should be considered.  One respondent pointed out that the idea means 
something for “Russians, northern Scandinavians, maybe Iceland, for Greenland people, 
Canada, northern part of that. Most of the people in the world believe that this empty 
area, there's nothing harmed. Yeah, in that case, I just really hope that these people who 
are living there, they have some rights to say something” (F19).  Some people brought up 
the agency of indigenous groups and the need to speak with them, and a few also 
discussed how women might be marginalized from decision-making.  One noted: 
 
[Women] are anyway the minority in decision-making in this area … they 
are not so interested in the new technology. They are not so much 
involved in it. They don't believe so much in the new technology as men. 
Technology and economics, they are very much in the hands of men. 
Women also fear that we don't understand. That it's a men's business. That 
kind of segregation is even bigger in this Arctic and Lappish area than in 
other parts of Finland, for example. I suppose they leave it, in a sense, in 
the hands of men. That's a problem. (F16) 
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People began to think of methods of representative participation in decision-
making, such as voting schemes, though these interviews were carried out in the wake of 
Brexit, which provoked a few critical reflections on the idea of voting.  For example, one 
respondent mentioned that some months ago, she would have suggested a referendum. 
 
But what happened now in England, this is an example how it shouldn't 
work.  So the older people went to vote, and they had still the old United 
Kingdom in mind, what was existing many, many years, and they didn't 
like the influence of whole Europe, and they voted not to belong to the EU 
anymore.  But the younger people, they even didn't go to vote.  So now 
they are out.  And I think that this kind of thing is dangerous as well.  It's 
hard to decide if the politicians should be able to say what we should do - 
this is as well dangerous.  Maybe we should be [doing] independent 
research. (F6) 
 
 
Sources of hope 
 
Many participants expressed a desire for scientists to research other topics, which 
would be preferable to climate engineering: into new energy sources, for example, or into 
the question of why political will to act on climate change is so low given everything we 
know about climate science.  Other studies have also found that in discussing 
geoengineering, people broaden the horizons of the problem and solutions.  As Wibeck et 
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al (2015: 29) put it: “The focus group participants repeatedly criticized the growth ethos 
while articulating far-reaching demands for renewable technology, lifestyle change and 
societal transformation.”  Corner et al (2013) also noted that “while the link between 
mitigation (via lifestyle change) and materialism is clear, what was more surprising was 
the extent to which deliberating about geoengineering also triggered many comments 
about the wasteful nature of society;” they remark that for some participants, considering 
geoengineering triggers “a rejection of the idea that consumption rates can continue to 
grow indefinitely, facilitated by a geoengineered climate.”  In this study, a few people 
mentioned the concern that geoengineering would be used to continue economic growth, 
but surprisingly few discussed this.  Many mentioned the need for societal 
transformation, however. 
 
What form did hope for the future take?  Not geoengineering, by and large — it 
was rarely seen as a source of hope.  People did cite familiar green strategies, but without 
particular effusiveness or passion about them (decreasing flying and driving, taking 
“individual actions”, reducing waste, electric cars and windmills).  However, there were 
areas in which people did imagine the future in positive terms. 
 
Relocalization and new rural livelihoods 
 
Lapland is a rural region experiencing structural change — as one respondent 
pointed out, thirty years ago there were 10,000 farms; now there are 1,500; while there 
were 3,500 dairy farms, there are now 300.  When speaking about the future, “the 
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challenge for this area is how the people can work here; what kind of job they have” (F9).   
It was observed that children want to “escape the countryside” (F18).  Another asked, 
“Why are we not doing anything against urbanization?  That also people can live in the 
country” (F5). 
 
Some approached this question around future rural livelihoods in conjunction with 
questions around climate futures: “we have to find basic living there [in rural areas], and 
the climate change could bring new possibilities.”  One cited opportunities in local 
energy production for villages, and making small villages more self-sufficient in energy 
and food (F3).  The changes wrought by climate change could be opportunities for 
restructuring, from centralized systems into dispersed systems; to change to a system of 
processing materials near where the resources are.  Another respondent saw the power of 
place as providing possible new livelihoods in terms of nature tourism offering therapy or 
healing: that “ecosystem services” are both mental, cultural, and spiritual; that the 
ecosystem offers a good place to work with troubled youth or people struggling with 
addition, a kind of nature tourism beyond beauty or wildlife to a deeper healing 
experience (F19). 
 
 
Dematerialization, education, and new values 
 
Related to this question of new rural livelihoods is the idea of dematerialization 
— that perhaps the economies don’t need to be based on material goods as much 
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anymore.  While some ideas around relocalization or new livelihoods might sound 
romantic, part of the discussion is linked to the failure of new economic opportunities 
from climate change to materialize.  One researcher describes discovering  
 
maybe one year or two years ago, that because people are discouraged 
with the speed or nonexistence of this large-scale development ... there 
were so many hopes for oil and gas extraction, and mining, and shipping, 
ships going back and forth all over the Arctic, but that is not happening, or 
is happening very slowly, people notice that there are so many constraints, 
including environmental constraints.  Climate change is not actually the 
main factor in triggering these developments. (F1) 
 
Instead, people are thinking about industries like the bioeconomy, data centers, cold 
climate testing and technologies, and “how sparsely populated remote regions can benefit 
and - not only benefit but somehow create, create jobs, create economic growth inside the 
regions based upon knowledge based economy, communication technology, or 
digitalization” (F1).  Other respondents commented on the prospects of this not from the 
policy side, but from observing what younger people are interested in:  
 
In rich countries, of course, there are poor people living in rich countries 
but people have already everything they need.  There are not so many 
things you want now.  Too many things or surprises, surprises are more 
here like you can see those Pokémon Go.  You couldn’t imagine 
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something like that some months ago.  It’s a real surprise.  … Probably it’s 
part of economic growth and not consuming so much.  Ecological 
damages not such a big part … Of course, people who can probably travel 
more are lucky to find those Pokémons.  … If economic growth will 
happen in the virtual world, it’s not damaging so much the global ecology. 
(F5) 
 
Another respondent commented that new generations “have different values, and 
they don’t appreciate so much in this area, I have seen signs of it – they don’t appreciate 
so much about new things in my cupboard, or buy new things, new clothes, maybe that is 
the future” (F12).  Of course, there is a question of capacity to buy new things — the 
same respondent, an educator, warns young people “that maybe they are the first 
generation ever that will be poorer than their parents.  And they get big problems, 
environmental problems, and less resources, we have been eating their cake, part of their 
cake.”  The educator sees hope in that this generation “has better education than any 
generation before” (F12). 
 
4.  Discussion and conclusion 
 
How can reading climate intervention through a local context help us with 
governance efforts?  Out of the two widespread concerns about climate change — 
shorter, uncanny winters and global turmoil — only the latter was really discussed in 
relationship to climate intervention.  People did not emphasize how climate intervention 
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would impact them locally, and many believed it would only be tried in times of global 
crisis, e.g. if food production in the global south was failing.  Contrary to discourse that 
suggest people will be out to maximize their own climatic interests, the cosmopolitan 
perspectives voiced actually point towards more hope for cooperative global governance 
of climate engineering — if governance was up to citizens.  
 
It might seem inconsequential to talk about what a few dozen Lappish people 
think about albedo modification, but in fact, these conversations bring up challenges to 
three tacit assumptions in the geoengineering discourse to date. 
 
 The first is that people’s climate preferences are obvious or quantifiable.  We in 
lower latitudes might assume that people up north might be okay with it a few degrees 
warmer, when in fact only one person mentioned that as a possible benefit (and not much 
of one, in the context of other changes).  There aren’t metrics which easily capture snow 
quality, the type of snow, or “real” winter.  Even metrics like temperature are contextual.  
As one respondent explained: 
 
Over here, if you have minus 20 degrees, ... it's cold. You can go out, it's 
not possible anymore to do downhill skiing, your face is freezing and 
fingers, not nice. As well cross-country skiing is dangerous, you have to 
breathe a lot, it's ... but minus 20 doesn't feel that bad because it's so dry, 
over here.  Minus twenty in Germany, you freeze to death, because it's 
humid.  Over here it's dry.  If I wash clothes and put it somewhere to dry, 
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it takes an hour to dry, in wintertime - because it's so dry. And it feels 
different, totally.  It does not feel so cold as in Middle Europe, when you 
have the same temperature. (F6) 
 
At minimum, this suggests that people will need more information besides temperature 
metrics to understand what a climate under albedo modification might feel like.  It also 
underscores the importance of going out and engaging with various populations to 
understand their climate preferences. 
 
A second key assumption is that people will look at geoengineering as a local 
concern, or through an individual utilitarian lens.  However, these respondents — in part 
because of their systems view, but perhaps for other reasons — understand the 
interconnectedness of the world’s economies and peoples, even if politicians are speaking 
in terms of nation-states.  (This might seem counterintuitive in a time which seems to be 
marked by rising nationalism, but these could be simply two sides of a coin.)  The 
material in these interviews invites us to rethink the relationship between categories of 
“outside” and “inside”; what is external and what is local.  People in societies like 
Finland may be open to democratic, collaborative processes for governing climate 
engineering.  But there may be a serious disjunct between citizen imaginaries and the 
positions of states on this issue.  People also did not claim a self-interested position 
themselves, but observed “power politics” in the behavior of states, now and throughout 
history.  Several people brought this up— one in the context of China, where it might 
have been easier to see: 
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Now even China has a stake on the Arctic and they are aggressive in so 
many terms, and the Arctic countries even, the Arctic Eight, they know 
about this and they have so many forums, and still they are doing what 
they want to do.  They want to explore the Arctic for more resources; they 
are also not following the rules or they are not very ... aware to protect the 
situation, about the climate change issues.  They are thinking about their 
own stake and their own profit.  So they are making this cost-benefit 
analysis, so in that case I don't know how the citizen will react, whether 
they will agree. (F2) 
 
Relatedly, a third tacit assumption is that states act in the interests of their citizens— 
when this has not been true in the case of climate change governance.  What happens to 
ideas of governing climate engineering in situations where governments do not represent 
the will of the people?  More research is needed into the possible tension in these 
perspectives. 
 
Reading geoengineering through other local contexts would be useful in order to 
explore whether people’s perspectives on geoengineering are indeed shaped by local or 
individual interests, and examine whether there is in fact tension between the 
perspectives of citizens and the states that purport to represent them.  Similar studies 
could also offer insight into regional variations in conditions of acceptability, or whether 
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people’s views are determined by climatic geography or other factors like equality and 
trust in institutions. 
 
Finally, it is notable that an interview guide with questions rather narrowly 
focused about climate engineering could evoke such a wide array of thoughts about how 
to live in a new or unfamiliar world — including an uncanny climate, but with thoughts 
even beyond climate or “environmental” issues.  This suggests that (1) perhaps the 
geoengineering discussion has a role in coming to grips with the changes needed, even if 
geoengineering is never conducted, and (2) people need more venues in which to think 
about the future they want — it’s rare that people have formal opportunities to discuss the 
future, and ideally there would be more forums for thinking about these questions of 
sustainable livelihood in the era of climate change over the medium-to-long term.  This is 
something which goes beyond academia, and yet people working in the academy have a 
potentially important role to play in creating these spaces, both in terms of the students 
served in universities and the wider public.   
 
Issues like geoengineering make clear the need for such deliberative forums: in a 
sense, it is curious why institutions for future-imagining and path-making do not exist 
already.  Is it because representative democracy has delegated decision-making and 
future planning to professional representatives?  Is it because activities like planning are 
so heavily bureaucratized?  Is it a question of scale — meaning that people can be 
engaged with local planning issues, but not global ones?  Probably a combination of these 
reasons and more; yet is the latter one that is most relevant for this example of solar 
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geoengineering.  These new global responsibilities demand a different sort of institution 
for participatory deliberation of possible futures, and it’s possible that we may need to 
innovate one where none exists.  Some creative work in the social sciences is being done 
in this direction.  Szerszynski and colleagues conducted deliberative research where 
participants were asked to imagine the worlds that might be brought about by 
geoengineering (discussed in Szerszynski, 2017). Stilgoe (2016) has suggested 
geoengineering could be reframed as part of a regime of collective experimentation 
(rather than a regime of technoscientific promises), in which publics are part of an 
experimental system.  It’s not yet clear how these types of efforts work together, but this 
type of research could be considered “basic research” in a nascent field of 
interdisciplinary future studies. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
This dissertation has examined four ecotechnical imaginaries, and focusing 
attention on how these imaginaries are articulated, negotiated, and contested on varying 
scales has brought up three insights.  Firstly, public engagement with environmental 
futures takes the form of selecting between options. Though many of these options are 
formed and promoted by experts, civil society actors do work on generating compelling 
narratives and metrics in order to improve the selectability of particular futures.  
Secondly, these imaginaries have illuminated some of the ways the narrative of 
responsibility in the Anthropocene is deficient and should be modified, i.e. to view 
responsibility in environmental future-making as not a moment of taking the right 
decision among predetermined options, but as a continual process of care and 
maintenance that recognizes labor and agency.  Thirdly, this dissertation reveals how 
these imaginaries are doing work far beyond their stated purposes in material 
transformation (in some cases, perhaps in lieu of their stated purpose).  In this conclusion, 
we will revisit and expand upon these three key takeaways, elaborating their implications 
for the key question of how citizens can have more agency in deciding about and 
designing emerging technologies of environmental future-making. 
 
 
1.  Considering selectability: From the Arab Spring to the First 100 Days 
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 This work emerged in the shadow of its context.  This context is not incidental, 
and not just background color to the chapters I have presented here.  Two social 
transitions loom especially large: one has been on the front pages of our newspapers 
almost daily, and the other seems curiously forgotten in the US, by both the press and 
academia.  Much of this fieldwork was done in August-December 2016, and the US 
presidential election was inescapable, both in the conversations I had with respondents 
and as general mood.  More troubling, though, throughout the five years I worked on this, 
was the unraveling of the Arab Spring.  When I was working as an analyst in the US 
Department of State in 2011, it seemed that it had actually begun as an African Spring. 
Events in Tunisia unfolded at the same time as the January 2011 referendum in South 
Sudan birthed a new country through a selection mechanism, the vote.  There was much 
hand-wringing during in the following months about how the intelligence community had 
"missed" the Arab Spring, not unlike the postmortem of how political and social 
scientists “missed” the rise of Trump five years later.  At the time, my interpretation was 
that Middle East – North Africa analysts had failed to see that citizens were able to 
mobilize as genuine actors; that the gaze of even the best analysts was trained to think 
other types of actors were the ones that mattered.  One think tank looked at analysis 
across professional sectors from academic, other think tanks, journalism, business, and 
NGOs, assessing that “even those who focused their work on the bottom-up perspective 
would not have judged that civil society groups, labor movements, or informal networks 
would be the catalyst for real change in the time frame considered” (Laipson, 2011: 5).  
Perhaps citizens would have to count. 
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 We now know how things seem in the countries we were watching: Tunisia, 
Libya, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, and elsewhere, including South Sudan, 
with parts of the new country now in a state of famine, with the oil exports the people 
hoped to benefit from virtually nonexistent.  People celebrated when South Sudan chose 
to be born.  They celebrated when protestors across the MENA region saw democracy as 
selectable over autocracy.  Six years on, those of us in the US witnessed the rise of a 
narcissist with autocratic tendencies in our own country, selected by popular minority.  
His first overseas trip involves selling $109 billion of arms to Saudi Arabia.  We can 
imagine that some of these will be used to prolong and expand the suffering in Yemen: 
where just a few years ago people were celebrating the ousting of Saleh after a 33-year 
reign, and which is currently one of four countries at risk of famine.  Meanwhile, global 
mean temperatures rise, with models predicting that parts of the region will cross the 
threshold of what heat stress the human body can bear (Pal and Eltahir, 2015); it is people 
in Yemen who will not have air conditioning to insulate them.  Fossil fuels are 
transmuted into double-suffering of weapons and heat, via the United States and voters 
like those whom I spoke with in rural California. 
 
 What does it mean to talk about selecting futures when our main mechanisms for 
doing so are broken?  Or when those with arms are willing to kill you for selecting 
something different?  The strategy I am arguing for, and observing some instances of — 
that citizens can use narratives along with calculations to shape what options become 
selectable — seems absurd in the face of an AK-47, or in a place where a narrative of 
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possibility and change did emerge and was quashed by violence.  This is where the 
geopolitical realists are able to lay their claim to understanding the world.   
 
However, crafting narratives and metrics to fight for selectability can still be a 
viable strategy for places like the US.  For example, the Salton Sea, as discussed in 
chapters three and four, different civil society actors (1) are calling for action in terms of 
environmental justice, and holding the state accountable for additional air pollution, and 
(2) working to make alternative engineering projects for the sea selectable.  They do so 
through strategies such as monitoring air pollution and wildlife, sharing data about it, and 
producing media designed for wider audiences, as well as attending formal meetings and 
using the traditional political structures on offer.  These hearings are a form of what 
Chilvers and Kearnes (2016) have called participation as technologized procedure; at the 
same time, they allow participants a forum to articulate the calculations and narratives of 
their alternative visions.   
 
 In the case of solar geoengineering, actors such as the ETC group, a small civil 
society organization, were actually quite effective in laying out a case for climate 
engineering being non-selectable.  They used the umbrella term "geoengineering" to 
bundle methods together and claim a moratorium on it using the UN's Convention on 
Biological Diversity.  In general, they have used narrative tactics, but also buttress their 
narrative with metrics of their own — i.e., meticulously tracking patents issued on 
technologies (ETC, 2010).  The option they would prefer is sustainable agriculture; the 
choice of climate engineering becomes defined as a choice of agricultural production 
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systems (Buck, 2015).  These groups have been relatively effective in reconfiguring the 
choices, given their limited resources.  It is possible, though, that in other contexts the 
selectability of geoengineering would emerge quite differently, if the selectable 
alternative is extreme warming.  A greater concern about climate change is correlated 
with willingness to consider solar geoengineering in several studies (Visschers et al, 
2017; Merk et al, 2016; Mercer et al, 2011).  Visschers et al (2017) found, for example, in 
China, public opinion of SRM is more welcoming; they muse that the “lack of adaptive 
and mitigative capacity in certain countries such as China may explain the more positive 
opinion of SRM held there.”  
 
Both solar geoengineering and negative emissions technologies are relatively 
unheard of by laypersons, which is a major issue, because there are limited opportunities 
to participate in shaping the imaginaries of these technologies.  Even participation by 
organizations claiming to represent civil society tends to close down discussion rather 
than open it, potentially resulting in a situation where global public views are 
authoritatively authored and mapped out before the vast majority of people have even 
heard of these techniques.  When the imaginaries are so unfamiliar to people, it remains 
largely speculative to write about how publics could do storytelling work to shape how 
they emerge— or counterfactual accounts that may be stories or actual histories. The 
"ocean economy", for example, is perhaps too wonkish and top-down to be a site of 
popular struggle (at least not until its construction results in material effects, should that 
come to pass).  But there is a fascinating way in which the visions of some enterprises 
with roots in 1970s counterculture — e.g. in aquaponics or algae cultivation or ocean 
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energy — is packaged up with other, more traditional "blue" sectors of growth, such as 
fishing and deep-sea extraction.  Some of the sectors counted in the blue economy may 
be at odds with each other, and part of the debate around selectable futures involves 
deciding what goes into the package.  Mauritius, for example, had a long process of 
creating its roadmap for an ocean economy, involving a National Dialogue with public 
consultation; yet it had already defined the ocean economy as building on the work of 
making Mauritius a petroleum hub (Ramgoolam, 2013).  Part of the dilemma is the lack 
of forums for engaging in debates around the long future in more general terms, and 
deciding what even gets to be “roadmapped” — a theme we will return to shortly.  But in 
summary, the storytelling and quantitative work done by civil society actors to make 
various options selectable is worthy of much more analysis, which could explore under 
which conditions these efforts are successful, what kinds of responses they face, and how 
the metrics and narratives used work together or against each other.  
 
 
2.  Revising Responsibility in the Anthropocene 
 
 Part of the Anthropocene theory quoted throughout this dissertation reiterates that 
the events in places like South Sudan are not distant tragedies, but connected to everyday 
life in the global north even more than ever during a time of carbon democracy (Mitchell, 
2013) and climate change.  For example, during the last two meetings of the IPCC, Saudi 
Arabia pressed for carbon geoengineering and negative emissions to be included in 
various IPCC special reports (IISD, 2016; IISD, 2017).  Not a single scientist working on 
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solar geoengineering or negative emissions that I have met is interested in developing 
these technologies so that the Saudis can pump more oil — and, in fact, would likely find 
that irresponsible— but it's very possible that this becomes the reality despite our best 
efforts and intentions.  A critical rendering of the Anthropocene involves recognizing 
these entanglements, and what responsibilities they might bring.  It also involves 
reframing our choices to select climate repair over war.  In my eyes, the brilliant 
innovation in a recent paper by Desch et al (2016) about artificially refreezing Arctic ice 
is not its calculations for winter ice thickening as a form of “geodesign” (the authors’ 
preferred term over geoengineering).  The innovation I appreciate is the framing: that the 
price tag of $500 billion per year to deploy freezing devices over the entire Arctic “is an 
enterprise comparable in scope to the U.S. automotive industry, or the execution of the 
Iraq War, which is to say that it is expensive but is economically achievable” (2016:  14). 
In those terms, refreezing the Arctic is more selectable.  It is also appears as a more 
responsible choice than the Iraq war.  There is immense work to be done in rehearsing 
possible imaginaries and the responsibilities they highlight.	
 
This dissertation is about the search for a new story, after the master narrative 
about modernity and progress is wearing out; the breakdown of this narrative is another 
entanglement between this work and its temporal context. This is a time when the old 
stories are not working — the campaign slogan of Donald Trump reflects this, and in 
some ways the rise and failure of the Arab Spring might as well.  Modernity under 
neoliberalism did not deliver; neither has digital democracy as of yet.  What new stories 
are taking hold, as narrated by my respondents?  Who populates these Anthropocene 
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stories?  The antagonists I am concerned with in this dissertation are characterized by 
their lack of response, their stagnation. Haraway writes of the thoughtlessness of 
decision-makers in this time; of "refusing to know and to cultivate the capacity of 
response-ability; of refusing to be present in and to onrushing catastrophe in time; of 
unprecedented looking away" (2016: 35).  This seems to be something more like the 
story: the antagonists are antagonizing in their slowness, their non-reactiveness.  And 
what of the protagonists?  They have the same characteristics: they are like Hamlet in 
their indecision and melancholy.  If the content of the story is repair — of how the world 
can be repaired — this is a classic story, and could perhaps do the job, if it is 
transformative.  Henke, writing about industrial agriculture as an ecology of power, 
draws a distinction between repair strategies of maintenance and transformation, writing 
that repair as maintenance tends to be the default strategy (2008: 11).  Dust mitigation at 
the Salton Sea as well as solar geoengineering could be seen as maintenance-repair 
strategies.  If repair-as-transformation prevails against that default, this could be a 
compelling story worth telling, with plenty of archetypical narratives about Eden, 
greening, restoration, or even springtime to draw from.  
 
 What I heard from some ecologists in the Imperial Valley was that they were 
attempting their best to build boring-looking, least-cost ponds to keep some fish and birds 
alive.  It wasn't a grand design, and there was no hubris there, either.  It's not an 
interesting story.  The same thing goes for people in Finnish Lapland, who were 
dreaming of new livelihoods in rural, depopulating areas or ways of educating children to 
have less material values.  People were in some sense living the new ecological 
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paradigm, but in the face of long odds and difficult global challenges: trying to do their 
best.  These stories lack the heroics of modernity's order, progress, and rationality; they 
are harder to see and not as clickworthy as disaster.  They are stories which are very hard 
to produce in this media ecology.  If turned into headlines, they would read as if from the 
satirical publication The Onion in their quotidian aspirations and lack of heroic ambition.   
 
Is this a problem?  In the Anthropocene, where we are all actors now, perhaps it’s 
a relief to be liberated from these big heroic narratives of progress; we can have and be 
smaller heroes.  Still, Sovacool and Brossman (2013) analyze visions for new energy 
technologies such as automobiles, hydroelectric dams, and nuclear reactors, finding that 
the optimistic fantasies around their widespread use had some commonalities.  They were 
positive, and responded to some challenge facing society; motivating "people to become 
enrolled in the fantasy together"; they were flexible in their open-endedness and 
vagueness; they gave people a story about how the future would be positively different 
from now (ibid.).  Today's audiences may be different readers, but it seems likely that this 
still applies — at least the people I spoke with seemed to want stories about how the 
future will be positively different.   
 
Responsibility is a part of narratives of resistance against certain ecotechnical 
imaginaries.  Part of the ETC Group’s argument against solar geoengineering involves 
shirking responsibility: "the major private sector players in geoengineering will likely be 
the same energy, chemical, forestry and agribusiness companies that bear a large 
responsibility for creating our current climate predicament – in effect, the same folks who 
	 256	
geoengineered us into this mess in the first place" (ETC, 2010).  Similarly, with regards 
to negative emissions, Actionaid argues that "the “net-zero emissions” approach shift the 
climate burden onto southern countries who have done the least to cause it (Anderson and 
Stone, 2015).  In short, negative emissions are seen as an avoidance of responsibility in 
the global north resulting in transference of burden, and the responsible, selectable future 
has to do with food security. 
 
These are important responsibilities to bring up, and elucidating historical 
responsibility is an important part of environmental justice.  But what of stories of how 
the future can be positively different?  One way to include responsibility in these stories 
is to bring up the forward-looking dimension, which is coupled with agency.  This is 
discussed in some narratives of land-based negative emissions technologies, such as soil 
carbon sequestration’s restorative dimension where growers can take agency in climate-
smart agriculture, or in plans for restoring the Salton Sea. 
 
 A final point on new conceptions of Anthropocene responsibility: it is not just the 
text with its content, setting, and actors in these responsibility stories that will be 
important, but the forms in which they are told.  Ulrike Felt, for example, writes about the 
narrative of Austria as being free from GMOs as an "imaginary of the absent"; an 
imaginary that entered the "repertoire of the possible" through successful rehearsals in 
varying forms, from storytelling to mapmaking (2015).  She writes that "this imaginary 
was the outcome of a gradual, long-term, bottom-up formation, always in need of 
rehearsal and (re)stabilization" (2015: 119).  Haraway writes that stories strengthen 
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response-abilities: "The details link actual beings to actual responsibilities. … Each time 
a story helps me remember what I thought I knew, or introduces me to new knowledge, a 
muscle critical for caring about flourishing gets some aerobic exercise.  Such exercise 
enhances collective thinking and movement in complexity" (2016: 29).   
   
 
3.  The multiple functions of ecotechnical imaginaries  
 
 The third key observation throughout these chapters is that these ecotechnical 
imaginaries are serving purposes other than their stated purpose.  Part of the storytelling 
work that can be done around these imaginaries is not just in shaping them as if they were 
going to exist, but for these other ends.  This becomes a bit clearer when we look at the 
specifics, as all these imaginaries have alternative purposes.  The instances actually differ 
quite a bit. 
 
 In the case of negative emissions, I refer to an excellent piece by Oliver Geden, 
where he discusses the work climate targets do.  "A decision on a certain climate target is 
presented and perceived as an act of deliberate choice between different possible end 
states, to be accompanied by assessments of proper sub-targets and instruments and 
followed up with the deployment of appropriate measures," he explains, clarifying that 
"Policymakers do not specialize in solving problems but merely in dealing with them. 
They view talk, decisions, and actions as independent organizational products, and do not 
see decisions as necessarily requiring appropriate action" (2016).  The goals of 2°C or 
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1.5°C are products of the work of the policymakers doing their jobs, and also generate 
jobs for modelers.  With Paris, though, the goals are not top-down mandates for what's 
environmentally desirable, but bottom-up goals for what's politically feasible, and "the 
only way to alleviate the inherent contradiction between top-down and bottom-up is to 
create a narrative in which voluntary bottom-up actions are able to deliver top-down 
climate stabilization targets” (ibid.). This narrative hinges on the innovation of negative 
emissions into carbon budgets in the IPCC's AR5, which makes it possible to mask the 
growing inconsistencies between political talk and action (ibid.). 
 
At the same time, the Paris Agreement doesn't refer to negative emissions, 
because it is known that the amount of CDR needed to meet the temperature targets is 
unfeasible due to land competition and other issues — i.e. the issues in scaling up NETs 
discussed in chapters one and four in this dissertation are tacitly apprehended to some 
degree.  But if NETs were magical thinking, and policymakers knew it, then why set 
these temperature targets so low?  Geden identifies four other functions of these targets: 
"(1) creating legitimacy for policymakers and the negotiation process; (2) claiming 
responsibility for saving the planet; (3) mobilizing short-term action within the 
negotiation process; and (4) creating a potential benchmark for loss and damage claims."  
Crucially, he observes, target implementation is not necessary for the targets to fulfill 
these functions (ibid).  Negative emissions are an innovation in calculation that 
accomplishes these other functions: it doesn't mean that they will actually come to pass.  
The tricky thing is that now that NETs exist in calculations, they may in fact be taken at 
face value as a selectable option.  As Beck and Mahoney ask, “does the significant 
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presence of BECCS in RCP2.6, and the political significance of RCP2.6, make a 
BECCS-inflected future more likely?”  They argue that the IPCC should take 
responsibility for a future-making role, and do work in solution-oriented assessment, as 
one way to facilitate policy alternatives (2017). 	
It is hard to know if NETs and BECCS are impossible or inevitable.  Van Lente 
notes that "one of the striking things about technological futures is that they often appear 
in the imperative mode.  That is, once defined as promise, action is required" (2000: 43).  
Negative emissions certainly appear in the imperative mode, but because of the 
aforementioned challenges as well as lack of a profit rationale, action will probably be 
forestalled.  The imperative is not as strong as the inertia in this case.  At the same time, 
this technology would be incredibly useful if done in a socially just way, which is part of 
why I have bothered to write about its feasibility in chapters one and four.  I believe that 
examining the social aspects of carbon practices on a landscape level can provide a dual 
function of disrupting the alternative work that negative emissions does as masking 
political action and imagining what a better version of NETs could look like. 
  
 What work do these other ecotechnical imaginaries do?  In the case of blue 
growth / the ocean economy, the state motivations are covered in chapter two: the 
objectives of the imaginary vary from geostrategic to economic, but one key aim is to 
garner investment in blue biotech as well as other sectors (including offshore fossil fuel 
extraction). The arguments for the blue economy, as calculated in the United States, 
collect the importance of all these sectors as a unified unit.  In Mauritius, the idea of blue 
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growth is important to identity as not just a small island state but a “large ocean state”; in 
China, the ocean economy involves sovereignty as well as claiming territory.  The 
calculations work to support some grand ideas, in theory — it is an empirical question 
how many people are paying attention to blue economy calculations, and how far the 
associated ideas travel. 
 
In the case of solar geoengineering, which is frequently met with allegations of 
being a way to avoid responsibility and allow continued fossil fuel pollution, I believe its 
few advocates genuinely believe that it could be one way of averting a climate 
emergency.  They do not see the climate system as controllable; they know it doesn’t 
have a “thermostat.”  Solar geoengineering still seems worth researching given the 
alternate scenarios.  But one alternative end it could serve is haunting the climate policy 
discussion.  Some social science evidence suggests that it galvanizes action for mitigation 
for some groups (Corner and Pidgeon, 2014), concern about climate risks (Kahan et al, 
2015), or, for political conservatives in the UK, actually increases trust in climate science 
(Fairbrother, 2016). 
 
 In the case of the Salton Sea, I believe that the state has come up with smaller, 
sustainable sea and the habitat creation projects because it legally had to do something — 
the Imperial Irrigation District delivered a significant threat to pull out of the water 
transfer if the state did not act.  Performance of small actions is necessary to maintain 
legitimacy.  However, the citizen-led development of alternative ecotechnical, 
engineering-heavy imaginaries, is interesting as it seems to be an exception to the norm.  
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Why would people here articulate different ecotechnical futures?  Part of it may be 
desperation: they have nothing left to lose; property owners can't afford to go elsewhere.  
Part of it may be that the state has defined responsibility and a contractual obligation, and 
the state is part of the people, so there is both a clear mandate and a means of 
participating.  Part of it also may be the advent and penetration of the Internet, which 
makes it much easier for citizens from geographically disparate communities all around 
the sea to document and discuss the sea’s decline.  Communication about the sea is 
serving a communal function for some people, who have made it their daily work and 
passion. 
 
 
The future of future studies 
 
 An overarching idea in this dissertation is that social science can do much more to 
address how people do and can make environmental futures.  The study of how futures 
are made falls into a disciplinary void.  The chapters of this dissertation aim to fill the gap 
in small ways, but they are drops into a vast field.  To further understand why this is the 
case, I turn to Appadurai's discussion of the “anthropology of the future”, which he 
imagines would examine things that shape the "future as a cultural fact": imagination, 
anticipation, and aspiration (2013). Appadurai explains that anthropology's core concepts 
such as culture, diversity, and custom pull scholars towards concerns like persistence, 
stability and fixity in various societies; culture has been viewed as a matter of pastness 
while development is seen in terms of the future.  "This opposition is an artifact of our 
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definitions and has been crippling," he observes, explaining that economics has become 
the science of the future, "and when human beings are seen as having a future, the 
keywords such as wants, needs, expectations, calculations have become hardwired into 
the discourse of economics.  In a word, the cultural actor is a person of and from the past, 
and the economic actor a person of the future" (2013: 180).  Sociology, he argues, took as 
its central problem the shift of societies of sentiment to societies of contract; 
anthropology chose to look at societies of the past and societies that remained outside of 
Western modernity (2013: 285).  This left the systematic study of future-making to other 
fields: neoclassical economics and its derivative policy fields like decision analysis or 
operations research; environment sciences and planning; disaster management; and when 
it comes to the material environment, design and architecture (2013: 286).   
 
 Rational choice is an artifact of how the future has been disciplined by this 
disciplinary hegemony.  Stirling, writing about energy sustainability, discusses how 
politics has been conceived as a process of "rational choice" by these disciplines, the 
effect being that much social science work on energy has drawn upon these rational 
choice framings towards "tranquil, neatly segregated and formally orchestrated 
procedures of 'polycentric governance' – for instance in ‘global assessments’ with narrow 
topical remits driven primarily by experts," where qualitative form merely reflects the 
closure committed in quantitative expert analysis (2014).  The same processes can be 
seen in environmental future-making more broadly.  However, as Appadurai emphasizes, 
imagination is not a professional or expert capacity, but a "vital resource in all social 
processes and projects, and needs to be seen as a quotidian energy, not visible only in 
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dreams, fantasies, and sequestered moments of euphoria and creativity" (2013: 287).  
Imagination is a workday thing, as is the capacity to aspire; the future must be 
deprofessionalized terrain.    
 
 What is needed, then, is not just a sociology or anthropology of the future, but an 
interdisciplinary field of future studies where these can be not competitors to rational-
choice ways of seeing, but in conversation.  I'm also quite sympathetic to Thomas's call 
for a parallel "futurology from below", including case studies, deliberative processes, and 
fieldwork "from below" for a people's assessment of new technologies (2015); in my 
view, this would go beyond assessment to involvement in development of new 
technologies.  Fields such as political ecology and science and technology studies have 
already done the work of explaining how (eco)sociotechnical orders are constructed: as 
Appadurai notes, social construction of the future is by now too well established to need 
belaboring; but he comments that “the corollary that other worlds are always there for the 
making is less well understood and still less acted upon” (2013: 339).  I hope that this 
dissertation has shown some glimmers of other worlds there for the making, and am 
grateful to everyone who shared their fragments of alternative futures with me: from the 
man who served me a test dish of reindeer casserole as part of a plan to introduce Lappish 
schoolchildren to local, sustainable meat, to the farmer who took me to a restored marsh 
habitat he had built at the shores of the Salton Sea.  The future is not empty; it is 
populated with other humans and nonhumans.   
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The conclusions here could read as grim: many of these chapters have showcased 
severe obstacles to citizens having more agency in shaping environmental futures.  It 
seems impossible, or at least a conundrum with a yet-unresolved solution, to reconcile a 
global imaginary like solar geoengineering with ideas about citizen participation in 
research and design.  It seems unlikely that citizens near the Salton Sea will see a full 
restoration or maintenance of the sea in the near-term; many of these imaginaries, like 
negative emissions or ocean cultivation, seem technically feasible but sociopolitcally 
very distant in time.  Part of environmental justice, though, is recognitive — recognizing 
and grappling with failures of responsibility, action, and judgment.  It seems impossible 
to move forward without going through this process, and while taking responsibility can 
seem like (and legitimately be) a burden, it is also part of the way to agency.   
 
Loving our monsters, tending unruly gardens, and doing our best with continued 
struggles is the only way to reclaim agency.  The willingness of people to love something 
as monstrous as the Salton Sea, care for its marshland habitats, and show up at meetings 
with power-points full of alternative plans is a testament to how continued responsibility-
taking can mount a response to inaction.  While this dissertation has been replete with 
big-picture concepts and grand coming-of-age, restoration, or responsibility narratives, it 
is also the everyday actions of ordinary people which are interesting and additive in terms 
of creating greater agency for environment-shaping in the Anthropocene. 
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Appendix A.  Respondent key 
 
Respondents in California — Chapters 3 and 4 
 
C1 Community organizer 
C2 Community advocate 
C3 Farmer 
C4 Entrepreneur 
C5 Farmer 
C6 Architect 
C7 Official 
C8 Developer 
C9 Businessperson 
C10 Community advocate 
C10 Environmental official 
C12 Academic scientist 
C13 Community advocate 
C14 Environmental advocate 
C15 Community advocate 
C16 Official 
C17 Official 
C18 Farmer 
C19 Entrepreneur 
C20 Agricultural specialist 
C21 Community member 
C22 Activist 
C23 Community advocate 
C24 Official (national) 
C25 Agricultural executive 
C26 Researcher 
C27 Former teacher 
C28 Scientist 
C29 Activist 
C30 Facilitator 
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Respondents in Finnish Lapland — Chapter 5 
 
F1 Political scientist 
F2 Social researcher 
F3 Agricultural scientist 
F4 Forest expert 
F5 Environmental policy expert 
F6 Expert in winter testing for automotive industry 
F7 Tourism entrepreneur 
F8 Politician 
F9 Regional planner 
F10 Tourism researcher 
F11 Engineer 
F12 Educator 
F13 Politician 
F14 Environmentalist from the northern part of Finland who knows reindeer in the Arctic 
area 
F15 Politician working on youth issues 
F16 Gender studies expert 
F17 Tourism security expert 
F18 Cultural worker 
F19 Artist 
F20 Wildlife expert 
F21 Entrepreneur and business leader 
F22 Reindeer expert 
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Appendix B.  Interview Guides 
 
 
Interview guide 
 
California's Imperial and Coachella Valleys in 2050:  
The future of the land, agriculture, and new technologies 
 
 
 
Preliminary Questions:  I would like to begin with some background questions about your 
community and your views on the future of the environment here. 
 
1.  How long have you lived here?  What is your role in this community? 
   
[What products do you grow, and how?] 
 
 
2.  Describe the region in which you live.  How has it changed over time? 
 
[How has production changed over time?] 
 
 
[Has the recent drought impacted your community?  Your work?  Your life?  In what 
ways?] 
 
 
3.  In 30 years, what do you think the environment of this valley looks like? 
 
[ How do you think climate change will affect this area?] 
 
4.  What are your main concerns about the environment in the future?   
 
5.  Which of these concerns is the most important to you, and why? 
 
6.  What, if anything, do you think should be done about climate change?  By whom?   
 
7.  How do you plan to cope with projected climate changes? 
 
8.  What do you think is the future of agriculture in this valley? 
 
 
Salton Sea Questions:  In this second part of the interview, I’d like to hear your thoughts 
on the Salton Sea. 
 
9.  How concerned are you about the situation at the Salton Sea? 
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[Do you expect the shrinking of Salton Sea to personally affect you in the future?] 
 
10.  What do you think the best option for the Salton Sea is? 
 
11.  Have you seen this option discussed?  If not, why not? 
 
12.  Whose responsibility do you think it is to do something about the Salton Sea? 
 
13.  Why do you think the people responsible have been so slow to act? 
 
14.  Has this experience changed your opinion about our ability to solve environmental 
challenges, such as climate change? 
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Interview Guide 
 
Climate intervention in the Arctic: 
Integrating public engagement and climate model simulations 
  
  
Background questions about your community and your views on climate change: 
  
1.  How long have you lived here?  What is your role in this community? 
  
2.  How has the environment in this community changed over time? 
  
3.  How do you identify with the Arctic?  Are you an Arctic resident? 
  
4.  How do you think climate change will affect the Arctic? 
  
5.  What are your main concerns about climate change?  Which is most important to you? 
  
6.  What, if anything, do you think should be done about climate change?  By whom?  
  
Climate intervention questions:   
  
7.   Have you come across the topic of climate intervention, climate engineering, or 
geoengineering before?   
If yes: 
  
7a)  Where have you heard about it? 
7b)  What do you think about it so far? 
  
Even though you may have heard of climate intervention before, because many people 
might be unfamiliar with it, I’m going to back up and give a brief description about the 
type of climate intervention that I’d like to discuss today.  This is so that everyone has the 
same information about it.  
 
Some scientists have proposed using strategies to alter the climate on purpose, to counter 
climate change.  They call these techniques “climate interventions.” One type of 
intervention involves reducing the amount of sunlight that comes to the surface of the 
earth, so that the planet’s surface is cooler.  This is called “albedo modification".  Other 
terms for it include "solar geoengineering" or "climate engineering".  One example of 
albedo modification is injecting particles into the upper atmosphere using specially 
designed aircraft.  These particles would block a small fraction of incoming 
sunlight.  This would need to be done for several decades, perhaps indefinitely.  Another 
example is using ships to create clouds at sea that would reflect incoming 
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sunlight.  Today, we’re going to focus on stratospheric particles.  You can see this 
concept depicted in Figure 1. 
Scientists researching these techniques have found that there is no substitute to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions.  All these climate interventions involve different types of 
risks.  However, some scientists recommend increasing research into these techniques in 
case they might be helpful in the future. 
 
I am not an advocate for or against these technologies.  I am interested in learning what 
other people think about them. 
  
8.  What are your initial thoughts about climate intervention? 
  
9.  Do you think scientists should be researching climate intervention? 
  
10.  What are your main concerns about climate intervention? 
  
11.  Do you think climate intervention could change your community?  If so, how? 
  
12.  How do you think citizens in the Arctic will feel about climate intervention?  How do 
you think decision-makers in the Arctic will feel about climate intervention? 
  
13.  How should decisions about climate intervention be made?  
  
 
Figure 1. 
 
